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Preface
From time to time, Latin American countries experience growth spurts, like 
in th e  period 2004-05, w hen  th e  region achieved the highest biennial 
grow th rate of the  past 25 years. However, sustained grow th has been 
elusive in  the  last quarter of a century, and this elusive grow th has come 
hand-in-hand  w ith notorious econom ic and social inequalities.
Concerned by these twin failures, on September 1-2, 2005, the Economic 
Com m ission for Latin America and the  C aribbean (ECLAC) convened an 
outstanding  group of econom ists to  review the state of the  art in the  fields 
of policy and developm ent, w ith  th e  aim  of establishing the best available 
knowledge regarding how developm ent can get started and how  it can then  
evolve into a sustained trend.
Ten papers were prepared for the  sem inar and  revised for the  present 
volum e edited by ECLAC. An overview chapter, covering the m ain issues of 
grow th and equity  in the  region, opens th e  volum e. The following three 
chapters tackle the challenge of reviewing recent developm ent experiences, 
discussing the alternative in terpretations of the  sources of success stories 
and failures in both Latin America and other emerging economies.
A lthough developm ent is associated w ith  m any branches of public 
policy, econom ic and  social policies are often designed and im plem ented 
independently , w ithou t accounting  for the  com plex relationship  am ong 
them . The following two chapters exam ine th is relationship  from  the per­
spective of social policies and their po ten tia l im pact on  grow th and  
poverty. The final aim  of these chapters is to  establish how  policy makers 
and societies can adopt pro-growth social policies.
The last four chapters analyze th e  policy areas th a t were two of the m ain 
targets of W ashington Consensus reforms: respectively, finance and trade. 
The chapters covering the  form er focus on dom estic capital m arkets and 
productive investm ent, on the  one hand , and  on th e  m anagem ent of the  
capital account for a developm ent-friendly financial env ironm ent, on 
the other. The chapters covering trade concentrate on the  external environ­
m ent faced by the  countries, the  im pact of the  com position  of trade on  
the  econom ies, and  the  effects of the  diversity and stability of exports 
on aggregate econom ic growth.
The subject of this volum e and th e  topics covered have been at the  core 
of ECLAC's research and policy work th ro u g h o u t its history, as w itnessed 
by th e  significant con tribu tions m ade over the  years to  the  study of the 
determ inants of econom ic developm ent. The C om m ission has recently 
em phasized the need to put back public policies at the  center of the devel­
opm ent agenda, and  has insisted on  th e  im portance of an integrated
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approach to  social and econom ic policy issues. The objective of these 
recom m endations is to  allow th e  countries of the  region to  achieve sus­
ta ined  grow th and, at the same tim e, to  be able to  d istribute m ore 
equitably the resulting benefits of this process.
This volum e, w hich constitu tes a co n tinua tion  of ECLAC's line of 
thought, has been produced in the context of growing concern and interest 
on  the  inequality  prevailing in  Latin American societies. Economies w ith  
average per-capita GDP of about one-fifth th a t of developed countries m ust 
tackle the challenge of equitable growth, since this appears to  be a requisite 
for reducing the  developm ent gap w ith richer econom ies. The purpose of 
the  set of papers in  th is volum e on  grow th-w ith-equity  is to  contribu te  to  
the debate and action in th a t direction.
We appreciate the contributions of all the  authors of the  chapters in this 
book, as well as the  revisions of the drafts presented in  the  Septem ber 
sem inar, and th e  efforts m ade to  incorporate the  com m ents received 
during and after th a t event. N aturally, all authors are fully responsible 
for the  co n ten t of their respective chapters, w hich do n o t necessarily 
represent the  p o in t of view of any of the  institu tions represented in  th is 
volume.
We acknowledge the valuable contributions of the discussants and chair­
persons tha t participated in the seminar. The group includes Nancy Birdsall 
(President, C enter for Global D evelopm ent, W ashington, DC), Roberto 
Bouzas (Professor, U niversidad de San Andrés, Buenos Aires), Vittorio 
Corbo (President, Central Bank of Chile), Robert Devlin (Integration, Trade 
& Hem ispheric Affairs Division, IDB), Fábio Eber (Professor, In stitu to  de 
Economía, Federal University of Río de Janeiro, Brazil), Joao Carlos Ferraz 
(Director, Production Productivity and M anagem ent Division, ECLAC), 
Alejandro Foxley (M inister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, form er Senator), 
Daniel H eym ann (Expert, ECLAC Buenos Aires Office), Jorge Katz (Professor 
of Economics, U niversity of Chile; form er D irector of the  Production Pro­
ductivity and M anagem ent Division, ECLAC), Claudio Loser (Interamerican 
Dialogue, W ashington, DC), M anuel Marfán (Member of the Board, Central 
Bank of Chile), Juan A ntonio Morales (President, Central Bank of Bolivia), 
Guillerm o Perry (Chief Econom ist for Latin America and the  Caribbean, 
World Bank), Joseph Ramos (Dean, School of Economics, University of Chile), 
Andrés Solimano (Regional Adviser, ECLAC), Augusto de la Torre (Regional 
Adviser on Finance, World Bank), Andras Uthoff (Chief, Social Division, 
ECLAC), Dorotea W erneck (former M inister of Industry and Trade and of 
Labor of Brazil), Roberto Zahler (Former President, Central Bank of Chile).
Rodrigo Heresi, Rafael López-M onti and Miguel Torres assisted in  the 
revision of drafts. Lenka Arriagada and Marcela Osses worked efficiently in 
the  presentation and form atting of files.
The sem inar and the publication of this book were m ade possible by the 
generous con tribu tions of the  Ford Foundation  and the  G erm an Federal
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M inistry for Economic Cooperation and D evelopm ent (BMZ). The funds of 
the  latter in stitu tion  are m anaged by the  "D eutsche Gesellschaft für 
Technische Zusam m enarbeit" (GTZ).
Ricardo Ffrench-Davis 
Senior Advisor
Economic Com m ission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
José Luis Machinea 
Executive Secretary
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1Growth and Equity: In Search of the 
"Empty Box"
José Luis M achinea an d  O svaldo  L. K a ce f
Introduction
Nearly a decade and  a half ago, th e  renow ned ECLAC econom ist 
Fernando Fajnzylber had a sim ple bu t p rofound idea. He constructed a 
double-entry table for use in  categorizing the countries of Latin America 
according to their perform ance in term s of incom e concen tration  and 
grow th rates (Fajnzylber, 1992). W hen it was com pleted, only one of 
the  four boxes in th a t table rem ained em pty, and th a t was th e  one th a t 
com bined high grow th w ith low levels of inequality. Hence the  idea 
of the  "em pty box" as a m etaphor for the  region 's shortcom ings in 
th is  respect, w hich con tinue to  pose a challenge for analysts and policy­
makers.
Fajnzylber's keen eye detected several traits of Latin American societies 
tha t he associated w ith their com paratively poor performance: the region's 
con tribu tion  to  gross world product (GWP) was less th an  its share of 
world population , and  its share of industrial ou tp u t was even smaller. 
M oreover, if we were to  disaggregate th is last variable further, we would 
find th a t th e  region's shares of the  world totals for capital-goods produc­
tion , engineers and scientists, and  the  resources m ade available to  them  
are, in decreasing order, smaller still.
The region's developm ent has been m arked by low rates of technical 
progress, by low levels of value added to  its natu ral resources and  by the 
use of im ported technologies, all of w hich reflects a reliance on  im itation  
rather th an  original though t. Thus, the significance of th is em pty box 
canno t be fully understood  w ithou t reference to  the  region 's inability to 
open w hat Fajnzylber referred to  as the  "black box" of technical progress. 
This inability stems, in its turn, from  the  history of the continent and from 
the  individual and institu tional m entalities and behavioral patterns gradu­
ally formed through centuries of conquest and colonization. The result was 
a legacy of highly concentrated  assets, societies bu ilt on  a caste structure, 
and States tha t were strong on ensuring the m aintenance of such a scheme,
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but weak when it came to providing public goods such as health , education 
or a stable, impartial legal system.
The region's deficits in term s of growth and equality cannot be explained 
w ithou t reference to  their historical roots. The bureaucratic structure of 
the colonial governm ent, designed to  extract taxes and deliver them  to the 
Crown, was succeeded by the predom inance of European elites and their 
descendants, w ho accum ulated real assets, access to education and control 
of public adm inistra tion . C om paring the developm ent of Latin America 
and the  Caribbean in colonial tim es w ith the early European settlem ents 
on the  east coast of N orth America, Engerm ann and Sokoloff (2002) 
showed tha t the  latter's factor endow m ents encouraged the  establishm ent 
of a p roduction  system based on  small-scale family farms th a t had little  
access to econom ies of scale.
Thus, the societies of th e  N orth, w ith their less unequal d istribu tion  of 
w ealth (especially in term s of land, political rights and public education), 
developed m uch faster than  the more polarized societies of the South. This 
was partly because, under conditions of extrem e inequality, elites will tend 
to  be m ore reluctan t to  share political rights, w hich can be used to  re­
d istribute pow er and to  open up  access to  econom ic opportun ities and 
basic education for the m ajority. The reason for this lies in the  pow er of 
knowledge as a source of political m obilization, together w ith the fact tha t 
the  burden of providing the  requisite financing necessarily falls on the 
wealthier sectors of society.
The region's recent h istory  has exacerbated its chronic difficulty in  sus­
ta in ing  a grow th process whose benefits are shared more fairly. In fact, over 
the  past 25 years th e  region 's pace of grow th has been slow and  volatile,
Figure 1.1 GDP per capita and poverty in Latin America, 1980-2004
GDP per capita (in US dollars at 2000 prices)
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and  incom e d istribu tion  has w orsened.1 As a result, poverty levels in  the  
region have increased b o th  in absolute term s and as a percentage of the  
total population (see Figure 1.1).
The rapid econom ic liberalization process th a t took place in  the early 
1990s w ith in  a contex t of appreciating real exchange rates m ade foreign 
capital goods cheaper relative to  local labor. This, in tu rn , provided an 
incentive for the  adop tion  of technologies th a t m ade in tensive use of 
capital goods and  im ported inputs. M eanwhile, increased foreign direct 
investm ent brought w ith it new  forms of work organization and m ore 
advanced product and process technologies. The com bination  of these 
factors caused businesses' hum an resource structures to shift towards more 
highly skilled labor. At around this same time, the  dism antling of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers heightened com petition  betw een dom estic goods 
and  im ported substitutes, a large part of w hich came from countries w ith 
an abundant endow m ent of unskilled, low-paid labor.
This had the  effect of sharply increasing the  p roduction  structure 's 
heterogeneity and gave rise to the  form ation of a "three-speed" model. The 
first com ponent of th a t model was m ade up of large capital-intensive firms 
using state-of-the-art technologies. The second com prised small and 
medium-sized labor-intensive enterprises th a t were losing their linkages as 
suppliers to the  first group and as producers of consum er goods due to  
rising com petition from imports. These firms had also serious difficulties in 
gaining access to capital and credit markets. The th ird  and last com ponent 
was com posed of a growing num ber of inform al m icroenterpriises, w hich 
were, to  a great extent, one of the  m any m anifestations of th e  countries' 
social fragm entation.
In a low-growth setting, econom ic reforms triggered an increase in  the 
region's unem ploym ent and inform al em ploym ent levels and w idened 
the  wage gap between high- and low-skilled workers.2 These im pacts stand 
in  sharp contrast to  th e  Eastern Asian countries' experiences in the  1960s 
and 1970s.
Apart from the two liberalization processes' different styles,3 the differen­
tiating factor between the  experiences of the  four Asian "tigers" and of the
'Per capita grow th betw een 1980 and 2005 has been rough ly  11% , and regional 
output has been twice as volatile as the global econom y and m ost o f the developing 
world (ECLAC, 2006).
2In 2000 , 54%  of labor incom e am on g the poorest 40%  of h ouseh old s and 63%  of 
their em ploym ent cam e from  the inform al sector. At the sam e tim e, whereas in 1990 
the average incom e o f an em ployed w orker in the form al sector was roughly 60%  
higher th an  that o f an in form al worker, 10 years later the difference had grow n to 
72%.
3See Agosin (2001) or Ffrench-Davis and O cam po (2001).
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Latin American countries probably has less to  do w ith unequal endow ­
m ents of o ther factors of production in the two regions (e.g., greater abun­
dance of arable land in Latin American countries) and more to  do, as W ood 
(1997) argues, w ith th e  fact th a t large-scale exporters from low-incom e 
countries were en tering  world m arkets just w hen  the  Latin America 
econom ies were being opened up.
As W ood poin ts out, 50 percent of the  w orld 's population , m uch of it 
unskilled labor, lives in just five low-income Asian countries: China, India, 
Pakistan, Indonesia and Bangladesh. Their com petition  w ith m iddle- 
incom e Latin American countries on world markets altered the com petitive 
position  of the  la tter (whose ratio  betw een low- and high-skilled labor is 
above the  world average bu t below th a t of the new  Asian exporters), 
skewing their com parative advantages towards the production  of goods of 
interm ediate skill intensity.
Thus, the region’s liberalization process of the late 1980s and early 1990s 
led to  a con traction  of bo th  the  m ost skill-intensive sectors (as a result of 
com petitive pressure from developed-country products) and the least skill­
intensive production  sectors (which had to  com pete w ith  products from 
low-income countries). The net result was an increase in the  skill prem ium  
(and in unem ploym ent).
Moreover, draw ing on  some of the  argum ents m ade by Rodrik (1997) in 
his analysis of globalization 's im pact on  developed econom ies, it can be 
argued th a t greater econom ic in tegration  per se increased the  elasticity of 
the  labor-dem and function. Growing econom ic in tegration  also exposed 
less-skilled workers to  m ore direct com petition  from products m ade by 
their counterparts in countries w ith a similar per capita incom e or develop­
m ent level, thereby making it m uch harder for them  to defend earlier social 
conquests or to sustain their wage levels.
In sum, in view of the  fact th a t Fajnzylber's box rem ains em pty today, in 
this analysis we in tend , first, to  explore the  feasibility of filling th a t box 
in  Latin American developing countries and, second, consider how  we 
m ight go about doing so. In the  next section we will look at the interaction 
between equity and growth, before going on to analyse the lessons tha t can 
be learned from  o ther experiences in th is area. We th en  discuss a num ber 
of econom ic policy options th a t we believe could help  the  region to  grow 
m ore and distribute the benefits of tha t grow th better.
Equity and growth: Antagonistic or complementary processes?
From the  very outset, th e  concepts of equity  and grow th have had a com ­
plex and changing relationsh ip  w ith in  econom ic developm ent theory. 
In the  post-war period, w hen econom ists began to  th in k  about ways to 
increase per capita GDP in less developed econom ies on a systematic basis, 
greater inequality  seemed to be an alm ost inevitable by-product of growth.
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A classic exposition of this idea can be found in  A rthur Lewis' m odel of 
econom ic developm ent w ith unlim ited supplies of labor (Lewis, 1954).
In econom ies w here the popu lation  is so large relative to  capital and 
natural resource stocks th a t in  som e sectors th e  m arginal productiv ity  of 
labor is negligible or nil, increasing inequality  is an outcom e of the model 
and a constituent elem ent of the developm ent process. Most of the benefits 
reaped by the m odern  sector are channelled  in to  saving, and all saving is 
invested in reproductive capital. D evelopm ent is viewed as consisting of a 
shift in  proportions between the m odern sector, w hich is necessarily more 
unequal, and the traditional sector, w hich is m ore equitable bu t technolog­
ically stagnant. Inequality, in  th is view, is sim ply the  price to be paid for 
m odernization.
This pa ttern  of grow th w ith  increasing inequality  reaches a tu rn ing  
point, however, w hen the  source of surplus labor is exhausted. W hen this 
occurs, wages will start to rise and growth will begin to  become more equi­
table.4 5 This succession of phases was consistent w ith one of developm ent 
theory 's m ost popular and controversial empirical regularities, nam ely the 
Kuznets curve (Kuznets, 1955). Nowadays, em pirical research tends to m is­
trust the  idea of a universal law th a t determ ines the path  to  be followed in 
all cases, given the  diversity of factor endow m ents, ow nership structures, 
historical backgrounds and econom ic policy experim ents tha t can be found 
in each society.6
Latin America emerged from the 1980s w ith a per capita incom e tha t was 
10 percent lower th a n  it had been at the  start of the  decade and w ith 
47 percent more people living in poverty. The succession of external shocks 
in  the region, and the ensuing adjustm ent policies aimed at making a dual 
transfer viable,7 triggered abrupt contractions in activity levels and em ploy­
m ent. These contractions were, w ith few exceptions, followed by unstable 
recoveries and then , in some cases, un tenable  or chaotic adjustm ents 
th a t plunged a num ber of econom ies in to  hyperinflation  (Bolivia, Peru, 
Argentina).
4This b rief description  does n ot pretend to do justice to  the richness o f the original 
m odel form ulated by Lewis, nor to the literature to w hich it gave rise. Fields (2005) 
provides an  in terestin g review o f the influence o f Lewis' thesis on the an alysis of 
labor markets.
5This new phase can take quite som e tim e to  arrive if dom estic  labor supp ly  is au g­
m ented by in ternational labor as a consequence o f the increasing m obility o f goods 
or labor.
6A W orld Bank review (2005) o f the recent em pirical literature indicates that no sys­
tem atic relationship  exists betw een changes in in com e in equ ality  and per capita 
GDP growth.
7From the private sector (which was the m ain  generator o f foreign exchange in m ost 
countries o f the region) to the public sector (which held the bulk o f  external debt) 
and thence abroad. See, for exam ple, Ros (2001).
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Cuts in social spending made as part of the countries' adjustm ent policies, 
rising unem ploym ent and informality, and bouts of high inflation led to steep 
increases in inequality and poverty, which have become a more or less stable 
feature of the region. It was precisely in the late 1980s th a t Latin America 
became the focus of thought-provoking research concerning (and later a 
testing ground for) an internally coherent package of econom ic policy initia­
tives and structural reforms. These measures were intended to put an end to 
macroeconomic imbalances and to boost the countries' growth rates. The key 
com ponents of these measures -  trade and capital-account liberalization, 
labor-market reform, privatizations, and financial and fiscal reform -  were the 
m ain pillars of what came to be known as the "W ashington consensus."8
D istributive measures were conspicuously absent from the  package of 
policy recom m endations th a t emerged from the "consensus." The im plicit 
assum ption was th a t the bo ttom  sectors in  the  incom e-distribution  struc­
ture were certain to  see an im provem ent in the ir situation  as a by-product 
of the  up tu rn  in grow th and reduction in  inflation th a t th e  proposed eco­
nom ic reform s w ould bring about. This view was based on the "trickle 
dow n" theory, according to  w hich -  in a stable, growing econom y -  the  
poorest sectors were bound to benefit, sooner or later.9
The first part of the  1990s saw, for the m ost part, a recovery in econom ic 
grow th and a decline in inflation, w hich helped to lower poverty levels. 
This outcom e was supported by additional public expenditure on health  
and education, w hich was increasingly being targeted on the  poorest 
sectors of society (Morley, 1998).
Nonetheless, th e  lim itations of this approach were soon revealed. 
A lthough m ost countries saw a reduction  in poverty in  th e  1990s, there  
was no clear correlation between growth and inequality. In fact, inequality 
increased in m ost cases, as show n in Figure 1.2. As incom e distribution acts 
as a filter th a t increases or reduces the  "trickle-dow n" effect, the  more 
unequal a society is, the higher the growth rate required to reach any given 
poverty-reduction target.10
8See W illiam son (1990 and 2003), w ho shows how recom m endations m ade by inter­
n ation al organ ization s con cern in g financial open n ess w ent m uch further than  the 
"con sen su s" itself.
9The World Bank, w hich had been one o f the m ain  prom oters o f the trickle-dow n 
h ypoth esis, recently acknow ledged the lim ita tion s o f th is approach . See Perry 
e ta l. (2006).
10This poin t has been discussed in a num ber o f ECLAC, docum en ts that underscore 
the difficulty o f im proving equity and grow th in h ighly  heterogeneous societies (see 
for exam ple, ECLAC, 1990 and 2004). A ccording to a recent W orld Bank study 
(2005), in countries w ith low levels o f inequality , each percentage poin t o f grow th 
allow s a reduction  o f rough ly  four percentage poin ts in poverty, m easured as the 
num ber o f people living on less than  one dollar a day; the im pact falls to alm ost zero 
in countries with high levels o f inequality, however.
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Figure 1.2 Growth and inequality
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Partly as a reaction  to  the  poor results of th is view of grow th as a 
hom oeopathic cure of poverty and partly because of the empirical evidence 
amassed by m ore recent research, a new line of th ink ing  has been gaining 
ground w ith in  econom ic developm ent theory . This line of th o u g h t sees 
poverty and inequality as constraints on  econom ic developm ent and seeks 
to  design policies th a t will bo th  im prove the  d istribu tion  of w ealth and 
incom e and raise the  productivity of the  resources th a t are in  the  hands of 
the poor -  and hence the econom y's overall growth ra te .11
Following a line of argum ent th a t tends to  focus on ex-ante inequality  
(i.e., inequality  of opportun ities ra ther th an  of incom e), the analysis by 
Bourguignon and W alton th a t appears in  C hapter 5 of this volum e con­
tends, in keeping w ith this new line of thought, th a t equity and growth are 
com plem entary. In this view, the  m ain  challenge for the  countries in  the 
region is to fully understand how  the link between equity (defined as equal 
economic, social, and political opportunities) and the grow th process oper­
ates in those societies. These authors conclude th a t a characteristic feature 
of Latin America is the  prevalence of institu tions th a t tend  to  restrict the  
opportun ities open to low- and  m iddle-incom e groups and to  perpetuate 
the  privileges of elites and corporations. The failure to  grasp the scope
1 S tu d ie s  such as those o f Birdsali and  Szekely (2003) and Lustig et ai. (2002) are
pioneers in this line o f thought.
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of these inequalities negatively affects investm en t and innovation  and 
constitutes a factor tha t hinders econom ic growth.
Initial differences in opportunities are perpetuated down through the 
generations in a vicious circle that reproduces inequality and underm ines 
growth. Once we begin to th ink  of inequality as an obstacle to growth, the 
trade-off between purely m acroeconom ic policies and social policies dis­
appears; spending on health and education then ceases to be the nightmare of 
finance ministers concerned with balancing the budget and instead takes its 
rightful place as a core com ponent of development strategy.
An initial po in t th a t emerges naturally from this new approach concerns 
the need to  redistribute assets. The poor need to  have greater access to  edu­
cation, land, and m arkets for services such as credit and  insurance. Of 
course, these broad guidelines do no t translate into straightforward, readily 
applicable policy recom m endations, a lthough som e policy options for 
breaking this vicious cycle are discussed in  M achinea and H openhayn 
(2005) and in C hapter 6 of this volume, where Szekely analyses the specific 
case of conditional transfer programmes in Mexico.
The poor are poor because they  have incom es th a t are far below the  
average and possess little or no stock of wealth (wealth, ultim ately, is accu­
m ulated  saving, and saving is a positive function  of incom e). Of course, 
sufficient investm ent levels would enable low -incom e sectors to  increase 
the ir productiv ity  and thereby gain access to  returns th a t would im prove 
the ir living standards. However, in  addition  to  lacking sufficient collateral 
to secure the loans they would need in order to make an investm ent, lower- 
incom e sectors also face the problem  of indivisibilities.
M any investm ents require a m in im um  fixed outlay before they  can be 
im plem ented or start to  generate a positive rate of return. Moreover, a 
certain m inim um  num ber of years may have to  be invested in education in 
order to amass the necessary hum an capital to achieve an appreciable jum p 
in incom e levels. The developm ent of tailor-m ade financial institu tions to 
cater to  the  low est-incom e deciles, the  necessary regulatory adjustm ents, 
and  subsidies for purchasing m achinery and investing in  hum an  capital 
are all policy measures th a t could im prove the  situation  of the  poorest 
m em bers of society by increasing their access to  econom ic opportunities 
and m aking their resources more productive.
This kind of initiative, in tu rn , would be m ore effective if adopted in  an 
env ironm ent th a t prom otes a m ore equitable access to  p roduction  assets. 
In the  case of land, the  provision of land deeds, leases or sharecropping 
contracts would endow  small producers w ith the  collateral they  need to 
gain access to  credit and insurance markets. Because n o  insurance m arket 
exists for the  poorest sectors of society, downswings in  the business cycle 
force these sectors to  resort to  expedients th a t exact a dram atic toll in  per­
sonal terms and reduce society's overall long-term  growth rate. These meas­
ures may include selling off such farmers' meagre herds of livestock or the
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w ithdraw al of the ir children from school so th a t they  can earn an  incom e 
in the  inform al sector w hich, albeit meagre, nonetheless contributes to 
their families' subsistence.
An im portan t po in t to  bear in  m ind in  term s of poverty alleviation po­
licies, particularly w ith  respect to  extrem e poverty, is the  urgency of such 
measures. C hildren w ho are victim s of undernu trition  in the  early years of 
life no t only have a h igher m ortality  risk, bu t also tend  to  suffer from 
dim inished learning abilities, w hich negatively affect their perform ance 
as citizens and workers w hen  they  are adults. Neglect in  this area has 
irreversible consequences over time.
Growth and equity. What can we learn from certain countries’ 
success stories in recent decades?
As Rodrik points out in Chapter 2, we are witnessing the emergence of 
a new consensus on growth. The basic precept of this consensus is that policy 
outcomes depend on the context in which policy measures are applied and, 
therefore, vary from country to country. Hence, the lessons learned from 
other countries' experiences do not translate into an uncritical transposition 
of other countries' policy initiatives or institutional arrangem ents to  the 
region. Experiences cannot be copied w ithout taking account of history, social 
structure, external settings, political dynamics, and institutions, i.e., the 
specific characteristics of each country. Clearly, this approach is not a new 
one for ECLAC, the hom e of Latin American structuralism, w hich has placed 
special emphasis on this view throughout its history.
The no tion  th a t a developm ent strategy should be founded on  each 
country 's realities warns us against one-size-fits-all recipes such as those 
proposed by the  W ashington consensus and by some in ternational organi­
zations during the 1990s. Nonetheless, this should no t lead us to the oppo­
site extrem e of arguing we canno t learn from  o ther experiences. To do so 
would be to  deny the  usefulness of com parative analysis or abstract 
th o u g h t and would, therefore, be tan tam o u n t to negating the  analytical 
foundations of our profession, thus bringing us to  the  brink of a lapse in to  
nihilism  (Hausmann, etal., 2004).
As noted by Rodrik in  C hapter 2, while it is possible to  find a set of p rin ­
ciples th a t are com m on to  all successful grow th strategies, there are m any 
different ways in w hich these principles can be applied, depending on the 
characteristics of each country. Reasoning along these same lines, in 
C hapter 3 Easterly calls for hum ility  on the  part of econom ists in  in te rn a­
tional organizations or o ther centres w ho issue general policy recom m en­
dations based on proclaim ed "tru ths" tha t, as our ow n recent history 
clearly shows are by no means certain.
Econom ic developm ent is a com plex process th a t reaches far beyond 
mere quantitative changes and increases in scale. This is attested to  by the
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differing em phases tha t, over time, econom ists have placed on the  various 
determ inants of g row th .12 Today we can state th a t grow th should be 
viewed as an ongoing process of change in production  structures whereby 
sectors, product and process technologies, ways of organizing the  work 
process, and business enterprises are created, m utate, and disappear on a 
cyclical basis.
As O cam po and  Parra state in  C hapter 4, the ability to  generate new 
dynam ic activities w ith in  the  framework of th is process of structural 
change is one of the  m ain determ inants of growth. The developing world's 
difficulties in th is respect stem  from the absence of certain  m arkets (e.g., 
long-term  local-currency credit), imperfect com petition in  others, inform a­
tion  asym m etries (in credit and technology m arkets and in  investm ent 
opportunities, for example), and coordination failures. This explains why, 
in  m ost successful cases, the  State has played a decisive, or at least im por­
tan t, role in providing incentives for the  em ergence of certain  types of 
activities.
A lthough th is leaves us in a better position , w hen com pared w ith  the 
idea of the "absent State" advocated in the early 1990s, it also raises new  
questions as to  how  the State should act and w hat its capacities and lim ita­
tions are in  the Latin American and Caribbean region of today. The need to 
ensure high and equitable growth, requires State policies aimed at reducing 
the  structural heterogeneity  in  the  region -  no t because we are n o t aware 
th a t the dynam ics of grow th generates heterogeneity, bu t because we 
believe that, if th a t heterogeneity  is to  constitu te  a creative phenom enon, 
th en  it m ust no t leave roughly 50 percent of the  popu lation  on the  side­
lines of the region's m odernization process.
Economic history shows us th a t the  variability of grow th rates is largely 
caused by the shocks th a t econom ies suffer as a result of sudden fluctua­
tions in the  term s of trade, financial crises, and so fo rth .13 In C hapter 4 of 
this volum e, O cam po and Parra provide additional evidence of the im por­
tance of external shocks as an explanatory factor for success and failure in 
term s of econom ic grow th over the  past few decades. Latin America w hich 
is far from an exception to this rule, has been buffeted by num erous exter­
nal shocks over the  past 25 years. In the 1980s, these shocks took the form 
of unfavourable term s of trade and a shortage of external financing, while 
in the 1990s, the volatility of capital m ovem ents was the culprit.14
Unlike those periods, today m uch of the region is enjoying favourable 
external conditions, particularly in relation to  the term s of trade, and, to  a 
lesser extent, relatively low in ternational in terest rates and lower country-
12See, for exam ple, Easterly (2003).
13See for exam ple, Easterly e ta l. (1993).
14See for exam ple, M achinea and Lopez M onti (2005) and Ffrench-Davis (2006).
Figure 1.3 Term s of trade in  Latin  America
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risk prem ium s.15 The im provem ent in the terms of trade is partly the result 
of stronger com m odity prices, bu t it is also attributable to  lower prices for 
m any of the  m anufactured products w hich the  region im ports. It is p re­
cisely these lower prices for certain m anufactures th a t prevent the positive 
aspects of th e  process from radiating out to  th e  entire region, since some 
countries, particularly in Central America, have to com pete w ith some of 
these cheaper m anufactures and, therefore, see a deterioration in their own 
terms of trade (see Figure 1.3).
On th is point, it has been claimed, w ith  some justification, th a t special­
ization in  com m odities or com m odity-based m anufactures is unlikely to 
lead to sustained growth. The paradox represented by the  "curse" of an 
ample endow m ent of natural resources is based on the associated deteriora­
tion  of the  term s of trade caused by protectionism  in developed countries, 
the  volatility of in ternational prices and a lack of dynam ism  (slow techno­
logical progress, absence of economies of scale, and few externalities).
N onetheless, there  may be reason to be less pessim istic about some of 
these factors in the future. First of all, the emergence of China and India as 
m ajor global buyers may provide an u nderp inn ing  for th e  region's term s 
of trade th a t could keep them  well above the ir average level of th e  past 
30 years. Second, w ith few exceptions, the region has diversified its exports 
over the past few decades, thereby making it less vulnerable to real external 
shocks. Higher exports earnings, in  addition  to  the  rem ittances being 
received by various countries in  the  region, are enabling Latin America 
to  grow while at the  same tim e generating a surplus on  its balance-
15W hereas m ore favorable term s o f trade cou ld  be the result o f structural factors, as 
d iscussed  below, better in tern ation al financial con d ition s are subject to sudden  
shifts, as we know from  our experience over the past 30  years.
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of-paym ents curren t accoun t.16 This unprecedented  event in the  eco­
nom ic history of the  region is also help ing  to  reduce its external vu lner­
ability. Even assum ing th a t the  in ternational environm ent rem ains largely 
unchanged (which, of course, is by no m eans guaranteed while the im bal­
ances in  the  U nited States current account persist) and if the  developed 
world m oves to  reduce agricultural pro tection , there is still a question 
regarding the  capacity of a natural-resource-based grow th strategy in terms 
of incorporating technology and generating linkages and externalities.
This topic is addressed in  greater detail in the  next section. Nonetheless, 
a quick historical review shows th a t nations such as Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand and the  Nordic countries have m ade the  transition  from the  
extraction of rents from natural resources to the  quasi-rents generated by 
technological in n o v a tio n .17 Of course, there  are political-econom y issues 
associated w ith  this type of developm ent. Generally speaking, access to 
land has been m ore equal in  those countries th an  in  nations th a t have 
failed to  develop value chains. This has resulted in  lower poverty indices, a 
greater accum ulation of hum an capital and the early developm ent of more 
diversified domestic markets w ith greater purchasing power.
A nother im portan t factor in  the establishm ent of natural-resource-based 
value chains has been the  developm ent of national technological capaci­
ties. This type of capacity-building encom passes everything from literacy 
tra in ing  to  the delivery of a w ide-ranging supply of technological services 
and the presence of a network of universities engaging in applied research.
Can resource-rich countries in  the  region play a creative role in  im ple­
m enting a scheme of this type? Can the density of the production structure 
be increased th rough  the incorporation  of new activities or sectors based 
on natural resources? The answer, as evidenced by o ther countries, is yes; 
bu t doing so presupposes the  design of a grow th strategy in  w hich the  
State, w orking in  coord ination  w ith  the private sector, plays a m ajor role 
(Rodrik, 2004).
In m ore general terms, ECLAC has described the  region's position in  the 
in te rna tiona l econom y in term s of three models: the  m aquila model, 
w hich involves low levels of value added and technological progress; a 
resource-intensive com m odities model; and the  tourism  and financial- 
services export m odel pursued by a num ber of Caribbean countries and
16Although, in the short run, countries that receive m igrant rem ittances m ay benefit 
from the large inflows o f such funds, which in som e countries am ount to as m uch as 
15-20%  of GDP, this is an issue that warrants more careful analysis: first, because it is 
largely a sym ptom  of a lack of em ploym ent opportunities that is forcing the citizens 
o f a country  to em igrate; and, second, because it has a very sign ificant im pact on 
foreign exch an ge m arkets in the recipient countries, w hich gives rise to com plex 
problem s in term s o f com petitiveness.
I7See, for exam ple, De Ferranti e ta l.  (2002).
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Panama. None of these models plots out a certain path  towards progress in 
the  light of distributive issues or technological externalities. Be th is as 
it may, these m odels are the  pillars of th e  region 's com petitiveness, and it 
makes m ore sense to  explore possible developm ent paths based on w hat 
already exists th a n  to  return  to  th e  starting  p o in t and  conjure up com ­
pletely different growth models.
From the standpoint of equity, however, a pattern of specialization based 
on  natu ral resources does n o t seem to  hold  ou t m uch prom ise in term s of 
im proving incom e distribution, m ainly because, in m uch of the region, the 
production of com m odities tends to  be a highly concentrated activity tha t 
generates a quite  lim ited dem and for labor and few incentives for h u m an  
capital form ation. This is particularly true of trad itional agriculture and 
m ining. The rapid in tegration  of C hina and  India (which, together w ith 
Pakistan, Indonesia and Bangladesh make u p  50 percent of the  w orld 's 
population) in to  in te rna tiona l trade flows, as no ted  earlier, signals the 
emergence of an infinitely elastic supply of low-paid labor. Given this situ­
ation , in  com bination  w ith  th e  bias tow ards skill-intensive technologies 
witnessed in recent years, it is hardly surprising th a t skills-based wage gaps 
w idened during the liberalization process or th a t there  appear to  be few 
grounds for expectations of im provem ents in  incom e distribution, at least 
by way of the labor market, for the  region.
This having been said, in  principle the  higher incom es arising from  the 
region's im proved term s of trade ough t to  im ply an  increase in national 
incom e, w hich could, in theory, resolve the  issue of distribution. Lum p­
sum taxes exist only in  theory, however, so the  operational challenge for 
public policy is a particularly dem anding  one. This is especially true in 
term s of the State's ability to  generate sufficient revenues to  finance 
increased social spending aimed at building up hum an  capital in coordina­
tion  w ith productive developm ent policies -  a p o in t th a t will be discussed 
in the following section.
Towards growth with greater equity
Since the  region's poor incom e distribu tion  is also a consequence of an 
unequal d istribu tion  of real and  financial assets, we need to  th in k  about 
w hat kinds of public policies can be m ost effective in  changing the  dis­
tribu tion  of those assets (capital, knowledge and technology). As we have 
seen, inequality no t only hinders poverty reduction; it also interferes w ith 
grow th. Thus, it is no  longer a question  of viewing inequality  as the  price 
to  be paid for an increase in per capita GDP or regarding its reduction as a 
potential by-product of developm ent. Instead, it m ust be rightfully seen as 
a constraint on the growth process as such.
As ECLAC contends in a recent study (2004), if Latin America is to achieve 
sustained econom ic growth in  con junction  w ith gains in  productivity and
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equity, public policies have to  be focused on reducing the structural hetero­
geneity characteristic of its economies. This heterogeneity increased consid­
erably in the 1990s because, since the various econom ic agents were in 
widely differing positions to  face the far-reaching changes (particularly eco­
nom ic liberalization) tha t occurred during tha t period, their ability to  adapt 
to them  was also markedly unequal.
Productive developm ent strategies in the  region therefore need to  "level 
the  playing field" by elim inating  obstacles th a t have a differential effect 
on the various types of business enterprises (large firms, medium-sized and 
small formal businesses, and inform al microenterprises) tha t operate on the 
basis of clearly differing productivity dynamics. Although growth dynamics 
as such generate heterogeneity, w hen this phenom enon  reaches the  levels 
and the  "durability” seen in  the  region, it clearly is underm ining  no t only 
equity  bu t also grow th itself. Hence the  need for policies specifically 
designed to  in tegrate excluded groups in to  the  grow th process and to  
provide small and m edium -sized enterprises w ith access to  credit, tech n o ­
logy, markets, and knowledge and to  enable them  to develop linkages w ith 
the wider production structure. Such policies need to be articulated around 
three broad strategies: inclusion, m odernization , and densification of the  
production structure. This question is discussed in depth  by ECLAC (2004) 
and by M achinea and  Vera (2005). Here we will confine our discussion to 
three topics th a t we consider to  be of strategic im portance: in ternational 
trade, innovation  and financing.
The selection of these three topics is no t intended to  overlook the im por­
tance of other issues such as saving and investment, hum an capital formation, 
infrastructure or institutions -  areas in which the region displays considerable 
shortcomings, albeit of differing degrees and natures depending on the 
country. On the contrary, all of these issues are no t only of prime importance 
but are also very closely related to  the  topics that we will be talking about in 
greater depth here. Trade prom otes growth by generating new investm ent 
opportunities. The same can be said of innovation, broadly defined. It is also 
difficult to  foster investm ent in the absence of financing. By the same token, 
innovation  is contingent upon the presence of hum an resources tha t are 
capable of adopting, adapting, and creating. And all of these factors require an 
appropriate institutional framework that, of course, encompasses property 
rights, but which also embraces a great deal more.
The role of foreign trade w ith in  a productive developm ent strategy is 
intertw ined w ith a num ber of issues of strategic im portance for the region's 
econom ic performance. Let us take two examples. First, external constraints 
have always been a key and recurrent issue in  the  analysis of the region's 
countries' boom  and bust cycles, particularly for Latin American struc­
turalists and the ir in tellectual descendants. Second, on  a m ore con tem ­
porary level, the  feverish rush to  sign bilateral agreem ents attests to  the  
im portance th a t policymakers a ttach to gaining access to  industria l­
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ized m arkets and to  build ing institu tions under the  term s of those 
agreements.
Bilateral agreem ents are certainly im portan t for various reasons, one of 
the  m ost im portan t being the  generation of new m arkets, bu t in  no way 
do they  guarantee a simple solu tion  for the  com plex process of growth. 
Nor did the structural reforms of the  1990s, particularly econom ic liberal­
ization -  possibly one of the  m ost overblown (and overacted) com ponents 
of the  package of recom m endations to have emerged from the W ashington 
consensus.18
We should also bear in  m ind th a t exports may be the  solu tion  to  the 
growth problem only in very small economies where integration into world 
m arkets is enough to  ensure full em ploym ent resources. In larger eco­
nomies, growth depends, to  a great extent, on the perform ance of activities 
th a t produce goods and services for the  dom estic m arket. Thus, in  these 
econom ies, developm ent canno t be seen solely as a function of export 
activities (Ffrench-Davis, 2005).
W hile there are considerable doubts surrounding the im pact of liberaliza­
tion  o n  the grow th process, there does indeed appear to  be a positive link 
betw een exports and grow th, as dem onstrated  by M anuel R. Agosin in  
Chapter 9 of this volume. And this linkage is more influential today th an  it 
was in the  past. In o ther words, in  these tim es of globalization, a develop­
m ent strategy tha t seeks to prom ote growth in  the absence of an increase in 
exports would hardly seem to be viable. Furtherm ore, as Agosin also notes, 
it is easier to find econom ic success stories am ong countries w ith  a 
diversified export structure th an  am ong those whose exports are concen­
trated in just a few products.
The em pirical evidence also seems to  show  th a t the  m ost successful 
econom ies in term s of grow th are those th a t export high- and  inter- 
m ediate-technology m anufactures. The studies conducted by Ocampo and 
Parra (C hapter 4) and  Rodrik (2006) bo th  provide som e evidence on this 
point.
Nonetheless, a lthough an export basket concentrated  in  prim ary com ­
modities (or products based on them ) would appear to  have a less dynam ic 
effect on  growth th an  exports of manufactures, particularly high-tech ones, 
the region 's experiences show  th a t exports of m anufactures do no t neces­
sarily entail a qualitative leap to  m ore com plex, technology-intensive 
goods. Mexico and  C entral America, for exam ple, export m anufactured 
products of differing technological contents (greater in the  case of Mexico), 
bu t the ir exports do no t seem to have had a m ajor im pact in term s of 
boosting growth in those countries. This is because exporting manufactures
18Bilateral agreem ents, and particu larly  N orth -South  accords, have certain  types of 
costs that we have d iscussed  extensively  over the last two years. See, for exam ple, 
ECLAC (2004).
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does n o t necessarily have dynam ic spillover effects on th e  rest of the pro ­
duction  structure, nor does it ensure the  existence of significant exter­
nalities. In o ther words, we need to do m ore th an  sim ply export m edium - 
and high-technology m anufactures in order to boost econom ic grow th. 
A country  also needs to have the knowledge to produce such goods -  no t 
simply to assemble them  in the  final stage of the production  process -  and 
th e  capacity to generate backward linkages th a t will increase the density of 
the  production process.
As noted  earlier, som e countries have succeeded in  m oving from a p ro ­
duction structure based on natural resources to a more diversified and more 
knowledge-intensive structure. In some cases, this transition has resulted in 
exports having a greater technological content, as in the  case of the Nordic 
countries, Malaysia, and, to a lesser extent, Canada. In o ther cases, the  
export structure has con tinued  to be based on  natural resources (e.g., 
Australia and New Zealand) (see Figure 1.4). In all of these examples, 
however, it is clear th a t knowledge is being incorporated in to  the produc­
tion  process, th a t technology transfers are taking place, and th a t linkages 
w ith  other production sectors are being forged.
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The im portance of export diversification as a positive factor for economic 
grow th poses a m ajor issue for the countries of the region. The high prices 
currently  being com m anded by South America's com m odity  exports and 
th e  volum inous rem ittances being received by Mexico, C entral America, 
and  the  Caribbean countries could po ten tia lly  generate a Dutch-disease 
effect tha t could underm ine our ability to create new activities or, in partic­
ular, new  exports. W hat can be done to  prevent this? C ountries w here 
im provem ents in the terms of trade are concentrated in activities where the 
m ain producer is the  public sector have the option of w ithdrawing resources 
from those activities and  using them  to prom ote em erging ones, w hich 
may be independen t from the  original activity or related to  it (linkages of 
one type or another). In the  case of private-sector exports, the issue is more 
com plex, at least from a political econom y standpo in t. N onetheless, it 
should be rem em bered th a t the  region's first stabilization fund was for 
coffee -  a good produced entirely by the private sector.19
N onetheless, th e  possibility of increasing and diversifying exports, and 
the  im pact this can have on  the  rest of th e  p roduction  structure, do no t 
depend solely on having greater m arket access or the  m ain tenance of a 
high real exchange rate. As aptly pointed out by de Paiva Abreu in Chapter 10, 
even though these factors are im portant, and indeed necessary, a great deal 
can also be achieved through domestic policies targeting the  production 
sector. Although the constraints imposed in  this regard by the W orld Trade 
Organization (WTO) need to be taken into account, de Paiva Abreu rightly 
points out that there is still substantial m anoeuvring room  for designing 
horizontal and vertical policies to prom ote production. In particular, this 
author highlights the need for policies to  leverage and mobilize national 
innovation systems, including science and technology institutions, univer­
sities, certification institutes, business associations and private enterprises.
This brings the issue of in nova tion  to  the  fore. The im portance of in n o ­
vation  in  the  design of a grow th strategy has n o t only been increasingly 
recognized in the  econom ic literature, but has also occupied a progressively 
m ore im portan t place on the public agendas of the  region 's governm ents. 
This may be accounted for by the region's disappointing record in terms of 
factor productiv ity  grow th ,20 as well as by the w idespread perception th a t 
natural resources' very lim ited con tribu tion  to  grow th is attribu tab le to  a 
lack of innovation in th a t area.
It is also clear th a t m arket failures in th is area make some form  of State 
in terven tion  necessary. As po in ted  ou t by Katz (2005), even w here p ro ­
duction  structures are specialized in  natural resources, the  State has an 
im portan t role to  play in  help ing to  generate and expand the  available
19See Jim enez and Trom ben (2006) on  the integration of com pensation  funds.
20On this issue see Solim ano and Soto (2005).
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knowledge infrastructure in areas such as m edical technology, com puter 
sciences, biotechnology, and others.
The evidence shows th a t in the specific form  of innovation  know n as 
"creation" (i.e., local knowledge generation  th rough  R&D activities), the 
region is lagging far beh ind  o ther econom ies. As noted by M achinea and 
Vera (2005), the  region's countries no t only spend quite little on R&D, but 
w hat they  do spend is inefficient as m easured by expenditure per pa ten t 
obtained. These authors suggest th a t one likely reason for this inefficiency 
m ay be th a t th e  private sector accounts for a smaller share of to ta l R&D 
expenditure th a n  it does in  o ther m ore successful countries such as 
Canada, the Republic of Korea or New Zealand. This raises the issue of w hat 
kinds of incentives should be offered for activities whose social benefits 
exceed their private profitability.
R&D is no t the  only  type of innovation  required by developing coun­
tries, however. The pioneering work of Jorge Katz21 on Latin American 
industrialization draws a tten tion  to  the im portan t role played by the  incre­
m ental innovations needed to  adopt and adapt technologies. Thus, if inno ­
vation  is to  be in terpreted  broadly, beyond R&D activities as such, we 
m ight well ask ourselves w hether adoption and adaptation are no t equally 
or even m ore im portan t in the  initial phases of developm ent. If this is the 
case, th en  focusing exclusively on R&D expenditure w ould lead to  an 
underestim ation of the region's efforts in this area.
Arguing along sim ilar lines, M aloney and Perry (2005) show th a t several 
successful countries, w hich today have high levels of R&D expenditure, 
also w ent th rough  a stage in  w hich such expenditure was m uch lower and 
innovation  activity basically involved copying and  adapting. Over the 
years, the  incorporation  of innovations in these countries has relied m uch 
m ore heavily on  the acquisition of licenses th an  in Latin America, w here 
foreign investm ent has been a m uch m ore im portan t factor. Here again, 
the  region's weaker perform ance reflects the  low rates of technology trans­
fer associated w ith the  direct investm ent it receives (M ortim ore et al., 
2001).
Be th a t as it may, once a certain  phase of the  developm ent process has 
been reached, it w ould seem th a t sustained grow th requires an increase in 
expenditure on R&D. In view of the  levels of R&D expenditure seen in  the 
rest of the world, th e  use of the  region's scarce resources m ust be focalized 
if we expect to  be relevant players in  any activity. Nonetheless, the  ques­
tio n  rem ains as to how  to choose given sectors or activities and how  to 
design an incentive system th a t will maximize efficiency.22
zlSee, for exam ple, Katz (1986).
2zFor a discussion o f appropriate incentives, see M aloney and Perry (2005).
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Finally, the lack of sufficient financing on appropriate term s has been an 
ongoing problem  for grow th and  equity  in  the region. The following styl­
ized facts appear in virtually all the  countries' experiences:
• In term ediation  spreads are wide, and as a result of capital m arkets' lack 
of depth , financing tends to  be channelled  in to  consum ption  rather 
than  into productive ventures;
• Long-term financing denom inated in local currency is very scarce;
• External financing is generally available only to large corporations, and 
m any small and m edium -sized enterprises are, therefore, unable to 
im plem ent potentially profitable projects;
• The preponderance of dollar-denom inated financing increases the coun­
tries' vulnerability to external shocks; and
• Financing for "innovative" projects is unavailable.
As Castelar and Bonelli p o in t out in C hapter 7, a lthough the  financial 
system was one of the  sectors in w hich econom ic reform s were im ple­
m ented m ost intensively th roughou t the 1990s, these reforms contributed 
very little to  sustained grow th and even less to  th e  p rom otion  of equity. 
As outlined by Ffrench-Davis in C hapter 8, instead of streng then ing  the 
process of capital accum ulation and thereby prom oting econom ic growth, 
the  opening up of dom estic econom ies to  capital m ovem ents has been 
associated w ith increased external vulnerability  and the  emergence of suc­
cessive financial crises.
Castelar and Bonelli also show how  th e  com bination  of instability  in 
financial markets, high real in terest rates, high reserve requirem ents on 
bank  deposits, deficient analysis of debtors and insufficient p rotection for 
creditors lead to financial d isin term ediation  and  heighten  the preference 
for liquidity and for very short-term  financial assets.
This state of affairs results in  a virtual absence of long-term  financing, 
w hich generates a bias against long-term  assets and, hence, against invest­
m ent. The fact th a t the  sm allest enterprises and the  poorest citizens have 
no collateral generally blocks the ir access to  formal credit channels 
(thereby com pounding  the problem  posed by the  fact th a t an investm ent 
m ust reach a certain m inim um  threshold am ount in order for it to generate 
a positive return). The denom ination  of loans in  foreign currency increases 
borrowers' exchange-rate risk, especially for businesses whose small size 
and lack of access to technology exclude th em  from  in ternational m arkets 
and whose revenues are, therefore, exclusively in local currency. Similarly, 
the absence of insurance m arkets for poor clients forces underprivileged 
sectors to  sell off their scarce assets at a loss in the  downswings of the  busi­
ness cycle or to  suspend investm ent activities of strategic im portance, as 
hum an  capital form ation, w hich are cut short w hen parents take their chil­
dren out of school in order to put them  to work.
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A lthough our analysis has been concerned w ith  long-term  issues, before 
concluding we would like to devote a few paragraphs to  short-term  macro- 
econom ic policy. Latin America's recent perform ance has am ply reflected 
th e  high econom ic and social costs of instability  in the real sector of the 
economy. The traditional goal of m aintain ing a m acroeconom ic framework 
th a t reduces nom inal volatility (by keeping inflation low), therefore, needs 
to  be com plem ented by countercyclical policy actions aim ed at m aking 
grow th processes less volatile. These policy measures should address fiscal, 
m onetary, exchange-rate, and financial variables.
Fiscal policy m ust be designed to  cope w ith  fluctuations in  the business 
cycle. In order to  avert sharp  fluctuations bo th  in  the  provision of 
public services and in  the  real exchange rate and interest rate, the obvious 
recom m endation  is to  save resources during econom ic boom s for use 
in subsequent recessions.23 This kind of policy effort is subject to  a 
num ber of tensions and conflicts, however, including the  difficulty of 
separating ou t trend  variables from  cyclical variables in econom ic fluc­
tuations.
M onetary policy should provide for countercyclical reserve requirem ents 
and a flexible exchange rate th a t is com patible w ith the  targeted inflation 
rate and external balance. It is im portan t, however, to  avoid being overly 
am bitious in  term s of inflation targets, at least w hen inflation rates are 
already at single-digit levels, and to bear in m ind  th a t the  "inflation band" 
is designed for use in  the  event of supply shocks. It should also be rem em ­
bered th a t real volatility  is in  part a reflection of the  real exchange 
rate's excessive divergence from its m edium -term  trend, w hich has a nega­
tive im pact on trade and particularly investm ent, especially in tradable 
goods.
The difficulties involved in  reducing exchange-rate volatility  in  a region 
exposed to  powerful external shocks are n o t to  be underestim ated, bu t it 
is clear th a t an excessive appreciation (as experienced by several of the 
region 's econom ies in  the  1990s) works against the  countries' position  
w ith in  the global econom y and particularly against their export diversifica­
tion. Therefore, econom ic policymakers, and especially central bankers, 
should pursue a secondary goal of m ain ta in ing  a com petitive exchange 
rate. The tools they  could use for th is purpose could range from direct 
in terventions and deterren t actions by th e  central bank to  controls on 
short-term  capital inflows, w here appropriate.24 More active m onetary pol­
23Fiscal policies, particularly  in developin g countries, usually  tend to  be procyclical 
due to a shortage o f resources in the dow nsw ing o f the cycle or to the accum ulation  
o f pen d in g  dem ands, com po un ded  by an erroneous perception  o f  the durability  of 
fiscal strength, in the expansionary  phase. See Gavin et ah (1996).
24For a further discussion o f this issue, see ECLAC (2004), or the chapters by O cam po 
and Parra and by Ffrench-Davis in this volum e.
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icies aim ed at underp in n in g  the real exchange rate clearly need to  be 
m atched by greater fiscal discipline.
It is also clear, however, th a t the  exchange rate cannot be m aintained "at 
any cost," am ong o ther reasons because it is difficult to  define an equilib­
rium exchange rate. In addition, under certain circumstances, m aintain ing 
a given rate can fuel excessive inflationary pressures. The p o in t th a t we 
wish to  em phasize is th a t excessive fluctuations in the  real exchange rate, 
particularly sharp appreciations, have a negative effect on an  econom y's 
export-based position in external m arkets and exacerbates the real sector's 
volatility. This is w hy the real exchange rate should n o t be treated as a 
"residual" variable of econom ic policy.
Finally, financial policy should aim  to  reduce vulnerability  and ensure 
access to  credit at reasonable rates and m aturities. This, in  tu rn , calls for 
im provem ents in prudential regulation, a deepening of the financial system 
and an effort to  discourage dollarization, while also reducing currency and 
m aturity  m ism atches. In th e  m edium  term , instrum ents need to  be 
designed to help democratize access to credit.
Concluding observations
Ethical considerations and the  principle of solidarity are no t the  only 
reasons why we should strive to  reduce inequality  and poverty. There are 
also o ther powerful reasons having to  do w ith econom ic developm ent and 
a concern for harm onious coexistence am ong citizens in  dem ocratic, civi­
lized societies. The existence of vast sectors of the  popu lation  who are 
unable to  lead a decent life is n o t only m orally repugnan t bu t also paves 
the  way for political instability, racial and religious hatred, and social 
conflict.
This is a dom ain  in w hich econom ists have an  im portan t role to 
play. Ultimately, it is a m atter of carrying on a long and honourable  tra­
d ition . And we will succeed in doing so if we con tinue  to  search for 
new answers to  the  questions that, at the  daw n of m odern econom ic 
though t, Adam Sm ith asked regarding th e  origin of th e  w ealth of na tions 
and David Ricardo rose concerning the laws th a t govern its distribution.
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What Produces Economic Success?
D a n i R odrik1
In troduc tion
Some 20 years ago, it would have been relatively easy to  come up w ith an 
answer to the  question posed by this chapter's  title. Economic success, it 
was though t, could be achieved by loosening the  governm ental controls 
th a t held markets in poor countries in their grip, and by freeing up private 
econom ic activity. The strategy was clear: reduce barriers to  im ports, 
remove price controls and o ther m arket im pedim ents, bring public spend­
ing under tigh t rein, and sell off public enterprises. Such was the nature of 
the consensus around these policy solutions th a t researchers th a t came 
of age around this tim e (like me) found them selves driven to  do political 
econom y analysis rather th an  norm ative econom ic analysis. After all, it 
seemed like all the im portan t policy questions had already been answered. 
We knew w hat governm ents needed to  do; w hat was needed was to under­
stand why they failed to do it.2
Interestingly, th is policy agenda (w hich came to  be know n as the  
W ashington Consensus thanks to  John  W illiam son's infelicitous nam ing) 
was no t derived from  the actual experience of any real countries.3 It was 
partly  a negation  of the  policies in  place -  and w hich, therefore, had 
becom e associated w ith  econom ic failure. Since so m any of the coun­
tries caught up in  crisis and stagnation  em ployed im port-substitu tion
'I am  grateful to Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, Jo sé  Luis M achinea, Ja im e  Ros, and Andrés 
Solim ano for helpful com m ents. I rem ain solely responsible for errors.
2My 1996 paper "U n d erstan d in g  econ om ic policy  reform " captures that general 
m ood quite well, a ltho ugh  1 did em ph asize in that paper that the policy  choices 
m ade in actual success cases (such as those in East Asia) differed substan tially  from  
the agenda on offer at the time.
3C hile, an  early success, was often  portrayed as an  instance where policies o f  the 
W ashington C on sen sus type had paid o ff handsom ely . But the reality was quite d if­
ferent (Ffrench-Davis, 2005).
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policies, had high barriers to  trade, and ran large fiscal im balances, it 
seemed to  follow th a t the  rem oval of these would unlock their grow th 
potential. It took some stretch ing  for the  experience of East Asian coun­
tries to  fit in to  th is picture, bu t th a t too  was done. It was also partly  a 
reflection of econom ists' im plicit ideological preference for m arkets 
over governm ents. Econom ists tend  to  th in k  th a t even advanced coun­
tries would be richer if they  had  fewer governm ent controls in place. 
W hen the  crises of the  1980s created tem porary space for technocrats to  
substitu te for politicians, these predilections shaped the  reform agendas 
th a t emerged.
The past two decades have led to  considerable re th ink ing  and soul- 
searching. This is no t the  place to  revisit the dissatisfactions w ith the 
W ashington Consensus, bu t it is enough to  say th a t th ings have no t 
worked ou t as it was hoped. Given the  list of policy reforms around the  
w orld since 1980, a disinterested observer would have guessed th a t 
the  countries th a t m ost rapidly im proved the ir econom ic perform ance 
w ould have been Latin America and  Sub-Saharan Africa, in th a t order. The 
observer would hold little hope for C hina, India, or Vietnam, econom ies 
tha t still rem ained m ired in state ow nership and governm ent controls in to  
the  new  century. T hat the outcom es have been so different leaves us w ith 
an interesting  paradox: the  last quarter century  has been a great tim e for 
econom ic developm ent (as large populous countries like China, India, and 
V ietnam  have m ade im portan t strides forward), but a bad tim e for eco­
nom ic developm ent policy as conceived in Cambridge, MA, or W ashington, 
DC. Luckily for the  world, Beijing, Delhi, and  Hanoi had dom estic d rum ­
mers they listened to.
Today there are few who w ant to  take credit for the policies of the 1990s in 
Latin America. Even John Williamson, with justification, says that what ended 
up being implemented was no t quite the moderate market-oriented agenda he 
had in  m ind, bu t one th a t w ent considerably beyond (especially in the 
financial arena) in the direction of market fundam entalism . And those who 
had a hand  in running  the economies say, also w ith justification, tha t the 
reform agenda they embarked on is one th a t requires m uch deeper political 
and institutional underpinnings than  they realized at the time.
But w hat are the  real lessons of the last quarter century? W here do we go 
from here? I begin by providing an overview of the range of views that exist at 
present. These views poin t to an em ergent "consensus" tha t is significantly 
less self-assured about the ability of economists to proscribe potent treatment, 
views reform as heavily dependent on context and therefore varying from 
country to  country, and looks at institutions as the ultim ate arbiter of how 
things will go. I am in agreement with m uch of this. But I also emphasize two 
potential downsides w ith this emergent approach, which I will argue need to 
be confronted head-on. First, the idea that institutional quality is the ultimate 
determ inant of economic convergence should no t detract us from the myriad
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small things tha t countries can do -  and w hich fall far short of institutional 
change -  to get econom ic growth started. Second, the  idea th a t growth pol­
icies are context-specific does no t m ean "anything goes," or that we lack a 
universal approach to designing growth strategies. These ideas are developed 
in the penultim ate sections of the paper.
Current thinking: Where we are
T hroughout the  1990s, ECLAC has advocated a m ore structuralist, m ore 
market-skeptic agenda th a t has held quite well over tim e, and  w hich 
I th in k  points us in the  right direction as we look in to  the  future (see for 
exam ple ECLAC, 2002, 2004; Ffrench-Davis, 2005). ECLAC has always had 
a "productivist" approach to  econom ic policy -  one th a t em phasizes the 
needs of the  real econom y and of the m ore advanced sectors w ith in  it. 
It has no t been shy in  pushing for activist public policies to  facilitate eco­
nom ic restructuring. This gives ECLAC its distinctive outlook am ong in ter­
national in stitu tions.4 ECLAC has also led the  way w ith  its proposals on 
reform ing global econom ic governance -  for exam ple by calling for greater 
acceptance of national econom ic diversity and by advocating the sym m et­
ric treatm ent of labor and capital mobility.
O ther institu tions, often having played the  role of cheerleader for the 
reforms of the 1980s, and 1990s have had to  adjust the ir views. It is in ter­
esting to  see the result. Most notew orthy in th is respect is the  W orld Bank's 
recent report on "Lessons of the  1990s" (W orld Bank, 2005). This docu­
m en t is upfront about several m yths th a t need to  be cleared away before 
progress can be m ade on  grow th policies. It acknowledges th a t econom ic 
perform ance in the  1990s canno t be easily explained by th e  prevailing 
views on reform; th a t reforms th a t w ent aggressively after efficiency trian ­
gles often  overlooked large grow th rectangles; th a t financial liberalization 
was often oversold; th a t there are m any different ways to  im plem ent first- 
order principles such as openness to  trade and m acroeconom ic stability 
(other th an  im port liberalization and reduction in  governm ent spending); 
th a t successful countries were those th a t used the ir policy autonom y 
to devise creative strategies to  target the ir specific b ind ing  constrain ts to 
grow th; th a t institu tional reform  is a lo t m ore com plicated th an  simply 
substitu ting  rules for discretion; th a t pragm atic, increm ental reforms may 
dom inate  am bitious efforts; and so on. M any of these are quite radical 
ideas, at least by the  standards of the  1990s, and it is no t surprising tha t 
they  rem ain controversial w ith in  th e  W orld Bank itself. Yet, it looks from 
the  outside as if (at least som e of) the  operational staff of the  Bank are
4This tradition extends o f course all the way back to  the institution 's first leader, Raul 
Prebisch.
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genuinely  looking for ways to  tu rn  these findings in to  concrete grow th 
strategies for their clients.5
A new  report from  the  Inter-Am erican D evelopm ent Bank (2005) repre­
sents a breakthrough of a different kind. First, it takes it as a starting po in t 
th a t there are no given set of policies tha t can be relied on to  generate eco­
nom ic grow th, and th a t sim ilar policies work very differently  in  different 
settings. Hence the  m ain tained  assum ption itself is an  im portan t break 
w ith established precedent -  and shows the extent to w hich the argum ents 
th a t the  W orld Bank's (2005) aforem entioned report takes pains to  estab­
lish are already being internalized. The core of the IDB's report is an analy­
sis of the political process th rough  w hich policies get on  the  agenda, 
get adopted, and  are im plem ented. By way of analysis, we get no t cross­
country  grow th regressions, bu t choice-theoretic m odels th a t trace out 
the  incentive effects of political and institu tional arrangem ents. In this 
treatm ent, econom ic policies are entirely the  endogenous outcom e of po l­
itical equilibria. The action lies in institu tional arrangem ents and rules, not 
in policies per se. In effect, the  message to  policy makers is this: the process 
by w hich policies get determ ined is m ore im portan t th an  the  natu re  of 
the  policies them selves. So d o n 't worry about trade liberalization, say, or 
about the  size of the  deficit. W orry instead about the  nature of political/ 
institu tional arrangem ents th a t generate your trade and fiscal policies.
C ontrast all th is w ith the  line taken by the  IMF, as exhibited in a recent 
report on Latin America (Singh et al., 2005). The basic argum ent here is 
th a t Latin American countries did basically the  right things, bu t th a t their 
efforts did no t go deep enough. Using the  report's ow n words, "reforms 
were uneven  and rem ained incom plete" (p. xiv). "M ore progress was 
made," the report claims, "with measures th a t had low up-front costs, such 
as privatization, relative to  reforms th a t prom ised greater long-term  bene­
fits, such as im proving m acroeconom ic and labor m arket institu tions, and 
streng then ing  legal and judicial system s" (p. xiv). The same diagnosis is 
expressed, using less d iplom atic language, in  the  title of one of Anne 
Krueger's speeches on policy reform: "M eant well, tried little, failed m uch" 
(Krueger, 2004). Hence the  uneven and disappointing growth perform ance 
of the  region. The policy im plication of th is diagnosis is basically simple: 
do m ore of the same.
At some level, the  analyzes of the  W orld Bank, the IDB, and the IMF are 
quite similar: Latin American policy makers stopped at fixing the policies 
(and the  "easy" ones at that), whereas the  m ain problem  was getting the
5R oberto Zagha of th e  W orld Bank was th e  key ind iv idual b e h in d  th e  "Lessons of th e  
1990s" report. R icardo H au sm an n  an d  I have been  co llab o ra tin g  w ith  h im  an d  o th e r 
B ank sta ff in  an  effort to  e m p lo y  a "G ro w th  D iagnostics"  fram ew ork  to  g en era te  
ta ilo r-m ad e  program s for specific countries .
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in stitu tions right. Such analyzes exhibit an increasingly com m on habit of 
th ough t w hich we m ight call "institu tions fundam entalism ," to  relate to 
and distinguish from the earlier obsession w ith "market fundam entalism ."6 
U nfortunately, too  little effort goes typically to  trying to  understand  w hat 
"getting institu tions right" m eans in this contex t and how  one gets the 
needed institu tions up and runn ing . These questions are of course truly 
hard, and I am no t even sure th a t econom ists are the best placed to answer 
them . The IDB report referred to  earlier does a good job of drawing on the 
relevant academic literature and linking it up w ith Latin American realities.
W ith few exceptions, academics have had relatively little  engagem ent 
w ith this debate. O ne of the  exceptions is W illiam Easterly, whose survey 
for the  forthcom ing Handbook on Economic Growth tries to  come to  grips 
w ith the reality of unfulfilled reform potential (Easterly, 2004). His detailed 
work shows th a t w hat we once th o u g h t we had  -  system atic, predictable, 
robust relationships betw een policy variables on the  right hand  side of a 
regression and grow th outcom es on the  left -  was simply a mirage. Change 
your sample a bit, try a different tim e period, use an alternative estim ation 
technique, or alter the proxy for the  policy in question, and the  original 
result is likely to disappear before you can say "robustness test." Easterly's 
take from th is is in line w ith the  em ergent consensus: w hat m atters are not 
"policies" but "institutions." It is good institutions tha t make the difference 
betw een w ealth and poverty. Trying to  im plem ent good policies does no t 
buy you m uch unless you are able to pu t in  place appropriate in stitu tions 
of property right protection, rule of law, and governance.
Philippe Aghion (in work th a t is m ostly jo in t w ith Peter Howitt) takes a 
different approach (Aghion and Howitt, 2005). In his work, the key feature 
of countries th a t determ ines the suitability of different policies is their dis­
tance from the world technology frontier. The challenge for countries tha t 
are at or near the  frontier is to  innovate  -  develop new  technologies and 
products. The challenge for countries th a t are far from  the  frontier (most 
poor countries) is to  im itate -  th a t is, adopt technologies and products that 
have already been developed elsewhere. In a series of models, Aghion and 
his co-authors show that w hat works in the  former set of countries may not 
work in  the  latter. Subject a firm in the  la tter kind of country  to  greater 
com petition  from a firm in a frontier country, and the  firm will simply 
drop ou t (since it has no  hope of catching up). Policies of p ro tection  and 
regulation may therefore be appropriate -  at least for a while -  during the 
process of technological catch-up. Aghion argues th a t this kind of m odel
6I hav e  c o n tr ib u ted  to  in s titu tio n s  fu n d a m e n ta lism  w ith  R odrik et al. (2004). O ne 
serious ch a llen g e  to  in s titu tio n s  fu n d a m e n ta lism  has b een  la u n c h ed  by  G laesei 
et al. (2004) w h o  find  th e  em p irica l a p p ro ach  in  th e  in s titu tio n s-ca u se -in c o m e  
lite ra tu re  flawed an d  th in k  it is h u m a n  cap ital (and  d icta tors) th a t  cause grow th .
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has the  potential to  explain why reforms in a wide range of areas have pro­
duced disappointing results in poorer countries.
Even th is brief overview of the  recent literature shows how  far we have 
come from the early days of the  W ashington Consensus. The confidence in 
econom ists' ability to  prescribe grow th-prom oting policies has taken a 
heavy battering. "Quick fixes" (i.e., simple policy reforms and market liber­
alization) have been replaced w ith "deep fixes" (i.e., institu tional change). 
"Different strokes for different folks" has been transform ed from a heretical 
no tion  to a near-m ainstream  idea.
As useful as m uch of this correction is, it also has potentially debilitating 
side effects. Institutions are by their very nature deeply embedded in society. 
If growth indeed requires major institutional transform ation -  in the areas of 
rule of law, property rights protection, governance, and so on -  we necessarily 
need to  be pessimistic about the prospects for growth in poor countries. After 
all, such institutional change typically happens very rarely -  perhaps in the 
aftermath of war, civil wars, revolutions, and other major political upheavals. 
The cleanest cases that link institutional change to growth performance occur 
indeed at such historical junctures: consider for example the split between 
East and West Germany, or of N orth and South Korea. But, w hat are poor 
countries that do not want to go through such upheavals to do?
Second, the conclusion th a t policies work differently in  different settings 
and the  recom m endation th a t countries need to  develop their own specific 
fixes can generate undesirable consequences. They can easily tu rn  in to  
policy nihilism  ("no th ing  really works"), lack of policy discipline ("any­
th ing  goes"), or evasion of responsibility by outsiders ("they need to  work 
out their own problems").
Luckily, as I will dem onstrate in  the  rest of the  chapter, neither set of 
im plications is warranted. G rowth can be generated w ithout m ajor institu ­
tional reform, and there  are com m on diagnostic tools th a t countries can 
use to design their own, context-specific growth policies.
Igniting growth: What do the data say?
If deep and w ide-ranging institu tional change were a prerequisite for eco­
nom ic grow th, high-grow th episodes would be rare and  they  would be 
accom panied by these tum ultuous transform ations. In fact, growth acceler­
ations tend  to  be quite com m on, and they  are accom panied by significant 
institu tional changes only infrequently.
We know  th is from some work I have done w ith m y colleagues Ricardo 
H ausm ann and Lant Pritchett and reported in H ausm ann et al. (2005). We 
defined a "grow th acceleration" as an instance in w hich an econom y 
increased its grow th rate by at least 2 percentage points per annum , and 
m ain tained  high grow th for a period of at least 8 years. We excluded 
extremely small countries from the analysis (since they have highly volatile
Table 2.1 Frequency of g ro w th  episodes (%)
N um ber o f g row th episodes d iv ided  by n u m b er of d a tap o in ts  in  th a t decade a n d  region
Decade
Region
Total Episodes ObservationsAsia Africa Middle East Europe Latin America Other
1950s 11.11% 5.26% 22.22% 12.82% 3.77% 10.00% 8.78% 13 148
1960s 6.12% 3.49% 5.26% 0.76% 2.78% 6.90% 3.44% 23 668
1970s 3.36% 2.46% 6.06% 0.00% 2.81% 1.89% 2.49% 23 922
1980s 5.30% 0.56% 1.12% 2.78% 0.97% 0.00% 1.62% 16 990
1990s 3.13% 1.10% 0.00% 4.26% 5.45% 4.76% 2.96% 8 270
Total 4.90% 1.87% 4.08% 2.34% 2.53% 2.89% 2.77% 83 2,998
Episodes 18 20 10 12 17 6 83
O bservations 429 965 245 513 673 173 2,998
Source: H au sm an n  et al. (2005).
Table 2.2  A cceleration p robabilities: in co m e quartiles against decade an d  region
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Income Quartile (4 is the highest)
Decade 1 2 3 4 Total Episodes
1950s 8.33% 5.41% 10.81% 10.53% 8.78% 13
1960s 5.52% 2.94% 1.83% 3.51% 3.44% 23
1970s 3.96% 3.45% 2.63% 0.00% 2.49% 23
1980s 1.23% 1.60% 2.02% 1.60% 1.62% 16
1990s 3.03% 2.94% 2.99% 2.90% 2.96% 8
T otal 3.54% 2.77% 2.69% 2.10% 2.77% 83
Episodes 26 21 20 16 83
Source-, H au sm an n  et al. (200S).
Table 2.3 P redictability  o f g row th  accelerations
(a) All growth episodes
Percentage p ro p o rtio n  of g row th  accelerations th a t  are p receded  or acco m p an ied  by: 
E conom ic liberaliza tion  14.5
Political regim e ch an g e  49.4
External shock  27.5
Percentage p ro p o rtio n  o f occurrences o f co lu m n  variable th a t  is accom pan ied  or 
fo llow ed by g row th  accelerations:
E conom ic liberaliza tion  18.8
Political regim e ch an g e  13.9
External shock  5.2
(b) Sustained growth episodes only
Percentage p ro p o rtio n  of susta ined  g row th  accelerations th a t  are p receded  or 
acco m p an ied  by:
E conom ic liberaliza tion  18.8
Political regim e ch an g e  53.1
E xternal shock 33.3
Percentage p ro p o rtio n  o f occurrences o f co lu m n  variable th a t  is acco m p an ied  or 
follow ed by  su s ta in ed  g row th  accelerations:
E conom ic liberaliza tion  22.2
Political regim e ch an g e  8.5
External shock  2.1
Source-. H ausm ann  et al. (200S).
Notes: W e allow  for a five-year lag be tw een  a ch an g e  in  th e  u n d erly in g  d e te rm in a n t and  a 
g row th  acce lera tion . T he  tim in g  o f th e  g ro w th  acce lera tion  is th e  th re e  year w indow  cen tered  
on  th e  in itia tio n  dates.
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econom ies) and also ruled out cases of recovery from  extended crises (by 
requiring th a t the  pre-acceleration level of incom e be exceeded during the 
episode). Data lim itations m eant th a t we could search for such accelera­
tions during the  1957-92 tim e span and for 106 countries. We were sur­
prised by the  large num ber of grow th episodes th a t our filter identified: 
83 cases in  all. Summary statistics on these cases are presented in Tables 2.1 
and 2.2.
W hile m any of these grow th take-offs are well know n (e.g., China 1978, 
Argentina 1990, M auritius 1971, Korea 1962, Indonesia 1967, Brazil 1967, 
Chile 1986, Uganda 1989), m any others are not. Aside from the sheer num­
ber of accelerations, the  magnitude of the typical acceleration is also striking. 
C onditional on a growth acceleration of at least 2 percentage points, the  
average (median) acceleration was 4.7 (4.0) percentage points. In o ther 
words, in the typical episode output reached almost 40 percent higher at the 
end of the episode th an  it would have been in the  absence of an accelera­
tion . Of the 106 countries in the  sample, 60 (or 54.5 percent) have experi­
enced at least one grow th acceleration and 23 (or 20.9 percent) have 
experienced two (or more) accelerations. The average probability th a t a 
country  would experience an acceleration in  any given decade was about 
1 in  4. Moreover, accelerations were com m on in all regions of the  world. It 
is no t surprising to  learn of course th a t East Asia had the highest incidence 
of growth accelerations. But while Sub-Saharan Africa had the lowest inci­
dence, we still identified 20 instances of growth take-offs there.
N ote from Table 2.2 th a t grow th accelerations were m ost frequent in 
the  lowest incom e quartile and least frequent in the  highest quartile, in d i­
cating th a t the forces of econom ic convergence are (at least weakly) in play. 
This is largely inconsisten t w ith the  view th a t poverty traps are a dom in ­
an t feature of the  low -incom e world. The poor countries in our sample 
have, if anything, a higher probability th a t they  will experience grow th 
take-offs.
Since the institu tional indicators tha t m ost research focuses on vary very 
little over time, it is a foregone conclusion th a t they  canno t explain this 
growth pattern. To probe this issue deeper, we next asked w hether standard 
explanators could help explain these grow th take-offs. We categorized 
explanatory variables under three headings: (i) econom ic reform (captured 
by the  W acziarg-W elch [2003] index); (ii) political change (captured by a 
th ree-po in t or larger m ove in country 's Polity score); and (iii) external 
shock (captured by exceptionally favorable m ovem ents in the term s of 
trade). The question is the ex ten t to w hich  these variables are able to 
predict the  grow th take-offs in  our sample. To give them  the  m axim um  
chance to  have an effect, we allowed up to  a 5-year lag, and placed the 
grow th acceleration date in a 3-year w indow  centered on the date th a t our 
exercise had identified. The core of the exercise consists of a series of probit 
regressions, bu t Table 2.3 below summarizes the results quite well.
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Table 2.3 shows the  answers to tw o types of questions: (a) w hat p ropor­
tio n  of grow th accelerations are preceded or accom panied by changes in  
our list of determ inants; and conversely, (b) w hat p roportion  of changes 
in the  determ inants are accom panied or followed by growth accelerations. 
W ith regard to  econom ic reform, the table shows tha t only  14.5 percent of 
accelerations are associated w ith m ajor econom ic liberalization -  or, equiv­
alently, th a t 85.5 percent of grow th accelerations are no t preceded or 
accom panied by liberalizations. Moreover, fewer th an  one in five episodes 
(18.8 percent) of econom ic liberalization are followed by growth take-offs. 
W ith regard to  political changes, we find th a t around half of grow th 
accelerations are preceded by political-regim e changes. This may seem 
high, but on  the  o ther hand  only a tiny  p roportion  of political-regim e 
changes (13.9 percent) are followed by grow th accelerations. So it appears 
th a t political regim e changes result in a lot of false-positives. Finally, the 
relationship  betw een grow th accelerations and positive term s-of-trade 
shocks is quite weak. Som ew hat m ore th a n  a quarter of grow th accelera­
tions are preceded by such shocks, but only  5 percent of positive terms-of- 
trade shocks are followed by grow th accelerations.
W ould the analysis lead to different results if we were to restrict attention  
to  grow th accelerations th a t are sustained  beyond our 8-year horizon? 
W ould the  determ inants do better if we were to  focus solely on cases of sus­
tained grow th accelerations? The short answer is no. The bottom  panel of 
Table 2.3 shows the  relevant num bers. O nly 18.8 percent of sustained 
grow th episodes are preceded or accom panied by m ajor econom ic lib­
eralization, while only 22.2 percent of econom ic liberalizations are 
followed by sustained grow th take-offs. Once again, around half of all 
growth take-offs are preceded by political changes, bu t the  vast m ajority of 
political changes do no t produce econom ic boom s. The bottom  line is 
clear: grow th accelerations seem to be driven largely by idiosyncratic 
causes.
To sum up the results, far from  being a rare event, grow th take-offs (that 
last for the better part of a decade) are quite a com m on occurrence. There is 
a poor m atch betw een occurrences of grow th takeoffs and favorable exter­
nal, econom ic, or political circum stances. In particular, there is scant evi­
dence th a t m ajor institu tional reform -  of the econom ic or political kind -  
is the  sine qua non of growth take-offs.
How do we reconcile this w ith the view th a t emphasizes the centrality of 
institutions? Very simply, by distinguishing betw een w hat it takes to ignite 
grow th and w hat it takes to  sustain  grow th. The em pirical analysis 
I reported on  above deals w ith the first challenge only. It addresses the  
question  of stim ulating  grow th, and suggests strongly th a t deep-seated 
institu tional reforms are no t required. But sustaining econom ic growth is a 
som ew hat different m atter. As countries grow, they  need to  develop insti­
tu tio n a l capabilities across the  board in  order to  w ithstand  the inevitable
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shocks along the way and to  m aintain continued productive dynam ism . So 
u ltim ately  convergence does m atter on institu tions, bu t only in the  long 
term . Conversely, institu tional reform does no t guarantee growth take-offs 
because it does no t necessarily target the  im m ediate constrain ts on eco­
nom ic grow th (as I will elaborate in  the next section). So the  d istinction  
between igniting and sustaining growth -  and the  possibility th a t they may 
have different prerequisites -  has im m ense practical im plications. It sug­
gests th a t addressing the  problem  of low grow th w ith a large institu tional 
reform  agenda is n e ither necessary nor effective. This is w here 1 th in k  the 
new institu tions fundam entalism  goes wrong.
In support of this line of argum ent, note tha t the empirical literature that 
underpins institutions fundam entalism  (Acemoglu etal., 2001; Easterly and 
Levine, 2002; Hall and Jones, 1999; Rodrik et al., 2004) is all based on 
regressing income on some measure of institu tional quality. The dependent 
variable is income, no t growth. Therefore, the  appropriate interpretation of 
this literature is th a t it dem onstrates a long-term  relationship  betw een 
these two variables. Measures of institu tions enter growth regressions in 
a m uch less strong way. Their statistical and quan tita tive  significance 
depends on the sam ple of countries, tim e period considered, and the 
nature of the covariates. Therefore, the finding tha t incom e convergence is 
strongly dependent on institutions in  the long-run is no t inconsistent w ith 
the  finding th a t grow th episodes do no t correlate strongly w ith in stitu ­
tional causes.
So what are the implications for growth policies?
The preceding discussion suggests tha t the focus of growth strategies should 
differ depending on where an  econom y is in  the growth process. If the 
economy is already growing, policy makers need to focus on the institutional 
underpinnings of a m odern market econom y to ensure tha t growth does not 
run out of steam and that full convergence is achieved. This means enhancing 
the legal and judicial system, public adm inistration, regulatory, fiscal, and 
m onetary institutions, and so on; it also means deepening (or establishing) 
democratic mle and participatory politics. W ithout such reforms, growth will 
either peter out or stop in its tracks when the economy is h it w ith an external 
shock.7 But w hen the econom y is no t growing, which is the more typical 
situation, the focus has to be igniting growth in the short run. The
7T h e  in ab ility  to  re sp o n d  to  neg ativ e  ex te rn a l shocks can  be  traced  u ltim a te ly  to  
p o o r in s titu tio n s  o f co n flic t m a n a g e m e n t (Rodrik, 1999). See S o lim an o  a n d  Soto 
(2004) for a recen t analysis o f g ro w th  cycles in  L atin  A m erica, in c lu d in g  g ro w th  
crises.
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just-m entioned institutional reforms are surely good for an economy;8 but 
they will not necessarily ignite growth because they do not necessarily address 
the most binding constraints on growth. Policy makers need to engage in  a 
diagnostic process to uncover what these b inding constraints are, and target 
them  directly. In this section, I develop this last point drawing on Hausmann 
etal. (2004) and Rodrik (2004).
In a world w here technology allows advanced countries to  produce tens 
of thousands of dollars w orth  of ou tp u t per year per worker and w here 
m arkets are global, poor countries m ust rem ain poor because the ir eco­
nom ies m alfunction in  some way. Typically, of course, there is no t a single 
source of m alfunction. There is a wide range of syndrom es associated w ith 
poverty and low growth: entrepreneurs do no t w ant to  invest, schooling is 
low, public health  is poor, infrastructure is weak, credit is highly rationed, 
markets are small and segmented, the tax and regulatory burden is too high 
in the  formal sectors, and governm ent officials are often corrupt. W hile 
this may suggest th a t we need to  work on all these fronts sim ultaneously to 
create the  conditions for grow th, the strategy th a t th is im plies is in  fact a 
non-strategy. It essentially am ounts to elim inating poverty by rem oving all 
the  sym ptom s associated w ith it. Yes, Sierra Leone will indeed look like 
Sweden once its markets and in stitu tions work like those of Sweden -  but 
tha t does no t m uch help policy makers in Sierra Leone.
A genuine grow th strategy requires the identification of priorities, areas 
th a t we need to  tackle first before we m ove on to the  others. Amazingly, 
operational country  work in m ultilateral and bilateral lending  agencies is 
rarely based on an explicit m ethodology for generating these priorities. To 
the extent tha t a prioritization strategy can be discerned, it usually consists 
of some kind of benchm arking exercise: indicators are com pared in a cross­
country  setting, and the  dim ensions on w hich the country  looks furthest 
beh ind  are selected as areas w hich require the  m ost im m ediate a tten tion . 
So if a country  looks bad in  term s of its ICT indicators -  relative to o ther 
countries at sim ilar incom e levels -  th is is taken as an ind ication  th a t 
im proving inform ation technology is a priority. Or if a country 's trade pol­
icies look less liberal than  those of its peer group, this is taken as an indica­
tion  th a t trade liberalization needs to  be on the agenda. This kind of 
exercise can be done at various levels of sophistication, but it is rarely based 
on  an actual analysis of w hat is ho ld ing  a country  back. The im plicit 
assum ption is th a t reform will have th e  largest grow th payoff w hen  it 
tackles the  "distortions" th a t look the largest by cross-national standards. 
T hat is obviously false, since the  partial derivative of econom ic perfor-
8Som e s ta n d a rd  in s titu tio n a l reform s can  backfire if u n d e rta k e n  to o  early  in  th e  
d ev e lo p m en t process. An IPR regim e or an  in d e p e n d e n t cen tra l bank  are som e possi­
ble exam ples.
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Problem: Low levels of private investment and entrepreneurship
t = l ; =0[r(1- T,- p]
Figure 2.1 G rowth diagnostics
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Source: H au sm an n  et al. (2004).
m anee with respect to any particular distortion depends on a whole host of 
structural characteristics, only a few of w hich are directly observable to the  
policy analyst.
The obvious alternative is to  ask directly w hat is ho ld ing  back private 
investm ent and econom ic activity. This can be done w ith the assistance of 
the  decision tree we developed and used in H ausm ann et al. (2004), repro­
duced here (Figure 2.1). The analysis follows a sequential logic. We first ask 
w hether investm ent (broadly construed) is constrained on th e  dem and or 
the  supply side. In o ther words, is private investm ent low because firms 
and entrepreneurs do no t w ant to  invest (low investm en t dem and) or 
because they do no t have adequate access to  investm ent funds (low invest­
m en t supply). D epending on the  answer, we next ask a different set of 
questions. If the  problem  is low investm ent dem and, is the  problem  w ith 
low social returns or w ith low private appropriability? If it is low social 
returns, is th a t due to  poor infrastructure, poor geography, or low levels of 
hum an  capital? If it is low appropriability, is it due to  m arket failures such 
as externalities or to  governm ent failures such as high taxes or corruption. 
If, on  the o ther hand, the problem  lies w ith inadequate investible funds, is 
th a t due to problem s w ith dom estic finance or problem s w ith external 
finance? And so on.
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This kind of analysis may seem impossible to carry out, but actually it is 
merely difficult. The central idea tha t we use in im plem enting it is to  check 
for diagnostic signals that each one of these problems generates. For example, 
an economy where investm ent is constrained by the low investm ent dem and 
is one where real interest rates will be low or moderate, banks will have plenty 
of liquidity, creditors will be running after debtors (rather than  the other way 
around), and the current account balance will be positive. An exogenous 
increase in the availability of foreign resources (an increase in remittances or 
an improvement in the terms of trade) will lead to a reduction in the domestic 
saving effort rather than  an increase in investment. These kinds of diagnostic 
tests can be used to distinguish cases like El Salvador and Brazil from each 
other. Both of these countries have low investm ent-GDP ratios, but the evi­
dence points to El Salvador being constrained on the investm ent dem and side 
while Brazil is constrained on the financing side.
Similar diagnostic tests can be performed for o ther nodes of the decision 
tree as well. For example, suppose we have identified a case where we th ink  
the  problem  is low investm ent dem and (low private returns to  econom ic 
activity). We next need to  decide w hether this is due to  low social returns 
or low private appropriability. To check on the  form er possibility, we ask 
w hether the tell-tale signs are in  place. Hence, if the  returns to  investm ent 
are being held back due to  low levels of hum an  capital, we would observe 
h igh returns to  schooling (a large skill prem ium ). If the  constrain t is infra­
structure, we would observe transport bottlenecks, a high dem and for 
private sources of energy, and so on.
Obviously, m uch of this is m ore art th a n  science. But the  diagnostic 
approach offers a system atic way in w hich b ind ing  constrain ts can be 
identified, or at least categorized as a prelude to  designing grow th strate­
gies. It has the  virtue th a t it is a universal tool th a t can generate country- 
specific approaches. Putting  th e  fram ework to  work, we can understand  
why some countries need the ir financial systems fixed first, o thers need 
m ore schools and clinics, and yet others will only respond to  industrial 
policies tha t address market failures.
Hence the diagnostic approach embeds all existing approaches to  eco­
nom ic developm ent. Indeed it clarifies the m aintained assum ptions in each 
of these schools of thoughts. So those w ho argue for increased foreign aid 
m ust be th ink ing  th a t the  b ind ing  constrain t is lack of dom estic saving. 
Those w ho w ant to invest in  health  and school m ust th in k  the  problem  is 
w ith low social returns to private investm ent. Those who w ant to  im prove 
governance m ust th in k  the problem  lies w ith poor private appropriability 
of otherw ise high social returns. Those w ho w ant to im plem ent industrial 
policies m ust th in k  th a t the  source of the  low private appropriability  is 
coord ination  and in form ation  externalities. This kind of framework helps 
us carry out a more intelligent discussion about these alternatives, even if it 
does no t definitively resolve w ho is right.
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Diagnostic analysis is only the  first step in  designing effective grow th 
strategies. The second step is policy design, th a t is the  form ulation  of pol­
icies th a t best tackle the  problem s identified in the  diagnostic stage. In 
principle, welfare econom ics provides the needed tools here: each wedge 
betw een m arket prices and social valuations is best rem oved by applying 
the  appropriate Pigovian tax or subsidy. In practice, though, second-best 
issues greatly com plicate m atters and necessitate im agination  and w illing­
ness to experim ent (Rodrik, 2004).
And finally, there is the  need to  undertake the  diagnosis/policy design 
analysis on an ongoing basis. It is in the  very nature  of the  diagnostic 
approach th a t a constraint that did not bind initially will eventually become 
binding as growth picks up. Building good institutions in the  legal, fiscal, reg­
ulatory, and governance spheres is in fact n o th in g  o ther th a n  pu ttin g  in 
place the  m echanism s th a t autom ate the process of diagnosing constraints 
and generating solutions. Rich countries are those th a t have m anaged to 
put those m echanism s in place. On their way to riches, poor countries need 
a bit m ore help  from  a self-conscious diagnostic exercise of the type 
sketched out above.
Concluding remarks
I have argued in  this chapter tha t we are seeing the emergence of a new con­
sensus on growth policies. This consensus, correctly in m y view, stays away 
from recom m ending specific policy reforms. In fact, it is explicitly cautious 
about our ability to generate systematic policy recom m endations. It stresses 
instead the primacy of institutions, the "rules of the game" in society. It 
argues, again correctly in my view, that getting these rules to  generate the 
right incentives is m uch more im portant in the long run th an  any specific 
policy action (such as reducing im port barriers or cutting the fiscal deficit). 
The new consensus is also explicit about the contingent nature of any policy 
advice: there are no "ten com m andm ents," no quick fixes independent of 
context. Policies need to be tailored to local circumstances.
The experience w ith econom ic grow th in the  last 60 years does allow us 
to  make some key generalizations. For exam ple, all high-grow th countries 
have pursued "responsible” monetary and fiscal policies th a t prevent high 
inflation and the buildup of unsustainable debt levels. All successful coun­
tries have sought to  integrate with the world economy. All have provided their 
investors w ith effective property rights and contract enforcement. All have 
m aintained a certain degree of social cohesion, solidarity, and political stabil­
ity. And the list can be extended to  include a few m ore of these higher- 
order principles -  such as an appropriate env ironm en t for productive 
diversification and innovation, social insurance and safety nets, prudential 
regulation of financial interm ediaries, appropriate m anagem ent of the  
exchange rate and of the  capital account, and  so on.
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However, w hat we have also learned is th a t these higher-order principles 
do no t m ap in to  clear policy recom m endations. It is im possible to  have 
observed the  patterns of developm ent around the  world during the 
past two decades and n o t realized th a t p rotection of property rights, con­
tract enforcem ent, m acroeconom ic stability, integration  in to  the  world 
economy, and so on can be achieved in a num ber of different ways (Rodrik,
2004).
The m ajor challenge ahead of us is to tu rn  these ideas into an operational 
framework. I have provided some ideas here on how  this can be done. The 
grow th diagnostics approach has the  advantage th a t it is b o th  general and 
specific. It is general in  the  sense th a t it provides a universal approach to 
designing grow th strategies. It is specific in th a t it aims to  identify bo ttle ­
necks th a t are particularly  costly to  grow th in  the setting  under analysis. 
My colleagues and I have found it to  be a useful fram ework for th ink ing  
about the  problem s of countries like El Salvador and Brazil. But it clearly 
needs to  be road-tested in m any other settings before its utility  can be truly 
established.
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Development Success: May History 
Breed Humility
W illia m  E asterly1
The nature  of m an is intricate; the  objects of society are of the 
greatest com plexity: and therefore no simple disposition or direc­
tion  of power can be suitable either to  m an 's nature  or to  the  
quality of his affairs.
Edm und Burke (1790)
It is no t reasonable to  assume th a t a com plete reconstruction of 
our social system would lead at once to a workable system.
Karl Popper (1971)
The curious task of econom ics is to dem onstrate to  m en how  little 
they really know about w hat they im agine they can design.
F.A. Hayek (1988)
Introduction
The past quarter-century (not to  m ention  the past half-century) has been a 
hum bling  one for advisors striving to  discover the  secrets to  developm ent 
success. This chapter argues tha t there are three facts th a t should prove par­
ticularly hum bling: (1) the  failure of structural ad justm ent and shock 
therapy, (2) the rarity of "miracles", and (3) the hom egrow n nature of most 
success stories, w ith only a lim ited role for outside advice and foreign aid.2 
This chapter reviews these facts, and concludes w ith some though ts for 
policy advisors.
’I am grateful for research assistance from Elizabeth Potam ites, and for com m ents 
received by conference participants, and for separate com m ents by Ricardo Ffrench- 
Davis, José Luis Machinea, and Andrés Solimano.
2This continues som e work presented earlier in Easterly (2001), and some m aterial 
forthcom ing in  Easterly (2006). For some related thoughts, see Birdsall et al. (2005).
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Fact 1: The failure of structural adjustment and shock therapy
Structural ad justm ent loans (SALs) were the  brain-child  of W orld Bank 
President Robert McNamara and his deputy  Ernest Stern, w ho sketched 
out the  idea on a flight the  two took together to  the Bank-Fund A nnual 
M eeting in  Belgrade in Septem ber 1979. Structural ad justm ent loans 
were loans given to finance imports, conditional on countries adopting free 
markets (see Table 3.1). The IMF, who had already been doing conditional
Table 3.1 Structural adjustm ent loans, growth, and inflation in poor countries 
w ith m ost structural adjustm ent loans received
Number o f  IMF Annual per capita Annual inflation
and World Bank growth rate from the rate from first
adjustment loans date o f  first structural adjustment loan
1980-99 adjustment loan (%) to 1999 (%)
African countries tha t were in the world's top 20 of structural adjustm ent 
loans received in 1989
Niger 14 -2 .30 2
Zambia 18 -2.10 58
Madagascar 17 -1.80 17
Togo 15 -1.60 5
Cote d'Ivoire 26 -1.40 6
Malawi 18 -0.20 23
Mali 15 -0 .10 4
M auritania 16 0.10 7
Senegal 21 0.10 5
Kenya 19 0.10 14
G hana 26 1.20 32
Uganda 20 2.30 50
Top ten recipients of structural adjustm ent loans over 1990-99 am ong 
Ex-Communist Countries (growth and inflation measured from first 
ad justm ent loan to 1999)
Ukraine 10 -8.4 215
Russian Federation 13 -5 .7 141
Kyrgyz Republic 10 -4.4 25
Kazakhstan 9 -3.1 117
Bulgaria 13 -2.2 124
Romania 11 -1 .2 114
Hungary 14 1.0 16
Poland 9 3.4 52
Albania 8 4.4 40
Georgia 7 6.4 37
Source: Easterly (2006).
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loans for a long time, signed on to the new idea as well. W hat was the inspira­
tion  for the W orld Bank financing comprehensive reforms instead of finan­
cing piecemeal improvements? The idea was tha t developing countries 
needed the big reforms in order for individual projects to be productive.
This reasoning was appealing. I used to believe in shock therapy and struc­
tural adjustm ent myself. We proponents of such comprehensive reforms con­
vinced ourselves at the time that partial reform will not work unless all of the 
com plem entary reforms happen quickly and simultaneously. Sometimes we 
clinched the argum ent w ith a m etaphor like "you can 't cross a chasm in two 
leaps." It seemed plausible tha t the returns to small interventions will be low 
if the whole economic and political system is messed up, hence the attem pt to 
remake the system in one fell swoop. The "W ashington Consensus" was a 
check-list of all the things tha t had to be done at once.
W hat we shock therapists d idn 't realize is tha t all reforms are partial; 
it is impossible to do everything at once and no policymaker has enough 
inform ation to even know w hat "everything" is. The choice is between large- 
scale partial reforms (which shock therapy mislabels com prehensive reform) 
and small-scale partial reforms. Either large-scale or small-scale partial reforms 
could backfire, but it is m uch easier to correct the  small mistakes than  the 
large mistakes. The unintended consequences problem is greater with a large- 
scale reform than  with a smaller one. The attem pted changes at the top are 
out of touch with the complexity at the bottom, as we will see in this chapter. 
To make a long story short, the shock therapy often ran afoul of poor institu­
tions that failed to prevent public corruption and private looting.
The W orld Bank and IMF gave Cote d 'Ivoire 26 structural ad justm ent 
loans in the  1980s and 1990s. Per capita incom e plunged th roughou t the  
period in one of the  worst and longest depressions in  econom ic history. 
Today, Cote d'Ivoire is mired in civil war. Indeed, it's a little unnerving tha t 
alm ost all recent cases of collapses in to  anarchy in Africa (Somalia, Zaire, 
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Burundi, Sudan) were preceded by heavy World Bank 
and IMF involvem ent. A lthough I d o n 't th in k  the  IMF and W orld Bank 
caused the collapse in to  anarchy, it would be hard to  argue the ir involve­
m ent in these cases had a positive long-run effect.
I picked out the African countries tha t were in the  top 20 worldwide in 
num ber of structural adjustm ent loans received from the World Bank and 
IMF. Most African countries that received intensive treatm ent from structural 
adjustm ent have negative or zero growth. I also list the top 10 recipients 
of structural adjustm ent loans in the ex-Com m unist countries. Most ex- 
Communist countries that received shock therapy and many structural adjust­
m ent loans have sharply negative growth and high inflation (see Table 3.1).
On balance, the outcomes associated w ith frequent structural adjustm ent 
lending are poor. There is the usual problem of selection bias: doctors treat 
people who are already sick. However, there are three features of structural 
adjustm ent outcom es tha t suggest a non-positive effect of IMF and World
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Bank SALs. First, things were so bad in so m any recipients of structural adjust­
m ent tha t it stretches belief tha t it had a strong positive effect. Second, since 
structural adjustm ent loans were repeated year after year, one wonders why 
the patient did no t improve after repeated doses of the medicine. Finally, 
formal statistical m ethods to control for possible reverse causality from crises 
to treatm ent still finds tha t structural adjustm ent lending had a zero or nega­
tive effect on economic growth (Easterly, 2005). An influential recent study by 
Adam Przeworski of NYU and James Vreeland of Yale (2000) still finds that the 
effect of IMF programs on growth is negative, even controlling for the adverse 
selection effect. A related piece of evidence: African countries (even the "suc­
cess stories" such as Ghana and Uganda) couldn't pay back zero-interest Struc­
tural Adjustm ent Loans, and the World Bank and IMF had to forgive the 
debts.
Structural adjustm ent was also deployed in the ex-Com m unist countries 
of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, where it became know n as 
shock therapy. U nfortunately, the  a ttem pted  leap across the  chasm  fell a 
little short of the o ther side, as show n in Figure 3.1, aside from the  Polish 
success story. It's hard to know how  to attribute blame for this disaster, but 
clearly the high expectations of the W estern reformers were no t realized.
Another region where there was great hope for comprehensive reform was 
Latin America, which had followed a regime of state intervention and restric­
tions on free trade from the 1950s through the 1970s. After the debt crisis of 
the early 1980s, in which Latin American countries were cut off from access to 
new loans from international private banks, they started moving towards free 
markets. As usual, SALs from the World Bank and IMF supported these com ­
prehensive reforms. One widely-used index shows increasing economic 
freedom from 1985 to 2000 on average in Latin America (Figure 3.2).
U nfortunately, the com prehensive reform in Latin America has no t been 
accom panied by economic growth. Ironically for structural adjustm ent pro­
ponents, the best period for Latin American grow th was in the period of 
state intervention, 1950-80. If th a t growth had continued, incom e in Latin 
America would now  be three tim es higher th an  in 1950. Instead in 2003, 
incom e is barely twice the level of a half century earlier, w ith little progress 
m ade over 1980-2003 (see Figure 3.3). The backlash against free markets is 
unfortunately  now  gaining strength  in Latin America, w ith free markets 
tarnished by the utopian  expectations of structural adjustm ent.
So we have three regions where there were great hopes for structural adjust­
m ent and shock therapy: Africa, the former Com m unist countries, and Latin 
America -  and three regions where these hopes were dashed. W hat went 
wrong?
One response to failure was to do more of the same. The IMF and World 
Bank kept on doing structural adjustm ent loans (SALs) for over two decades 
despite the record of failure. They missed the w arning signs th a t SALs 
were no t working (you could understand this for the early days, but for
50 Economie Growth with Equity
Figure 3 .3  Per capita incom e index in  Latin America (log base 2 scale, 1950 = 1): 
actual and trend, 1950-2003
As if all this were no t enough, the effects of "free market reforms" reflects 
n o t only social and institu tional conditions, but expectations about future 
reforms and social and institu tional conditions. As Pritchett (2005) argues: 
The total o u tp u t im pact of a policy action or an announced  policy reform 
depends on how  these change econom ic agents' beliefs about the  future 
sequence of policy actions (conditional on realizations of states of the  
world) and how  these in tu rn  affect econom ic agents' choices (investm ent, 
reallocation, innovation) and th e  grow th im pact of an o u tpu t im pact of
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any given m agnitude is determ ined by the  speed of ad justm en t to  the 
ou tpu t impact.
So nobody can design a com prehensive reform  for a poor country  tha t 
creates benevolent laws and good institu tions to  make m arkets work. The 
rules th a t make m arkets work reflect a com plex bottom -up search for 
the  social norm s, netw orks of relationships, and formal laws and in stitu ­
tions th a t have the  m ost payoff (see H ausm ann et al., 2004). To make 
th ings worse, these norm s, networks, and  institu tions change in response 
to changed circumstances and their own past history. Political philosophers 
like Burke, Popper, and Hayek had the key insight tha t this social interplay 
was so complex th a t a top-dow n reform th a t tries to change all the  rules at 
once can make things worse rather than  better.
Avinash Dixit has a m ore recent example of why top-dow n reform may 
have unintended consequences. Suppose a society is facilitating market trans­
actions mainly through informal networks. Such networks are self-enforcing 
in that any cheater can be expelled from the network and thus lose all future 
business opportunities. Now suppose tha t the World Bank twists the arm of 
the governm ent to  set up a system w ith formal rules overseen by courts. 
Suppose such a parallel system is at least partially effective, making some busi­
ness opportunities possible through the formal rules. Now some of the partic­
ipants in the inform al networks can cheat their partners, exit the network, 
and begin operating in the formal system. A society could get caught in a 
disastrous in-between situation in which the networks are breaking down, dis­
rupting the previous trades, but the formal system is still operating im per­
fectly, lim iting the scope for new trades. Having two sets of rules is often 
worse than  having one. A reform where the gradual introduction  of formal 
rules reinforced the existing networks would have worked better than one that 
tried to replace them . A plausible story for the evolution of institutions in the 
West is that tha t informal relationships and norm s in networks gradually 
hardened into formal rules (which are still supported by informal relation­
ships and norms) (see Hayek, 1973; and Cooter, 1996).
This is arm chair speculation, but Dixit's story may help explain why the 
transition from com m unism  to capitalism was such a disaster, as well as why 
market reforms in Latin America and Africa were disappointing. Even with 
severely distorted markets, the participants had formed networks of m utual 
trades and obligations that made the system functional at some level. Trying 
to change the rules all at once with the rapid introduction of free markets dis­
rupted the old ties, while the new formal institutions were still too weak 
to make free markets work well. Gradual m ovem ent to  freer markets would 
have given more tim e for the participants to  adjust their relationships and 
trades.
The m ain m oral of the story is th a t free m arket opportun ity  depends 
on  bottom -up social choices th a t planners usually d o n 't  begin (or try) 
to  understand . W hen researchers try a little harder (as did m any of the
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Figure 3.4 Power law of per capita income in pooled sample for 137 countries, 
1820, 1870, 1913, 1950, 2001
Source: A u th o r's  ca lcu la tio n s  u s in g  M add ison  (2003) datase t.
hard-w orking researchers cited here), there is hope for gradual, piecem eal 
reform and spontaneous efforts by poor people themselves.
Fact 2: Miracles are rare
There is ano th er fact th a t is so obvious th a t I am  em barrassed to  m ention  
it, except th a t m any of the  writings on success stories om it to  m ention  it. 
This is th a t success stories make up a small m inority  of cases bo th  in recent 
experience and in econom ic history. Figure 3.4 shows th is in the  form of a 
power law in w hich the  m agnitude of success is inversely and tigh tly  
related to  the probability of th a t m agnitude being achieved. A power law is 
w hen th is relationship  is linear in logs of bo th  probabilities and outcom e 
m agnitudes. Figure 3.4 shows b o th  axes in log base 2 scale, so th a t a u n it 
increase m eans a doubling of either incom e (on the x-axis) or the probabil­
ity of th a t incom e being realized (on the  y-axis). The data underly ing the  
graph are the pooled sample of 137 countries w ith  incom e m easured 
roughly every 50 years. The relationship in the graph shows tha t eveTy tim e 
the m agnitude of per capita incom e is doubled, the probability of attaining 
th a t incom e is roughly halved. W hat the  graph shows is th a t high incom e 
is rare in bo th  tim e and space: it did no t occur un til recently in rich coun­
tries, and it has n o t occurred at all for m ost countries. So the  historical 
experience of 1820-2001 says tha t for any given country in any given year, 
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Table 3 .2  Income increases and likelihood from 1950 to  2001
Ratio o f 2001 
income to 1950
Probability: income greater than: Country examples:
1 out of 32 10.8 South Korea, Taiwan, Botswana, Japan
1 ou t of 16 7.8 Hong Kong, Singapore, China, Thailand
1 out of 8 5.4 Spain, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Ireland
1 ou t of 4 3.6 Turkey, Netherlands, Swaziland, D om inican
Republic
1 ou t of 2 2.4 Chile, Switzerland, Jordan, Colombia
Source-. A u tho r's  ow n  c a lcu la tio n  from  M addison  (2003) da tase t.
while there is only a probability of 1/32 tha t income will be 16 times higher 
than  that.
Of course, per capita incomes in  every country could increase together at 
the same rate from now  on, bu t since we know  there  is no tendency  
towards absolute convergence and even som e evidence for absolute diver­
gence (Pritchett, 1997), there is no  reason to  expect th e  basic power law to 
change. M oreover, a power law also seems to  hold for econom ic grow th 
m agnitudes, as m easured by the  ratio increase over half centuries from the 
M addison data 1820-2001. Large six-fold increases over half a century, like 
the East Asian miracles, are a rarity.4
There is a huge literature on power laws across all the  sciences. They 
show up in such diverse places as earthquakes, avalanches, phase transi­
tions in  physics, visits to blogs on the In ternet, city populations, war casu­
alties, citations of scientific articles, and firm sizes (Buchanan, 2001). 
Incom e and w ealth d istribution w ith in  countries is well know n to follow a 
power law at the  higher incom e and w ealth levels.5 A lot of the w riting 
about power laws gets fairly breathless and seeks to uncover some deep 
principle of th e  universe underly ing  them . More prosaically, they seem to 
arise w hen the  m agnitude of an outcom e depends on  a lot of com plem en­
tary factors. There is only a small probability tha t all of the com plem entary 
factors will be aligned for huge success. M ediocre success or even failure 
happens if any of the com plem entary factors are askew.
4This m ay seem to contradict a finding by H ausm ann et al. (2005) th a t large grow th 
accelerations are com m on. However, they  also find th a t large grow th accelerations 
are typically n o t sustained, w hich is w hy a large ratio increase over half a century is 
rare.
5Some random  references: Brock (1999); Di G uilm i et al. (2003); Q uadrini and Rios- 
Rull (1997).
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For those w ho are interested in history m ore recent th an  1820, Table 3.2 
lists the  probabilities and incom e ratio increases for 1950 to  2001, out of a 
sample of 130 countries (again from Maddison). Large incom e increases get 
rare as we approach the  stratosphere of very large increases in  incom e 
(10-fold) over the  past half century.
This chapter is no t as concerned as the  rest of the power law literature as 
to  w hether incom e  increases or per capita incom e levels exactly follow a 
power law. My m uch more m odest point here is tha t econom ic miracles are 
rare. An awful lot of th ings have to  go right for miracles to  occur, like all 
the  com plex factors described in  the  previous section. It is unrealistic to
T able 3.3  Ten best and worst per capita growth rates, 1980-2002
Per capita Percent o f  time under
growth (%), A id/ GDP (%) IMF programs (%),
Country name 1980-2002 1980-2002 1980-2002
Ten best per capita grow th rates, 1980-2002
South Korea 5.9 0.03 36
China 5.6 0.38 8
Taiwan 4.5 0.00 0
Singapore 4.5 0.07 0
Thailand 3.9 0.81 30
India 3.7 0.66 19
Japan 3.6 0.00 0
Hong Kong 3.5 0.02 0
Mauritius 3.2 2.17 23
Malaysia 3.1 0.40 0
m edian 3 .8 0.23 4
Ten worst per capita growth rates, 1980-2002
Nigeria -1 .6 0.59 20
Niger -1.7 13.15 63
Togo -1.8 11.18 72
Zambia -1.8 19.98 53
Madagascar -1.9 10.78 71
Cote d'ivoire -1.9 5.60 74
Haiti -2.6 9.41 55
Liberia -3.9 11.94 22
Congo, Dem. Rep. -5 .0 4.69 39
Sierra Leone -5.8 15.37 50
median - 1.9 10.98 54
Source: Easterly (2006).
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expect to  replicate the  success of the East Asian (+ Botswana) success stories 
in a large num ber of o ther developing countries, because history speaks 
loudly tha t such rapid developm ent is rare.
Fact 3: Most recent success stories are home-grown
Most of the recent success stories are countries that did not get a lot of foreign 
aid and did not spend a lot of tim e in IMF programs, two of the indicators of 
w hat outsiders do for a country (Table 3.3). Most of the recent disasters are 
just the opposite -  tons of foreign aid and m uch tim e spent in  IMF con­
straints. This of course involves a lot of reverse causality, as the disasters were 
getting IMF assistance and foreign aid because they were disasters, while the 
IMF and the donors bypassed success stories because they d idn 't need the 
help. It thus does no t prove tha t foreign assistance causes disaster. But it does 
show tha t outlandish success is very much possible w ithout outside tutelage, 
while repeated treatm ents do n 't seem to stem the tide of disaster in the fail­
ures. Most of the recent success in the world economy is happening in Eastern 
and Southern Asia, not as a result of some global plan to end poverty, but for 
homegrown reasons.
Moreover, the success stories follow a variety of formulas, perhaps an indi­
cation of an exploration th a t reflected each country 's unique history and 
characteristics (see Hausm ann and Rodrik, 2003). South Korea's governm ent 
intervened in guiding its corporations, while Hong Kong was the poster-child 
for laissez-faire capitalism. China is a unique blend of Com m unist party dicta­
torship, state enterprises, and partial free market liberalization. India is a long­
standing democracy, South Korea and Taiwan more recent democratic 
converts, while Singapore is no t a democracy. All of these cases did realize 
m ost of their success from markets -  and thus subjected their reforms to a 
market test -  but some were far from a laissez-faire model. While most people 
believe that free markets and democracy are a big part of the success story of 
the West, other countries sometimes take a circuitous route to get there, or 
they may conceivably have their own unique recipe.
Of course, the  success story of the  W est itself was a com pletely hom e­
grown discovery, rather th a n  following ideal form ulas d ictated by o u t­
siders. Political scientist Charles Lindblom in a classic article described rich 
country  politics as the  "science of m uddling  th rough :" He noted  in  rich 
dem ocracies th a t "actual policy practice is a piecem eal process of lim ited 
comparisons, a sequence of trials and errors followed by revised trials, [and] 
reliance on past experience."6 In their history, rich country democracies did 
no t have to pu t up w ith  a team  of outside experts try ing to  im pose a 
"W ashington Consensus" on them .
6Quoted in  Scott (1998), p. 327.
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Anecdote: Right reform, wrong conditions
Let me illustrate the  principles th a t the above three facts suggest w ith an 
anecdote. Mexico for com plex historical reasons has failed to  evolve good 
financial laws. Take the  exam ple of privatization of M exican state banks 
beginning in 1991. Privatization is one of the staples of free market reform 
urged by the W orld Bank and IMF. But things did not go according to  plan. 
The problem  began w ith the  privatization program  itself, in  w hich buyers 
of the  banks could use loans from  the  banks they  were buying to  purchase 
the  banks. One buyer covered 75 percent of the  purchase price w ith  this 
trick. Normally, savers would no t w ant to  deposit in banks w ith such shaky 
financing, but savers had deposit insurance from the M exican governm ent. 
The newly privatized banks thus expanded credit rapidly, w ith  little regard 
for risk.7 Lax banking regulations allowed them  to roll-over loans tha t bor­
rowers did no t repay w ithou t even having to declare the  loans in default. 
Bank credit grew by over 20 percent per year in real term s from 1991 to 
1994, while past due loans grew by over 40 percent per year.8 If the  banks 
did try  to  collect from borrowers, they ran in to  M exico's tortuous (civil 
law) bankruptcy laws, in w hich it took betw een three and seven years for 
banks to  recover collateral from  borrowers. The reckless credit expansion 
contribu ted  to  the  collapse of the  peso beginning in  December 1994, in 
w hich the  peso lost half of its value, and Mexico had a severe recession.
In the  afterm ath  of the  peso crisis, the governm ent designed a bailout 
of the  banking system 's bad loans. U nfortunately, the  governm ent (with 
W orld Bank and IMF acquiescence) dragged its feet on the bailout. W ith an 
anticipated bailout, the banks' owners had incentives to  lend to themselves 
and then  default. During 1995-98, the banks gave 20 percent of large loans 
to  individuals on their own boards of directors. The looting  o f the  banks 
raised the  cost of the  bailou t to  the  governm ent, w hich in  the  end 
am ounted to 15 percent of Mexican annual GDP.
Since 1998, regulation of banks has been m uch tougher and the govern­
m en t has allowed foreign banks to en ter to  pu t com petitive pressure on 
M exican banks. The bad loan problem  has finally been solved, bu t m ainly 
because banks lend less to the  private sector. Because of the  still-shaky 
bankruptcy laws, banks are now  extrem ely cautious about private bor­
rowers -  the share of private loans in bank assets declined from 49 percent 
in  1997 to 30 percent in 2003 (m ost of the  rest goes to  governm ent lend­
ing). Mexico has still not solved the problem of getting financial markets to
7The C hilean banking crisis of 1982 happened  even though  there was no deposit 
insurance, but depositors and  banks may have expected a governm ent bailout 
anyway.
8Figures from Ross Levine, private com m unication.
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work because of the difficulty in getting the bottom -up rules and incentives 
right (Haber, 2004). This story may give some insight in to  w hy th e  payoff 
to Latin America's "free m arket" reforms was disappointing. In terms of the 
previous facts, it illustrates how  structural ad justm ent can misfire, it h igh ­
lights all of the  com plex ingredients for "m iracles," and  it shows the 
dangers of outsiders like the  IMF and W orld Bank im posing a universal 
b lueprin t instead of hom egrow n reformers searching for w hat works in 
local conditions.
Conclusions
A num ber of com m on-sense prescriptions follow from this rather sweeping 
and uneven review of recent experience. The first one is for econom ic 
policy advisers and in ternational developm ent economists: be humble!
If this sounds like useless m oral exhortation , let me quote Karl Popper 
again on how  hum ble policy advice (piecemeal engineering) proceeds dif­
ferently from hubristic advice (utopian social engineering): The piecemeal 
engineer knows, like Socrates, how  little he knows. He knows th a t we can 
learn only from our mistakes. Accordingly, he will m ake his way, step by 
step, carefully com paring the  results expected w ith  the  results achieved, 
and  always on the look-out for the  unavoidable unw anted consequences of 
any reform; and he will avoid undertaking reforms of a com plexity and 
scope w hich makes it impossible for him  to disentangle causes and effects, 
and to  know w hat he is really doing. Holistic or U topian social engineer­
ing, as opposed to  piecem eal social engineering aims at rem odeling the  
"whole of society" in accordance w ith a definite plan or blueprint.
W hen the Yale political scientist and anthropologist James C. Scott 
sum m arizes w hy u topian  schem es fail, he goes right to  lack of hum ility: 
"If I were asked to  condense th e  reasons beh ind  these failures in to  a single 
sentence, I would say th a t the  progenitors of such plans regarded th em ­
selves as far sm arter and farseeing th an  they  really were and, at the  same 
time, regarded their subjects as far more stupid and incom petent th an  they 
really were."
Scott's advice for reform ers is then  to take an  experim ental approach 
to  social change, and presum e th a t we canno t know  the  consequences of 
our in terventions in advance. Given this postu late of ignorance, prefer 
w herever possible to  take a small step, stand back, observe, and th en  plan 
the next small move.
If this sounds too m uch like recom m ending partial equilibrium  analysis, 
so be it! Economic reformers have been seduced by general equilibrium  
analysis, w hich is great as a theory  bu t a disaster as a guide to  policy 
reform, given the  severe lack of in form ation  on the  properties of the 
general equilibrium. Better to take a small step based on partial equilibrium 
analysis, see w hat happens in general equilibrium , then  adjust accordingly.
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Econom ic in tu itio n  will give some insights in to  the sequence of reforms -  
as the Mexico example showed, you should probably fix financial laws and 
regulation before privatizing banks.
Lack of hum ility also creates unrealistic expectations, w hich does damage 
of its own. Reformers promise miracles, and  th en  there is a backlash against 
m arket reforms w hen the m iracle does no t arrive. Econom ic developm ent 
advice should set reasonable expectations instead of prom ising every 
country  they  can grow like the  East Asian miracles. The IMF and W orld 
Bank routinely over-predicted growth rates in response to reforms.
The industry of studying success stories has failed to  generate the  ability 
to replicate them . Indeed, the  only com m on thread to the success stories of 
the past few decades -  the  East Asian tigers, China, India, Mauritius, Chile,9 
Botswana, etc. -  is th a t the  experim enters in each of these countries (which 
again were often  far from laissez faire m arket econom ies) subjected their 
experim ents to a m arket test, often th rough  in ternational m arkets. W ould 
private foreign investors invest? W ould the rest of the world buy w hat you 
are producing? The answer was yes in  the  success stories, w hich gave them  
feedback to  move in  the  d irection of prosperity, a lthough  their paths 
toward m arket successes varied drastically from  the  sim plistic visions of 
shock therapy.
Economics and history yield good in tu ition  in to  w hat piecemeal reforms 
are likely to  pay off. The m antra  of m arkets, dem ocracy, and institu tions 
becam e a m antra  because th is com bination  has a long and distinguished 
historical record and  theoretical pedigree. But how  to move towards m ore 
effective operation of markets, democracy, and institu tions is a task for the 
pragm atic local reformer to  experim ent w ith, always sensitive to  local con­
ditions, getting  lots of feedback on  w hat's working and  w hat's not, and 
accountable for adjustm ents w hen som ething is no t working. M any coun­
tries can make gradual progress towards a better tom orrow  in this way. Just 
d o n 't expect to grow like South Korea w hen you do so!
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The Dual Divergence: Growth 
Successes and Collapses in the 
Developing World Since 1980
fosé  A n ton io  O cam po an d  M aría A ngela Parra1
Introduction
Cross-country econom etrics has been th e  preferred tool of em pirical 
grow th analysis over the  past 20 years. This literature has tended to  focus 
on long tim e periods, ignoring the instability  and volatility of grow th p a t­
terns in developing countries. Because shocks play a central role in explain­
ing variations in  grow th patterns in  the  developing world (Easterly et ah, 
1993), the m eaning of the statistical coefficient estim ated for long periods 
of tim e is unclear. In this sense, the  use of panel data econom etrics for 
shorter periods m ay be m ore appropriate, a lthough, for m any reasons, 
no t ideal (Pritchett, 2000). A nother route is to  exam ine factors th a t deter­
m ine grow th spurts (accelerations) and collapses. Country-specific h is­
torical analysis is a th ird  route (see, for exam ple, Rodrik, 2003, am ong 
others), but the com parability of such analyses is a significant lim itation in 
this regard.
This chapter takes the second route, focusing on  grow th surges and  col­
lapses in developing countries and the ir relation to  com m on external 
factors th a t affect the  econom ic perform ance of these countries. It also 
looks at the role of patterns of specialization in  explaining relative grow th 
perform ance in recent decades. The first section presents a survey of the 
still lim ited em pirical literature on grow th spurts and collapses. This is fol­
lowed by a look at the  incidence of accelerations and collapses of grow th
'W e are very grateful to  Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, S tephany Griffith-Jones, Daniel 
H eym ann, Jorge Katz, Jom o Kwame Sundaram , Rafael López M onti, José Luis 
M achinea, Stefania Piffanelli, Jaim e Ros, Verónica Silva and  Lance Taylor for their 
com m ents and suggestions, as well as to  participants in the Seminar held at ECLAC 
on September 1-2, 2005.
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in developing countries since 1950. We find a "global developm ent cycle" 
th a t circumscribes the  grow th possibilities of developing econom ies. The 
th ird  section focuses on the role in th is contex t of specialization patterns 
and  p roduction  developm ent strategies. The final section presents some 
conclusions. Some of the facts th a t are m en tioned  are well know n, yet, 
curiously enough, have been generally disregarded in the growth literature.
Survey of literature on growth spurts and collapses
In one of the  best know n studies on econom ic grow th instability  in the  
developing world Easterly et al. (1993) show  th a t a large part of the  vari­
ance of grow th rates of developing countries, even in periods as long as a 
decade, can be directly explained by shocks -  in the term s of trade, in debt 
crises and sharp changes in net external transfers, and in  the  form of wars. 
Furtherm ore, shocks have an  indirect influence on grow th by inducing 
policy changes. In tu rn , Easterly (2001) underscores the  greater vu lner­
ability of poor countries to  natural disasters, com pared to  middle- and 
high-incom e countries. The greater sensitivity of low-incom e countries -  
particularly Sub-Saharan African countries -  to  these problems, as well as to 
civil wars, explains the greater dispersion of growth rates am ong them .
Looking at d iscontinuities in  th e  grow th experience is im portan t for 
several reasons. First, the  hypothetical determ inants of econom ic grow th 
may have non-linear effects, w hich im ply th a t the same policy may have 
different effects in different countries and  tim e periods. N on-linear in te r­
actions as well as (positive or negative) feedbacks are involved, for exam ­
ple, in the in teraction between hum an capital and econom ic developm ent 
(Ranis et al., 2000).2 As a result of non-linearities and  the  inconclusive­
ness of existing econom etric results,3 it m ay be im possible to  draw policy 
im plications from  cross-country econom etrics (Brock and Durlauf, 2001; 
Easterly, 2004; Rodriguez, 2005; Rodrik, 2005).
The second reason is th a t in econom ies experiencing substantial shocks, 
it may be impossible to isolate long-term trends from observable short-term  
trajectories. The m ajor explanation  for this is the  p a th  dependence gener­
ated by dynam ic econom ies of scale: the close association between techno­
logical learning and p roduction  experience (i.e. "learning by doing" in a
2See the analysis of the variable effects of education in different countries and tim e 
periods in Azariadis and Drazen (1990).
3Indeed, the volum inous literature on cross-country econom etrics has identified 
nearly 150 variables th a t have statistically significant effects on  grow th (Durlauf et 
al., 2004). Because these variables do n o t necessarily exclude each o ther, w ith th a t 
techn ique  alone it is im possible to  know  w hat priority should be given to  each one 
of them  (Brock and Durlauf, 2001).
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broad sense), as well as similar processes related to the developm ent of m ar­
keting networks and the growth of firms' reputation (goodwill). This means 
th a t both  negative shocks (an external crisis, a natural disaster, or a war) 
and positive shocks (the discovery of new natural resources) may have 
long-term  im plications.4 A related issue is th a t the  form ation of expecta­
tions in econom ies facing recurrent shocks necessarily involves a learning 
process (Heymann, 2000).
The origins of shocks are obviously im portan t in th is regard. Given the 
em phasis of the  existing grow th literature on the domestic factors th a t 
determ ine the grow th perform ance of developing countries, the  role of 
external shocks affecting perform ance generally has been dow nplayed or 
even ignored in cross-country econom etrics. In contrast, external factors 
have been the focus of the structuralist tradition , w ith its em phasis on the 
asym m etries th a t characterize the  function ing  of the  world econom y 
(Ocam po and M artin, 2003). As we will see, the  role of external factors is 
critical, for m ajor breaks in  the  grow th process in  th e  developing world 
tend  to  cluster around specific tim e periods, ind icating  th a t developing 
econom ies tend  to  follow a com m on cycle, w ith m ajor breaks clearly asso­
ciated w ith the world economy.
The th ird  reason why discontinuities are im portan t is in stitu tiona l in 
character. A lthough all forms of institution-building follow an evolutionary 
process, this feature is particularly im portan t in  State institu tion-build ing, 
again due to  the  "learning" processes involved. An in terrup tion  in the 
process of State building caused by a m ajor econom ic crisis may thus have 
long-term  im plications, as a cursory look at the  problem s of Latin America 
following the  "lost decade" indicates. The m ix of an econom ic crisis w ith 
civil conflict m ay be particularly problem atic, as the  experience of several 
Sub-Saharan African countries over the past quarter century shows. In turn, 
m ajor political d iscontinuities, such as revolutions (capitalist as well 
as socialist) can unleash  an institu tional restructuring th a t takes tim e to 
m ature and m ay have unexpected twists. The experience of C entral and 
Eastern Europe is the  m ost relevant recent story in  th is regard. A m ajor 
im plication of this analysis is tha t, even if a m ajor structural reform even­
tually has positive long-term  effects, it also has transitional costs tha t may 
swamp its favorable im pacts for a long tim e. In term s of the  debates of the 
1980s, this implies th a t "big bangs" are m uch less attractive th an  was 
believed during the  period of structural reforms. Nonetheless, the  discus­
sion below will concentrate on  econom ic issues, largely leaving aside these 
institu tional dim ensions.
4PSee, for instance, Easterly (2001, ch. 10), or the analysis of "D utch disease" by 
Krugman (1990, ch. 7), and Van W ijnbergen (1984).
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Finally, in  term s of the  evolution of econom ic structures, long-term  
grow th should be understood  as the  result of sequential sector-specific 
grow th spurts, of the ir in tensity  and  of the  dom estic linkages th a t they 
generate. The noticeable d iscontinuities th a t characterize the  evolution of 
production  structures and specialization patterns im ply th a t these factors 
may be crucial to  understand ing  grow th dynam ics. Cross-country econo­
m etrics has failed to  give adequate a tten tion  to  th is issue, em phasized in 
the  structuralist trad ition  (see, for exam ple, Amsden, 2001; Lall, 2001; 
Palma, 2004). The Kaldorian links runn ing  from  grow th to  productivity, 
associated w ith the  presence of underutilized resources during the grow th 
process, have also been disregarded, as well as the  links betw een produc­
tivity  convergence, dom estic p roduction  linkages and external balances 
(Cimoli and Correa, 2005; Ocampo, 2005a; Rada and Taylor, 2004).
Several attem pts have been m ade in recent years to  understand  the  role 
of discontinuities in  the  grow th process. H ausm ann et al. (2004) explore 
the  determ inan ts of episodes of econom ic grow th acceleration since the  
1950s. According to  their results, accelerations are associated w ith increases 
in  investm ent and trade, as well as w ith real exchange rate depreciation. 
Accelerations also appear to  be linked to changes in  political regimes. 
Positive term s of trade shocks have positive short-term  effects, but they are 
no t a significant predictor of sustained accelerations. On the contrary, stan­
dard econom ic reform measures play no role in explaining growth accelera­
tions, a lthough  they  can help  to  explain w hether or no t grow th is 
sustained. The m ajor conclusion of tha t paper, however, is th a t most of the 
variables used in  m ainstream  grow th analyses do n o t seem to play an 
im portan t role as determ inants of grow th spurts and, in this sense, growth 
spurts are highly unpredictable.
Ros (2005), in  contrast, considers the  factors determ ining grow th col­
lapses. He finds three factors th a t affect the  incidence of such episodes. The 
first is size: small econom ies are m ore likely to  face collapses. The second is 
the  pattern  of specialization: dependence on raw m aterial exports -  par­
ticularly m ineral exports -  is associated w ith the incidence of reductions in 
per capita income. The th ird  is incom e distribution: more unequal societies 
are likely to  face grow th collapses. According to  Ros, political-econom y 
issues are involved in  the  latter tw o links, whereas vulnerability  to  shocks 
clearly shows in the first two.
Reddy and M inoiu (2005) exam ine a sim ilar phenom enon: namely, real- 
incom e stagnation, w hich they  define as negligible or negative per capita 
real-income growth for a significant un in terrupted  sequence of years. They 
find th a t countries th a t suffered spells of real incom e stagnation  were 
m ore likely to be poor, dependent on prim ary com m odity exports, conflict 
ridden, and  located in Latin America or Sub-Saharan Africa. A m ajority  of 
landlocked developing countries also tend  to  be m ore likely to  face long­
term  stagnation. Stagnation is also very likely to persist over time: countries
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afflicted w ith stagnation  in the 1960s had  a 75 percent likelihood of being 
afflicted by stagnation in  the 1990s as well.
Jones and Olken (2005) claim th a t changes in physical capital accum ula­
tion  are not im portant in explaining growth accelerations and that, at best, 
they  explain only  a quarter of the  m agnitude of grow th collapses. Both 
events instead reflect changes in  productivity . Structural breaks are also 
associated w ith accelerations or decelerations in  the allocation of labor to 
m anufacturing, particularly to  advanced m anufacturing. U pturns are asso­
ciated, in turn, w ith the evolution  of trade shares, whereas inflation  plays 
some role in dow nturns. The authors find th a t changes in productivity are 
the m ajor determ inant of bo th  growth accelerations and collapses, but they 
fail to explain w hat determ ines m ajor productivity shifts.
"Explaining" differences in  grow th rates as the  result of differences in 
productivity growth, as do Jones and Olken (2005) and a volum inous liter­
ature, is however questionable, on at least tw o grounds. First, it ignores 
the  short-term  and  perhaps even the m edium -term  Keynesian effects of 
changes in capacity u tilization  on productivity, w hich will bias analysis 
against the effects of capital accum ulation .5 Second, it ignores long-term  
Kaldorian grow th-productivity  dynam ics, according to  w hich strong 
positive and negative productiv ity  trends are associated w ith the m ore 
or less intensive utilization of existing factors of production: variable under­
em ploym ent of physical capital and of the labor force, including hum an  
capital; and variable underu tilization  of natural resources; and existing 
infrastructure. These Kaldorian links, recently brought back to  the  debate 
by O cam po (2005a), Rada (2005) and Rada and Taylor (2004) im ply th a t 
productivity im provem ents are largely the result of econom ic growth rather 
th an  an exogenous determ inan t of grow th (as in  the  neoclassical develop­
m ent literature). More generally, to  the  ex ten t th a t these Kaldorian links 
are valid, growth and productivity m ust be explained simultaneously.
The global development cycle
The w idening incom e gap between different regions and countries has been 
a feature of the  world econom y for the  past two centuries (see Figure 4.1, 
and  M addison, 1995 and 2001). The only  exception to  th is trend  is the
sJones and Olken (2005) try to  take th is effect in to  account bu t do so using rather 
rough measures of labor force participation  and electricity consum ption . Their 
results indicate th a t there is little change in  labor force or capital utilization around 
either up-breaks or down-breaks. Contrary to this result, Ffrench-Davis (2005) shows 
th a t to tal factor productivity  (TFP) estim ates tend  to  be biased in a contex t of 
significant changes in capacity u tilization. He finds tha t, once th is factor is taken 
in to  account, capital stock reappears as the m ain determ inan t of grow th in  m ost 
Latin American countries.
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Figure 4.1 Per capita GDP growth and  dispersion, OECD and developing countries, 
1870-2001
(a) Weighted average per capita GDP growth
43  deve lop ing  countries  122 de ve lop ing  c o u n tr ie s -a -O E C D  |
(b) Simple average per capita GDP growth
(c) Standard deviation of average per capita GDP growth
4 3  d e ve lo p in g  countries  -  122 deve lop ing  countries  -¿ -O E C D  |
Source: A u tho r's  c alcu la tions  based on  M addison  (2001).
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period 1965-1973, in which the in ternational per capita GDP gap decreased 
slightly (as we will po in t ou t below, the mid-2000s may be the  beginning 
of another phase of this type, but it is too soon to say w hether this reflects 
a longer-term  trend). The story of the developing countries is thus one of 
"divergence, big tim e" vis-à-vis the  industrial world (Pritchett, 1997), w ith 
the late phase of the "golden age" the only exception so far in  history. This 
is also the conclusion of the analysis of the effects of inter-country inequal­
ity in world incom e d istribu tion  (Bourguignon and M orrison, 2002); 
growing divergence am ong countries has also been a m ajor contribu tor to 
the  growing inequality  of world incom e distribution  over the  past quarter 
century, if we isolate the effects of the rapid grow th of C hina and, to  a 
lesser extent, India (Berry and Serieux, 2004).
History has also shown considerable divergence among developing coun­
tries, particularly since the mid-1960s (Figure 4.1.c). Part of this divergence 
has been the result of several success stories ("miracles") at different times 
in  various parts of th e  developing world (China and India being the  m ost 
recent ones). There are, however, very few instances of "peripheral" coun­
tries th a t have joined the industrial "center" (Japan being the notable 
exception in th is regard, perhaps w ith some of the "first-tier" Asian NICs). 
This implies th a t "miracles" have been more com m only followed by either 
stagnation  at middle- or even low -incom e levels (a phen o m en o n  th a t can 
be called "truncated convergence") or by outrigh t collapses.
Figure 4.2  Percentage of developing countries w ith per capita GDP grow th (five-year 
m oving average) by intervals
■ Collapse (x< -3% ) □ (-3% < x< 0% ) □ (0% < x< 3% ) ■ S u c c e s s  (x>3%)
Source: Author's calculations based on Maddison (2001).
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This brief overview of historical trends helps to  underscore the  basic 
"stylized fact" about the post-war developm ent experience w hich serves as 
the  starting p o in t of th is chapter: unlike the "golden age" (1950-73) w hen 
there  was fairly widespread grow th in the  developing world and, in its last 
phase (1965-73), som e convergence of the  real incom es of developing 
countries vis-à-vis the industrial world, the period since 1980 can be charac­
terized as a "dual divergence," involving both  lower grow th rates of devel­
oping vis-à-vis industrial countries, but also strikingly different grow th 
experiences among developing countries (Figure 4.1). The interm ediate 
period, covering the  years betw een the  two oil shocks of the  1970s, was a 
mixed story: still high average growth in  the developing countries, but very 
h igh divergence am ong them .
The story can best be told in  term s of the  frequency of episodes of sus­
tained econom ic grow th and  collapses over tim e. In the  1960s and 1970s, 
about 40 percent of developing countries could be considered success 
stories (annual average per-capita GDP grow th greater th an  3 percent at 
least over a five-year period), but this proportion fell to less th an  20 percent 
through m ost of the past quarter century (Figure 4.2). In contrast, less th an  
15 percent of the  countries had negative grow th during th e  1960s and 
1970s, bu t th a t p roportion  increased to  over 40 percent in  the  1980s 
and early 1990s. Collapses (defined in th is graph as grow th rates of 
-3  percent per capita or less over at least a 5-year period) were ra ther 
nonex isten t during the  "golden age" but then  sho t up and becam e fre­
quen t during the  "lost decade" of the 1980s (in several parts of the devel­
oping world and no t only in  Latin America) and in the early 1990s (when 
collapses were com m on in th e  form er USSR, Central and Eastern Europe, 
and Sub-Saharan Africa).
A sim ilar story arises in Pritchett (2000), w ho catalogues countries 
according to  the  grow th pattern  followed before or after a statistically 
determ ined structural break, w hich, on average, fell around 1977-78. 
According to  th is classification, ou t of th e  88 countries included in his 
analysis, 7 followed a steep h ill;6 13 followed a hill pattern , w ith steady 
grow th around 1.5 percent, generally insufficient for convergence w ith the 
industrial center; and 7 accelerated7 after the  break. The m ajority of devel­
oping countries fall under the less appealing categories of grow th followed 
by stagnation (12 plateaus), grow th followed by con traction  (32 m o u n ­
tains) and stagnation, or very slow growth in b o th  periods (17 plains). This 
m eans tha t, for m ore th an  half of developing countries, grow th slowed 
dow n after the  structural break, w hile very few experienced the opposite 
trend.
6Fast growth, above 3% per capita, before and after the break.
7GDP growth below 1.5% before the break, followed by growth above 1.5%.
Figure 4 .3  Frequency of sustained growth and contractions in the developing world 
(a) Sustained per capita GDP growth by region
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Source: A u th o r's  calcu la tio n s  based o n  M add ison  (2001).
Note: First, 5-year m o v in g  averages o f p e r cap ita  GDP g ro w th  ra te s  were ca lcu la ted . T h en  we 
co u n ted  th e  n u m b e r o f co u n trie s  th a t experience  a ra te  below  0%  a n d  of those  w h ich  experience 
a ra te  above  2% . Finally , we o n ly  co n sid e r th e  cases in w h ich  4 of those  m o v in g  averages fulfill 
consecu tive ly  th o se  co n d itio n s .
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Table 4.1 Developing countries successes and collapses3
1950-1960  1960-1970  1970-1980  1980-1990  1990-2000
C um ula tive  g row th X > 25 42.6 49.5 45.5 15.8 30.7
o f w hich: X > 5 0 13 17 18 6 5
C um ula tive  g row th X < 0 6 7 27 54 31
o f w hich: X < -1 0 1 3 16 28 19
Source: A u th o r’s calcu la tions based  o n  M addison  (2001).
p e rc e n ta g e  of to ta l n u m b e r of coun tries  w h ith  cum ula tive  per capita  GDP g row th  rate 
(101 coun tries, 1990 G eary-K am in dollars, PPP).
Using a criterion of "success" sim ilar to  th a t used by H ausm ann et al. 
(2004) to define "sustained expansions" (four consecutive five-year periods 
w ith growth over 2 percent per capita8), we get again a similar picture: suc­
cessful growth clustered in the 1960s and 1970s (Figure 4.3.a). Those experi­
ences were w idespread in  the  developing world during the  "golden age," 
tended  to  disappear in  the  1980s, except in  East Asia, and becam e som e­
w hat m ore com m on in the  1990s, but at levels far below those of the  
"golden age." A sim ilar criterion to  define "sustained contractions" (four 
consecutive five-year periods w ith  negative GDP grow th per capita) in d i­
cates th a t they  were rather in frequent before the  first oil shock, then  
tended  to  appear m ore frequently  in  Africa betw een the two oil shocks, to 
become widespread during the  "lost decade" of the 1980s and the first half 
of the 1990s (Figure 4.3.b).
The cumulative effect of successes and collapses is summarized in 
Table 4.1. Between two-fifths and one-half of developing countries experi­
enced a fair rate of growth (25 percent per capita over a decade) from the 
1950s to the 1970s; this fell to less than one-fifth during the "lost decade" and 
increased again in the 1990s, although at levels far below those of the "golden 
age". Experiences of very rapid growth (over 50 percent in  a decade) were 
quite com m on from the 1950s to the 1970s, yet very infrequent since. In 
turn, experiences of negative or highly negative growth were very infrequent 
in  the 1950s and 1960s, started to become more com m on in the 1970s, shot 
up in the 1980s and were still very frequent in the 1990s. Seen as a whole, 
therefore, the era of structural reforms in the developing world still has a long 
way to go to m atch the performance of the  period of high State intervention 
in  development. And the transition from one era to the next has already been 
registered in history as a long and costly one.
A clear way to  sum m arize the  evidence is th a t growth successes and col­
lapses tend to cluster in specific time periods. It is unlikely th a t the  dom estic
8Four consecutive five-year periods are equivalent to an eight-year period. For 
example, if the first period is 1964-1968, for it to  be considered a sustained expan­
sion or contraction, the periods 1965-1969, 1966-1970 and 1967-1971 also have to 
be periods of 2% average growth (expansion) or negative growth (contraction).
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Figure 4.4  The global developm ent cycle, 1951-2004
Developing countries
WDI Worldbank Maddison
Source: A u th o r 's  c a lcu la tio n s  o f p e r c ap ita  GDP g ro w th  based  o n  M ad d iso n  (2001) a n d  W orld  
Bank W orld  D ev elo p m en t In d ica to rs  O n line .
factors explored in the growth literature can explain such clustering. Thus, we 
have to rely on com m on external factors, as well as on domestic policies that 
transm it their effects in developing countries (particularly procyclical macro- 
economic policies that tend to reinforce, rather than  sm ooth out, the domes­
tic effects of external shocks; see Ocampo, 2005b). The outstanding difference 
between "the dual divergence" and the "golden age" has been the significant 
increase in the frequency of growth collapses and the m uch lower frequency 
of growth successes over the past quarter century (1980-2005).
The clustering of both  successes and collapses implies that a global develop­
ment cycle has dominated the medium-term trajectory followed by developing 
countries. This cycle should be understood as the average growth performance 
of developing countries resulting from a set of external factors that affects all 
or large clusters of them, and thus constrains each country's growth possibili­
ties. While, historically, these factors have been associated w ith dynam ic 
processes originating in the industrial world, they have also increasingly 
encompassed the global effects of events originating in developing countries 
w ith systemic importance. These determ inants of the cycle may have diverg­
ing effects on different countries and regions. In this sense, the average 
growth trajectory is no t inconsistent w ith variable performance w ithin the 
developing world and, particularly, w ith strong regional dimensions.
Figure 4.5  External debt sustainability and interest rates, 1970-2004 
Debt/GNI ratio and US real interest rate
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Figure 4 .6  Primary com m odities and developing countries term s of trade, 
1900-2005
-Commodities/manufactures price index Manufactures/manufactures price index (right scale)
Source: Grill i  a n d  Y an g  (1 988) ;  O c a m p o  a n d  Par ra  (2 003) ; a n d  U n i t e d  N a t i o n s  (2003).
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Given the leading role played by the industrial world in  determ ining the 
global developm ent cycle, it is no t surprising th a t the  cycle coincides, to 
some extent, w ith  th e  average grow th perform ance of industrial countries. 
Thus, th e  end of the  "golden age" in industrial countries also m arked the 
end of the  "golden age" of developm ent. Nonetheless, o ther determ inants 
of the  cycle are m ore specific and relate to  global trade trends (including 
those associated w ith com m odity  markets) and w ith boom -bust cycles in 
in ternational financing to  developing countries.
The global development cycle is depicted in  Figure 4.4, in  terms of the  evo­
lu tion  of the unw eighted average per capita GDP grow th of developing 
countries. The oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 disturbed the  norm al func­
tioning of developed countries' economies, generating inflation and reces­
sion, and had im portan t effects in developing countries as well (directly 
and through the  recycling of petrodollars). Nonetheless, the  dynam ics of 
oil m arkets had different effects on different countries and thus canno t 
explain the  general dow nturn  observed by 1980. To explain tha t, we tu rn  
to  two m ajor and largely unexpected shocks th a t severely affected several 
parts of the developing world.
The first was the  permanent effect o f the interest rate shock of 1979 
(Figure 4.5). The second was the  structural downward shift o f the terms o f  
trade (Figure 4.6). The in terest rate shock had no historical precedents. As 
inflation  prom ptly  receded, real in terest rates in  the  US (using the  10-year 
Treasury note rate as a benchm ark) increased from -1 .8  percent in  1979 to 
3.6 percent in 1981, reaching a peak of 8.2 percent in 1984. The rate faced 
by developing countries was even higher: the average risk prem ium  paid by 
developing countries added to  the  LIBOR rate rose from 2.5 percent in 1979 
to  22 percent in  1981 in real term s. Having profited from the  recycling of 
petrodollars, developing countries suffered a substantial shock tha t implied, 
for m any of them , significant balance of paym ents distress. The non-oil 
com m odity term s of trade shock did have precedents, but only in  the 
d istan t past (in the  1920s). Real non-oil com m odity  prices experienced a 
structural dow nw ard shift of over 30 percent, breaking the  long stretch 
since the  1920s w hen they  had been essentially trend-less (Ocampo and 
Parra, 2003). The price index of m anufactures exported by developing 
countries, relative to  m anufactures exported by developed countries, expe­
rienced a sim ultaneous dow nturn . The unprecedented character of the  
interest rate shock and the d istan t m em ory of a com parable terms-of-trade 
shock explain the  unexpectedly large m agnitude of ex-post risks tha t devel­
oping world had to confront.
The debt dynam ics of developing countries tu rned  explosive after the 
interest rate shock and had bo th  short-term  and long-term effects. The pro­
portion of developing countries w ith m oderate debt ratios (over 50 percent 
of GDP) had been rising from  the  m id-1970s bu t was still low prior to  the  
shock, whereas the proportion w ith critical debt ratios (over 100 percent of
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GDP) was very low (Figure 4.5). Both increased sharply after the  in terest 
rate shock and rem ained at high levels for the next quarter century, for 
three basic reasons. The first is th a t real in terest rates rem ained high: over 
4.5 percent for alm ost 20 years for th a t same US in terest rate; in  fact, they 
only returned to  low real levels in the  early 2000s. The second was the lack 
of in ternational institu tions to  m anage debt overhangs; th is is in  sharp 
contrast to  the  1930s, w hen one such "institu tion" was available: broad 
based m oratoria. Eventually a few solutions emerged, bu t had only weak 
effects: the  Brady Plan of the late 1980s and the  Heavily Indebted Poor 
C ountries (HIPC) Initiative of the  mid-1990s (still no t fully im plem ented). 
The th ird  was th a t, together w ith the hike in in terest rates, net financial 
flows became negative. Thus, net resource transfers rem ained highly nega­
tive un til the  early 1990s for a vast num ber of developing countries. The 
Asian crisis, and its contagion effects, interrupted the recovery of the 1990s, 
a lthough  the  crisis had weaker and m ore tem porary  effects th an  the  debt 
crisis of the 1980s.
Interestingly, the two factors th a t generated the  "lost decade" m ay at 
long last be w aning. Low real in terest rates and the HIPC Initiative m ay 
finally break the  long-term  debt overhangs, while Chinese-led grow th 
has strengthened  com m odity  m arkets. These are some reasons w hy the 
global developm ent cycle may be experiencing an  upward shift (see 
Figure 4.4). It is still unclear, however, if these recent trends and the ir 
effects on the  global developm ent cycle will be sustainable, as the dis­
turbance in global financial markets associated w ith the  correction of 
current global im balances may lead to higher interest rates or risk prem ia, 
and  com m odity prices may have already reached a plateau (United 
N ations, 2006). To the ex ten t th a t ODA to the  poorest countries of 
the  world increases, based on the  com m itm ents m ade in recent years, 
ODA m ay also becom e a positive de term inan t of the  global developm ent 
cycle.
The central role played by the  global developm ent cycle does not render 
regional and country-specific factors insignificant. Indeed, these factors 
play an im portan t role, particularly in explaining why a country  or region 
departs from the  average trend  in either phase of the  cycle -  i.e., why it 
does no t experience rapid grow th during periods of grow th success in the  
developing world as a whole, or w hy it can m itigate or entirely  avoid a 
grow th collapse. N onetheless, this is an entirely  different question th an  
th a t raised in  cross-country econom etrics. This m eans th a t the relevant 
country- and region-specific factors depend on  those affecting the global 
developm ent cycle and its dom estic transm ission m echanism s -  and may 
thus be tim e-bound. It also implies that short-term  dynamics, including the 
way m acroeconom ic policy is done, can play a m ore p rom inen t role th an  
the  one usually a ttribu ted  in the  grow th literature. It m eans, finally, th a t 
long-term  determ inants of grow th -  such as institu tions, or the level of
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hum an capital -  largely play a role to the  extent th a t they help explain the 
capacity of individual countries to  benefit from  upw ard phases and their 
vulnerability  to  external shocks during th e  dow nw ard phase of the  global 
developm ent cycle.
This can be illustrated by the  variable perform ance of different develop­
ing countries during the  "lost decade,” w hen, under sim ilar adverse cir­
cum stances, some countries ended up in  m ajor crises, while others did 
not. Variance in  perform ance am ong developing countries has been 
analyzed from two different angles. The first is th rough characteristics of 
the m acroeconom ic adjustm ent m echanism , and the  second is through the 
institu tional effects of the massive shocks com ing from financial and com ­
m odity markets. The literature th a t has analyzed different ad justm ent 
m echanism  has underscored the  virtues of a broader set of m acroeconom ic 
instrum ents, including m ixing o rthodox w ith less o rthodox instrum ents 
(see, for example, Taylor, 1988). The degree of trade liberalization, as m ea­
sured by the levels of tariff and non-tariff protection, did not play a role in 
the  relative perform ance of different countries during the  1980s (see, for 
example, UNCTAD, 1992, Part II, Ch. I), but the  degree of m acroeconom ic 
instability, defined in  orthodox terms, did have significant effects. This is, 
furtherm ore, the  correct in terp re ta tion  of the  effects of several measures 
of "openness" used in cross-country econom etrics, as em phasized by 
Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001). The possibility and existence of national 
strategies to  profit from  th e  growing m arkets in  the  industrial world for 
m anufactures produced in developing countries did have im portance as 
well (see the next section). But, as indicated in the  volum inous literature 
on East Asian industrialization, the strategy followed by these countries has 
been quite different from trade liberalization, in the  trad itional sense (see, 
for example, Amsden, 2001, and Wade, 1990).
The adverse effect of inflation on growth has been used to show the inci­
dence of m acroeconom ic instability  on  th e  relative perform ance of differ­
en t countries. Seen in this light, however, inflation is partly  an effect of 
external shocks. This is reflected in the frequency of episodes of high 
inflation in the developing world during the "lost decade." That frequency 
resulted m ainly from the broad-based foreign exchange gaps tha t develop­
ing countries faced, w hich had direct and indirect im pacts on dom estic 
inflation (via devaluation).
As Rodrik (1999) has argued, institu tional factors, particularly insti­
tu tions for m anaging conflict, m ay help explain  why, of countries facing 
the  same adverse circum stances, only some ended up w ith this type of 
m acroeconom ic disequilibria. This argum ent gives strong indirect backing 
to  the  old Latin American structuralist idea th a t distributive conflicts 
underlie inflation. O ther structural factors m ay have been at work, too. 
A typical debate in  the  Latin American literature of the  1980s focused on 
the "dom estic transfer problem " (transferring resources to  the governm ent
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to service the foreign debt). This transfer was m ade m ore difficult in those 
countries in w hich th e  governm ent did no t have direct access to foreign 
exchange (i.e., did n o t directly or indirectly contro l the  foreign exchange 
generated by exports), and thus had to guarantee access to foreign ex­
change through indirect m eans (see, for example, ECLAC, 1996). Inflation­
ary crises were m ore com m on in countries where in ternal transfer was 
more difficult.
These argum ents indicate th a t external factors have a direct, as well as an 
indirect, effect on perform ance in developing countries. The indirect links 
are associated w ith the capacity of individual countries to manage vulnera­
bility, bu t vulnerability  w ould no t have played an im portan t role unless 
th e  countries faced an external shock. Thus, the  features of the  relevant 
dom estic factors are no t independent of those of the external variables th a t 
determ ine th e  global developm ent cycle. Furtherm ore, th e  in teraction  
betw een external and dom estic factors m ay be contingen t on th e  circum ­
stances surrounding a specific period, and their jo in t effect may have long­
term  im plications associated w ith path dependence.
The large and unexpected shocks th a t the  developing world faced in the  
early 1980s provide th e  best explanation  of th e  poor average perform ance 
of developing countries during the  "lost decade," while the relatively direct 
im pact of the  shocks, as well as th e  way econom ies adjusted to them ,
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provide a first explanation  of diverging perform ance am ong countries. 
A second explanation  focuses on how  dom estic institu tions or o ther 
dom estic factors m ay have affected the  dom estic response to  massive 
shocks. We will concentrate  in the  next section on  a th ird  factor, h igh ­
lighted in m uch of the  structuralist literature, yet generally ignored in 
m ainstream  growth analysis: the role of specialization patterns.
Patterns of specialization
As we have poin ted  out, the  experience of developing countries indicates 
th a t grow th takes place no t in  steady flows, bu t in spurts and  collapses of 
different m agnitude and frequency. The transform ation  of production 
structures and the  role of specialization patterns are crucial in  this context. 
In a broad sense, long-term  grow th can be understood  as a sequence of 
sector-specific growth spurts, their intensity and the domestic linkages they 
generate (Ocampo, 2005a). These spurts are the  result of innovations and 
the transform ation of production structures th a t they induce.
In developed countries, innovations are associated w ith  technological 
waves -  or, perhaps using Schumpeter's (1961) terminology, different forms 
of innovations or "new  com binations.” In developing countries, innova­
tions are more closely linked to the attraction of sectors, activities and tech­
nologies previously developed in the industrial world. Historically, this has 
involved processes of im port substitu tion , export p rom otion  or a m ix of 
bo th  strategies. In this context, a lthough m acroeconom ic policy can cer­
tain ly  block or prom ote it, steady grow th can be essentially seen as the 
result of a successful sequence of innovations in production structures (i.e., 
of micro and, particularly, mesoeconom ic processes). These sectoral dynam ­
ics are ignored or assumed to  play a passive role in grow th analyses tha t 
concentrate on  institu tional or m acroeconom ic features and policies. In 
contrast, it plays a central role in  the  "structuralist" trad ition  of econom ic 
th ink ing , broadly defined, w here grow th is viewed as the  result of success 
in m anaging the dynam ic transform ation of production structures.
Seen in  this light, the  m ajor issue over the past quarter century has been 
the rapid transform ation  of the  structure of developing country  exports: 
prim ary goods and  natural-resource intensive m anufactures fell relative to  
low-, mid- and high-technology m anufactures (see Figure 4.7). Ail develop­
ing country regions diversified in to  the m ore dynam ic com ponents of 
world trade, but East and South Asia diversified m uch faster (including into 
low -technology m anufactures), followed by Latin America. The success 
stories of the East Asian countries have been related to  their achievem ents 
in entering  external m arkets, profiting from dynam ic econom ies of scale 
and transform ing their production structures accordingly.
Three factors are im portan t in understanding the links between the  evo­
lution of international trade over the past quarter century and the record of
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econom ic growth in the developing world. The first is the rate of growth of 
global markets for developing countries' exports. Dynamic markets for such 
exports can be generated by high incom e-elasticities of final dem and for 
them  in the industrial world, by economies of diversification (i.e., high and 
rising dem and for diversity of designs), or by the  transfer of activities to the  
developing world due to cost factors (particularly wage costs). The second 
factor is the strong dynam ic econom ies of scale th a t characterize sectors 
with large technological content. In this regard, it can be expected tha t spe­
cialization in sectors w ith  greater technological con ten t will lead to faster 
grow th. The first two factors are linked in practice, as higher technology 
products are th e  m ost dynam ic in world trade (La'll, 2001; UNIDO, 2002). 
The th ird  is the spatial agglom eration th a t m ay result from static or 
dynam ic economies of scale. This has long been a key issue in regional eco­
nom ics and has taken center stage in the  recent literature on  econom ic 
geography (see, for example, Fujita et al., 1999).
In the  face of the diverse dynam ics th a t characterize world markets, 
developing countries can adopt either of two broadly defined export strate­
gies: increasing m arket shares in sectors where a specific country  has an 
established position and diversifying in to  higher technology products. The 
first strategy is widely available; the second m ay only be available to a 
lim ited num ber of developing countries. This is particularly  true for high 
technology exports, where opportunities may be subject to agglom eration 
effects. O pportunities for producing prim ary goods and resource-intensive 
m anufactures are m ore broadly available, b u t the dynam ism  of in te r­
national m arkets is lim ited and can therefore lead to  "fallacy of com posi­
tion" effects. C onsequently , th e  sim ultaneous entry  of several countries 
in to  these m arkets will lead to  an oversupply of exports th a t will be 
reflected in falling term s of trade for developing countries as a whole 
and /o r to high-cost producers being displaced from the  m arket. Low-tech 
m anufactures fall in between these two cases.
Individual countries can succeed w ith any of these strategies, especially if 
they  im plem ent appropriate productive strategies (see, for example, the  
success of Chile w ith  th e  first, or th a t of the  Republic of Korea w ith 
the second). However, as a group, developing countries can only succeed, in 
any m arket, if final dem and is elastic and /o r if developed countries lose 
m arket shares -  provided of course th a t th e  process is no t ham pered by 
protectionism  in the developed countries.
The existing literature has explored these issues in different ways. Lall
(2001) argues th a t export structures, being path-dependent, have im portant 
im plications for grow th and developm ent, w ith h ighest technology p rod­
ucts having the  greatest benefits in terms of learning and spillover effects, 
as well as being m ore dynam ic in world trade. Palma (2004) expresses a 
sim ilar view based on the  different capacity th a t low- vs. high-technology 
products have in inducing m edium - and long-term  productivity grow th in
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the  econom y as a whole, as well as their relative dynam ism  in world trade. 
Hausm ann et al. (2005) have argued, in turn, th a t the quality of exports, as 
indicated in the  "incom e level" of a country 's exports (i.e., an estim ate of 
the  weighted average incom e of countries exporting  specific products, 
w hich may be seen to  reflect the ir technological conten t), is an indepen­
dent determ inant of econom ic growth.
These relations have been used to explain East Asia's m uch superior 
grow th perform ance. According to  Lall (2001) and Palma (2004), am ong 
others, th a t perform ance is closely associated w ith th e  con tinuous effort, 
bo th  by the  State and  the corporate sector, to  upgrade export production 
capacities. UNCTAD (2003) provides a detailed analysis of the  significant 
divergence in the  grow th of developing countries along these lines. The 
East Asian econom ies have experienced persistent industrialization drives. 
In contrast, in  Sub-Saharan Africa, the  share of m anufacturing in  GDP 
fell in the  1980s and stabilized in the 1990s at relatively low levels. South 
America has experienced prem ature deindustrialization, while Mexico and 
Central America avoided this trend by specializing in high-im port intensive 
m anufacturing exports, but w ith lim ited benefits in  term s of grow th 
(see also, in th is regard, ECLAC, 2004; O cam po and M artin, 2004; Palma,
2005).
Some of the transform ation processes involved have links to the  external 
shocks experienced by developing countries -  i.e., to  the  dynam ics of the  
global developm ent cycle. Thus, UNCTAD (2003) argues th a t the  im pact of 
in tegration  in to  the  world econom y largely depends on the  circum stances 
under w hich it takes place and on the  policies pursued during the  in te ­
gration phase. In tegration  of Latin America and Africa (as well as Central 
and Eastern Europe) m arked a sharp shift in  developm ent strategy, occur­
ring in a “big-bang" m anner and following the  debt crisis (i.e., a period 
of weakness). This contrasts w ith the in tegration  process in  East Asia, 
w hich occurred from a position  of strength  and was characterized by a 
continuous and purposeful strategy of gradual opening  up. Expressing it 
in the  Schum peterian term inology used by O cam po (2005a), in  East Asia, 
the "creative" elem ents prevailed ("creative destruction"), while in  o ther 
regions of the  world, the "destructive" com ponents of the restructuring 
process were stronger ("destructive creation"), reflecting the  destruction 
of m any im port-substitu tion  activities and the  weak dom estic linkages 
generated by new export sectors.
The developm ent im pact of the  strategy of a given country  would 
depend not only on success in entering markets, but also on the capacity to 
capture a share of the  value added in the p roduction  chain. This is, in  a 
sense, obvious and even tautological, for GDP is n o th in g  else but "value 
added", bu t it can have broader im plications, as those activities w ith 
lim ited value added (e.g., m aquila) are also likely to  be footloose. In the  
term s used by Palma (2004), unless the industries are firmly "anchored"
Figure 4.8  Specialization vs. growth: simple correlation patterns, 1980-2002 
(a) Primary commodities and natural resource based manufactures
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Absolute change in primary commodities and natural resource based 
manufactures share in total exports, 1980-2002
(b) Low-tech manufactures
-40% -20% 0% 20% 40%  60%  80%  100%
Absolute change in low-tech manufactures share in total exports
(c) Medium-and-high-tech manufactures
Absolute change in low-tech manufactures share in total exports 
Source: A u th o r's  ca lcu la tio n s  based o n  UNCTAD H an d b o o k  o f In te rn a tio n a l S tatistics O n lin e  a n d  
UN data.
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Table 4 .2  Share of exports by technological content and 
economic growth in countries th a t specialized in primary 
comm odities and natural resource-based manufactures
Primary products Natural resource-based
m anufactures
A n nua l Annual
c Share in average Share in average GDP
•Ì c
country increase country increase growth Average
Ç •gj exports 1980- exports 198 0 - 198 0 - GDP
6 U l i 2002(% ) 2002(% ) 2 002(% ) 2002(% ) 2002(% ) growt)i(%)
Increasing market shares
Cltife 152 2 9 51 .6 6.8 39.1 5.4 2 .86
Seychelles 6 9 0 1 1 20.2 1.8 73.2 29.8 2.44
Oman 512 3 13 86.0 9.6 2 .26
Uganda 800 1 I 83.9 0.3 2 1 6
Sudan 736 1 3 31.7 0.7 65.3 11.7 1.81
Chad 148 1 2 92 .2 5.S 1.78
Crated RepuU c of Tanzania 834 1 1 66.5 1.0 26.6 1.5 1.21
Burkina Faso 8S4 1 5 79.4 2 4 1.20
Benin 204 1 S 8 2 2 8.3 1 .13
Panama 591 2 8 66.7 7.1 1.07
Colombia 170 2 9 5 2 1 3.4 0 .96
Mali 4 6 6 1 5 81.3 S.5 0 .8 8
Mceambiqie 508 1 1 86.8 6.5 0.74
Jamaica 388 2 7 83,1 0.3 0 .64
Sen egal 686 1 5 58.9 3.4 0.64
Guinea 324 1 5 90.6 0.5 0.49
Mauitania 478 1 5 S0.3 3.8 46.4 3.6 0 .4 2
¡ran, Islamic Republic cf 364 3 11 89.7 9.3 0 .37
Brazil 76 2 9 28.6 6.1 30.1 4.7 0 .3 6
S yriun Arab Republic 760 3 13 83.9 5,3 0 .30
Ecuador 218 2 9 76.0 2.8 0 .15
Guinea-Bissau 624 I 5 95.7 7.9 0.05
Malawi 454 1 1 77.8 1.8 - 0 . 1 3
Congo 178 1 2 79.4 1.9 - 0 . 1 4
Paraguay 6 0 0 2 9 68.7 4.8 - 0 . 5 0
Pern 604 2 9 48.6 2.1 33.8 3.S - 0 . 5 4
Angola 24 1 2 89.3 5.4 - 0 . 5 6
Bahrain 4 8 3 13 73.3 3.8 - 0 . 6 2
Argentina 32 2 9 50.3 4.4 27.3 5.9 - 0 . 7 2
Cameroon 120 1 2 75.5 1.0 21.3 3.0 - 0 . 7 7
Zimbabwe 7 16 1 1 41 .8 0.0 27.1 6.3 - 0 .9 6
Gabon 266 1 2 8 2 1 0.7 - 1 .3 8
Venezuela 8 6 2 2 9 83.1 3.9 -  1.43
Nicaragua 558 2 8 6 2 1 1.1 2 2 5 3.4 -  1.65
Comoros 174 1 1 9 2 2 1.6 -  1.72
Som alia 706 1 1 58.4 2.9 35.1 4 .1% - 2 . 2 5
United Arab Emirates 784 3 13 6 2 9 3.5 - 3 . 3 0  0.20
Decreasing market shares
Egypt 818 1 3 28.5 - 0 . 6 41.6 5.9 2.41
Cuba 192 2 7 85.0 - 4 . 8 0.70
Ghana 2 88 1 5 54.4 - 0 .4 37.2 1.2 0.47
Gambia 270 1 5 76.4 - 4 . 1 0.08
Algeria 12 1 3 83.3 - 0 . 6 - 0 . 0 4
Guatemala 320 2 8 45.6 -  1.0 26.9 5.1 - 0 . 1 6
Kenya 404 1 1 36.7 -  1.1 47.3 0.1 - 0 ,2 1
Rwanda 646 1 1 61.6 - 4 . 9 35.7 -  1.5 - 0 , 2 2
Bolivia 6 8 2 9 54.9 1.4 30.7 -  1.1 - 0 . 2 4
Nigeria 566 1 5 99.8 - 0 . 4 - 0 . 2 8
C ôte d’Ivoire 384 1 5 59.4 3.4 2 2 3 - 0 . 8 - 0 . 4 5
Burund 10 8 1 1 79.8 - 4 .2 - 0 .6 1
Central African Republic 140 1 2 86 .8 - 1 . 3 - 1 .0 9
Togo 768 1 5 46.6 - 2 . 7 38.4 - 0 . 6 -  1.52
Zambia 894 1 1 63.1 - 2 . 7 21.8 - 0 . 9 - 1 .7 3
Niger 562 1 5 3 2 3 - 0 . 1 59.5 - 6 . 4 -  1.87
Djibouti 262 1 1 34.4 - 1 . 4 39.4 0.7 - 1 .8 7
S ao Tome and Principe 678 1 2 96.2 - 5 . 6 -  1.92
Kuwait 414 3 13 6 2 3 1.0 3 2 7 -  1.2 - 2 . 3 8
Sierra Leone 694 1 5 91.1 - 5 . 7 - 2 . 6 8
Libyan Arab J amahiriya 434 1 3 81.5 -  1.4 - 3 . 3 8
Som h Arabia 682 3 13 87.0 - 3 . 0 - 5 . 0 6  - 1 .0 0
Source: A uthor's calcu la tions based o n  UNCTAD H andbook  of 
In te rn a tio n a l Statistics O n lin e  an d  UN data.
Table 4.3  Share of exports by technological con ten t and econom ic growth in countries 
diversifying exports to  non-resource based manufactures
004^
Primary products Na turai resource-based Lo w- tech Medium-tech High-tech
manufactures manufactures manufactures manufactures
Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual
Share in average Share in average Share in average Share in average Share in average G D P
S country increase country increase country increase counfry increase country increase growth Average
-a • | exports 1980- exports 1980- exports 1980- exports 1980- exports ¡9 8 0 - 1980- G D P
a <5 « 2 00 2 (% ) 2002(% ) 2 00 2(% ) 2 00 2(% ) 200 2 (% ) 2002(% ) 2 0 0 2 (% ) 2002(% ) 2O02(% ) 2 0 0 2 (% ) 2 0 0 2 (% ) grow th(% )
Diversifying to low, m edium
or high-tech  m anufactures
China ¡56 3 20 39.0 14.1 27.4 25.1 8.20
Republic o f Korea 410 3 10 30 .9 10.7 38 .4 17.0 6 .09
Thailand 764 3 12 20.4 14.1 31.4 31.5 4.50
Singapore 702 3 12 58.6 15 .9 4.11
HongKongSAR, China 344 3 10 37 .2 9.4 20 .6 10.5 35 .2 17.3 3.54
Malaysia 458 3 12 52.7 18.0 3.44
Turkey 792 3 13 49 .6 15.5 20.7 18.5 2 .00
Israel 376 3 13 45.3 10.3 26.6 14.5 1.64
Hungay 348 4 14 33.3 22.2 31.5 17.2 1.55
Poland 626 4 14 30.6 6.6 30.4 3.8 1.24
Costa Rica 188 2 8 26.6 26 26.7 22.4 1.04
Czech Republic 200 4 14 20.4 4 .0 26 .0 2.9 27.7 4.3 21 .9 10.5 0.94
Mexico 484 2 8 26.6 12.1 33.1 15.3 0.52
Trinidad andTabago 780 2 7 20.6 -3 .3 4 6 .6 -1 .1 2S.2 14.3 0.44
Philippines 608 3 12 70.6 29.5 0.22
Romania 642 4 14 48.0 2.9 21.5 0.4 -0 .1 2 2.5
D iversifying to low-tech
m anufactures
Viet Nam 704 3 12 50.4 18.3 31 .9 20.7 4.59
Mairifais 480 1 1 24.6 1.5 62.9 11.9 4.47
India 356 3 11 32.1 11.6 36 .2 9.4 3.S8
Indonesia 360 3 12 31.9 0.1 24.6 5.9 20 .6 2 1 .S 3.34
Cape Verde 132 1 5 93.1 25.7 3.23
Sri lanka 144 3 11 22.8 22 S9.1 15.3 3.18
N^anmar 104 3 12 53.0 10.2 27.9 28.0 2.71
Dominican Republic 214 2 7 61.4 4.1 2.4S
Nepal 524 3 11 74.0 11.2 2.25
Tunisia 788 1 3 53.2 10.0 2.16
Bangladesh 50 3 11 88.8 10.2 1.97
Pakistan 586 3 11 76.0 8.3 1.89
M aocco 504 I 3 22.6 1.2 20.1 3.6 38.5 11.5 1.15
Albania 8 4 16 80.8 8.7 1.07
El Salvador 222 2 8 28.3 10.8 34 .2 5.0 0 .69
Mongolia 496 3 10 26.6 -4 .7 37.9 12.0 34.5 4.1 0.61
Uruguay 858 2 9 41.5 3.4 22.3 5 .2 29 .2 0.6 0.21
Honduras 340 2 8 31 .2 -0 .1 43.6 S.5 20 .2 8.1 -0 .1 6
Jordan 400 3 13 24.7 5.2 29.3 10.2 -0 .6 8
Madagascar 450 1 1 55.2 -3 .1 32 .8 10.6 -2 .0 8
Ha it) 332 2 7 85.3 4.1 -2 .4 2 1.6
Source-. A u th o r’s calcu la tions based o n  UNCTAD H an d b o o k  o f In te rn a tio n a l Statistics O n lin e  a n d  UN data.
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Figure 4 .9  Specialization vs. growth: 1980-2002 
(a) Gains or losses in market share in 1980-2002
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pessim ism ," in  the  sense th a t it could be self-defeating for developing 
countries to  try to  industrialize. But several individual case studies for Asia 
show th a t this is no t necessarily true. Some countries have in fact achieved 
significant term s of trade gains. Could o ther developing countries also 
avoid this "curse"? There are, indeed, grounds for optim ism , but only in 
so far as developing countries take a m ore pro-active a ttitude towards 
p rom oting  technological im provem ents, industrialization, and export 
diversification.
The sim ple correlation betw een specialization patterns and grow th pre­
sented in Figure 4.8 provides a first look at the  relevance of the previous 
argum ents. Econom ic grow th in  the  developing world is negatively corre­
lated w ith continued  reliance on the  exports of prim ary goods and natural 
resource-intensive manufactures, but positively correlated w ith diversifying 
into mid- and high-tech manufactures, w ith no clear pattern w hen we look 
at low -tech m anufactures. There are, however, significant differences in 
perform ance around the  average pattern.
A closer look at th is issue shows the  in teraction  betw een two different 
variables: success in  increasing m arket shares and specialization patterns. 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 provide a detailed look at the  evidence on the  in te r­
action betw een these two factors. The first shows countries th a t have 
continued to  rely on  natural-resource-based m anufactures or prim ary com ­
modities, while the second looks at countries able to increase market shares 
in non-resource-based m anufacturing categories. In b o th  cases, we restrict 
the  analysis to  sectors th a t represent at least 20 percent of the exports of a 
country in  2002.
The evidence presented by these tw o tables is striking and can be sum ­
m arized in  four m ajor conclusions.10 First, m ost countries th a t have failed 
to  increase shares in  world m arkets are exporters of prim ary goods or 
natural resource-intensive manufactures, and all of them  experienced either 
low grow th or per-capita GDP contraction . Second, success in increasing 
m arket shares in  these sectors has been generally associated w ith  weak 
grow th. Indeed, Chile, Seychelles, Om an, Uganda, and Egypt are the  only 
cases in the  sample of 96 countries analyzed th a t extracted GDP per capita 
growth above 2 percent during 1980-2002 from a strategy based on natural 
resources (Table 4.2). O ther countries th a t had rapid rates of growth mixed 
th is strategy w ith low-tech m anufactures (Vietnam, M auritius, India, 
Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and M yanm ar) or high-tech m anufactures (Costa 
Rica, which had, in any case, a m uch lower rate of growth). Third, there are 
cases of countries (Cape Verde, D om inican Republic, Nepal, and Tunisia)
I0The analysis is based on the structure of exports of goods. Therefore, it does no t 
include diversification in to  services, w hich may be behind some of the rapid success 
stories.
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th a t have extracted rapid grow th from a specialization pattern  based on 
low-tech m anufactures or, as previously m entioned , by m ixing it w ith  
natural-resource-intensive goods, but m ost developing countries th a t have 
grown fast have been increasing m arket shares in mid- or high-technology 
exports (Table 4.3). Finally, there is, in any case, a significant difference in 
the  capacity of Asian countries to  extract grow th out of these sectors vis-à- 
vis Latin American (Costa Rica and  Mexico), C entral European (Hungary 
and Poland) and W est Asian (Turkey) countries. This may be related to  the 
"destructive" features of productive restructuring underw ay outside Asia, 
bu t also to  th e  stronger linkages associated w ith new technology exports 
in Asia, w hich are in  some cases national, but m ore generally regional in 
character.
Figure 4.9 sum m arizes in  a sim ple way the evidence provided in 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3. Panel a shows the very large difference in  average 
grow th rates betw een countries undergoing a transform ation  of special­
ization patterns in to  higher technology exports vs. those specializing in 
natural resource-intensive sectors, even w hen they increased market shares 
in those sectors. Those gaining m arket share in low-tech m anufactures 
fall in betw een. Panel b shows th a t countries th a t still based their exports 
m ainly on prim ary com m odities and natural-resource-based m anufactures 
in 2002 did no t grow in the previous two decades. Countries th a t grew the 
most had specialized in  two (out of three) non-natural resource based m an­
ufacturing categories or only in  h igh-tech m anufactures. Mixes involving 
natural resource exports w ith non-natural resource intensive manufactures, 
as well as specialization in  low -tech m anufactures, fall in  betw een. This 
indicates th a t specialization patterns, and  their evolution  over tim e, do 
m atter. Indeed, few factors am ong those explored in standard  grow th 
regressions can explain differences as large as those captured in Tables 4.2 
and 4.3 and Figure 4.9, w hich are in the  order of 3 percentage points 
per year.
A lthough the  conclusions are no t necessarily very encouraging for all 
developing countries, they indicate th a t any country  w anting  to  speed up 
grow th should learn from  the  NIEs' State and  corporate efforts to consis­
ten tly  upgrade export p roduction  capacities. A lthough diversifying in to  
mid- and high-technology exports is no t feasible for m any developing 
countries, and there may be agglom eration forces at work th a t benefit the  
already dynam ic East Asian regional cluster, there could be opportun ities 
for some of them  tha t should no t be disregarded.
Most developing countries would have to  com pete in prim ary goods, 
natural resource, or low-tech m anufacturing exports, w here they  may face 
"fallacy of com position" effects. The m edium -term  op tion  is clearly to 
prom ote the continued opening of markets for these products by industrial 
countries. In the  long term , countries should no t hesitate to  en ter the  
export learning process, always having in  m ind  the objective of upgrading
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export capabilities and avoiding stagnation  around prim ary com m odities 
and perhaps even labor-intensive m anufactures.
Conclusions
This chapter analyzes m ajor factors explain ing the  transition  from the 
"golden age” of fairly w idespread grow th in the  developing world in 
1950-73 to  the "dual divergence" since 1980, involving both  lower grow th 
rates of developing vis-à-vis developed countries and strikingly different 
grow th experiences am ong developing countries. It builds from a growing 
body of literature em phasizing discontinuities in th e  grow th experience 
of developing countries -  grow th spurts and collapses -  th a t render tra ­
d itional cross-country econom etrics involving long tim e periods a rather 
useless analytical tool. The chapter builds also on  issues traditionally  
em phasized by the  structuralist literature, yet frequently ignored by m ain­
stream developm ent economists.
A clear way to summarize the evidence is that growth successes and collapses 
tend to cluster in specific time periods. It is unlikely tha t the  domestic factors 
explored in the mainstream growth literature can explain such clustering; so, 
we have to rely on  com m on external factors. The significant increase in the 
frequency of collapses and the m uch lower frequency of successes in the past 
quarter century (1980-2005) is the significant difference between the period 
of the "dual divergence" and the "golden age." The clustering of successes and 
collapses implies th a t a global development cycle has dom inated developm ent 
trends. The global developm ent cycle is partly determ ined by that of the 
industrial world countries. Thus, the end of the  "golden age" in industrial 
countries also marked the end of the "golden age" of development. However, 
other determ inants of this cycle are m ore specific, and have to do w ith the 
functioning of financial markets vis-à-vis developing countries (and, more par­
ticularly, emerging markets) and w ith the major structural dow nturn experi­
enced by the terms of trade in the 1980s.
Of course, country-specific factors still play a role, explaining why a 
country does n o t experience rapid growth during periods of growth success 
in th e  developing world as a whole, or why it can better m anage 
vulnerabilities during dow nsw ings of the  global developm ent cycle. And 
dom estic policies, particularly pro-cyclical m acroeconom ic policies, are 
crucial for transm itting  th e  effects of external shocks. N onetheless, the 
relevant dom estic factors are n o t independen t of the  external factors th a t 
determ ine th e  global developm ent cycle. Furtherm ore, this in teraction  
betw een external and  dom estic factors m ay be con tingen t on the circum ­
stances surrounding a specific period.
D iscontinuities in the grow th experience are im portan t, due to the  path  
dependence generated by dynam ic econom ies of scale, w hich reflect the 
links between technological learning and production  experience. An addi-
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tional issue, no t explored in th is chapter, is associated w ith the  effects of 
shocks and m ajor institu tional changes on State institu tion-build ing , due 
to the complex "learning" process involved.
Discontinuities are also im portant for developm ent in the sense tha t long­
term  growth should be understood as the result of a sequence of sector- 
specific growth spurts, their intensity and the domestic linkages they generate. 
This implies that specialization patterns are crucial to understand growth dynam­
ics. Overall, the evidence presented in this chapter underscores the very large 
difference between the average growth of countries undergoing a transform a­
tion  of specialization patterns into higher technology exports and tha t of 
countries experiencing success in primary goods sectors.
This conclusion is not necessarily very encouraging for developing coun­
tries as a whole, for the  opportun ity  to  diversify in to  m edium - and high- 
technology exports may no t be available to m any of them , given the 
agglom eration forces at work. In any case, m ore developing countries 
should learn from  the  NIEs' substantive State and corporate sector efforts 
consistently to upgrade export production capacities.
Most developing countries would have to  com pete in  prim ary goods, 
natural resource or low-tech m anufacturing  exports, w here they  are likely 
to  face "fallacy of com position" effects. The m edium -term  option  is clearly 
to prom ote the continued  opening of m arkets for these products by indus­
trial countries. In the  long term , countries should be aware of the  risk of 
fallacy of com position, yet sim ultaneously prom ote a process of export 
diversification th a t creates dynam ic com parative advantages and "climbs 
the  ladder" towards more technologically advanced products.
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Part II
Interrelations Between Growth 
and Equity

Is Greater Equity Necessary for 
Higher Long-Term Growth in Latin 
America?
Frangois Bourguignon a n d  M ichael W a lto n 1 
In tro d u c tio n
This chapter explores the  relationship  betw een equity  and the  grow th 
process. It argues th a t equity, in the  sense of equality of opportunity , is, in 
some fundam ental respects, com plem entary to long-run growth. Sustained 
grow th is likely to  be m uch more problem atic in  highly  inequitable soci­
eties. This is of central concern for Latin America because of the continued 
large inequities prevalent th roughout the continent.
The extensive literature on th e  relationship  betw een inequality  and 
grow th goes back in tim e -  notably, in the  second half of the  tw entie th  
century to Kuznets and Lewis for the effects of growth on  inequality and to 
Kaldor for the  effects of inequality  on grow th. There was th en  a m ajor 
expansion of both  theoretical and empirical work in the 1990s. The em pir­
ical part of th is literature has prim arily concerned w ith in teractions 
between inequality of outcomes -  and especially incomes -  and growth. Our 
reading is th a t it is rich in  theoretical insight, bu t w ith weak empirical 
results.
Lewis (1954) and Kuznets (1955) postulated th a t incom e inequality  
w ould rise and fall in  the  process of developm ent from  poverty to  w ealth, 
incom e differentials in itially  rising as high-productiv ity  and high-wage
'This chapter draws on two recent publications undertaken under the auspices of the 
W orld Bank, w ith  w hich we were involved, one focused on  inequality  in Latin 
America (De Ferranti et al., 2004) and  especially the  W orld D evelopment Report for 
2006 on Equity and Developm ent (World Bank, 2005). We are grateful to colleagues 
on  the team  th a t prepared the  2006 Report, especially Abhijit Banerjee, Francisco 
Ferreira, Peter Lanjouw, Tamar M anuelyan-A tinc, Marta M enéndez, Berk Ôzler, 
G iovanna Prennushi, V ijayendra Rao, Jam es Robinson and Michael W oolcock. We 
are also grateful to  David de Ferranti, Yasuhiko M atsuda, G uillerm o Perry and 
Kenneth Sokoloff for contributions to earlier work on Latin American inequality (in 
De Ferranti eta ! ., 2004).
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production  took off in  the  contex t of a labor surplus, and th en  eventually 
falling as the  bulk of labor becam e absorbed in to  the  m odern sector. 
Kuznets -  draw ing on the  very lim ited historical data available at th a t 
tim e -  found an em pirical confirm ation of th a t inverted U-shape re lation­
ship betw een inequality  and developm ent. The "Kuznets Curve" came to  
be the  best-know n stylized "fact" of incom e distributional change in rela­
tio n  to  developm ent. However, w ith  the collection of better data across 
countries and over tim e, it becam e evident th a t this was n o t a fact at all: 
there is essentially no  evidence for the  Kuznets Curve as a general empirical 
phenom enon  (see, for exam ple, Bruno et al., 1998, and Kanbur, 2000). In 
effect, there are m any reasons to  believe that, in  view of the com plexity of 
the  m echanism s th a t determ ine the  evolution  of the  d istribu tion  of 
income, no  general pattern  is likely to  emerge.2
Most of the theoretical literature of the past 15 years points to  a negative 
relationship betw een inequality and growth. It is com m on to  organize this 
literature in to  tw o types of channel (see Aghion et a]., 1999; Benabou, 
1996; and Bertola, 2000 for reviews.) A first strand focuses on a positive 
relationship  betw een w ealth and investm ent: w ith lum py investm ent and 
credit market failures, people below a certain level of wealth will invest less 
(early work in th is direction is associated w ith Galor and Zeira, 1993). This 
can lead to  significant dynam ic effects on occupational choice (as in 
Banerjee and Newm an, 1993). If the  d istribu tion  of w ealth  were m ore 
equal, overall investm ent and labor productivity would be higher. A second 
strand focuses on political econom y channels. W here w ealth d istribu­
tions are m ore unequal, political processes can lead to  worse econom ic 
outcom es. This may occur for various reasons: a) weak incentives for 
elite pow er to  redistribute w ealth  so as to increase econom ic efficiency 
(Benabou, 2000); b) greater likelihood of the  populace im posing inefficient 
incom e redistributive measures, for exam ple under a m edian voter m odel 
(for early m odels see Alesina and  Rodrik, 1994); or c) because there is an 
increased likelihood of distributional fights.
Note th a t in  bo th  strands of the  theoretical work the variable th a t is 
focused on -  wealth and power -  is m ore closely related to  influences on 
future possibilities, th an  to the  distribution of opportunities (see Ferreira and 
W alton, 2006). By contrast, m ost of the  em pirical estim ation has involved 
exam ining the  links between measures of initial income inequality and sub­
sequent grow th. In itial results were seem ingly consistent w ith the theory, 
bu t these have been increasingly questioned on econom etric grounds. We 
share the  view of Banerjee and Duflo (2003) tha t, at this po in t, there is 
little th a t can be said of value on the  overall relationship  betw een incom e
2See Bourguignon et al. (2004).
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inequality  and grow th, ow ing to  pervasive problem s of om itted  variables 
anchmeasurement error.3
These, inconclusive, em pirical results are often explicitly or im plicitly 
taken to  support the  view th a t d istribu tion  should n o t be of significant 
concern in the  design of grow th-oriented strategy. G row th is a m atter for 
policymakers concerned w ith finance, trade, infrastructure and other deter­
m inan ts of com petitiveness and  innovation . Equity should be dealt w ith 
separately, m ost notably  th rough  social policies, w ith, of course, careful 
a tten tion  to tradeoffs between equity and efficiency th a t are alm ost second 
nature to  economists.
We present a very different position  here. We argue th a t equity  has a 
central role in  providing the basis for long-run grow th. It is bo th  bad eco­
nom ics and bad policy to  separate questions of equity  from  questions of 
grow th. In developing this argum ent, we make two departures from  past 
literature. First, in  line w ith the  recent theoretical literature, we focus on a 
concept of equity  th a t is essentially ex ante, th a t is, concerned w ith  equal 
access o f  all individuals to opportunities to  pursue a life of their choosing, 
including the pursuit of econom ic activities. The in tu itio n  is straigh t­
forward: if significant parts of the  population have restricted opportunities 
for investm ent and innovation , while those at the  top have extensive 
opportun ities to  pursue the ir private interests, th en  there  will be bo th  
efficiency losses and adverse dynam ic effects.
Second, we em phasize th a t interactions of equity  w ith efficiency and 
growth have to be understood in  terms of specific inequalities of opportun i­
ties, in economic, social and  political spaces, and  of their interactions w ith 
m arket and non-m arket institu tions. Once th is prism  is adopted, there 
is evidence for a negative relationship  betw een inequity  and econom ic 
processes affecting efficiency or grow th in tw o areas: in  the  inefficient 
results from the  interaction between market im perfections and inequalities 
of assets, status or influence; and in the effects of extreme political inequal­
ities on the design of econom ic institutions, w ith a tendency to  form insti­
tu tions th a t prom ote predation, rent-seeking, or p ro tection  of econom ic 
(and other) privileges, ra ther th a n  broad-based incentives for investm ent 
and innovation.
This analysis forms the  basis for the  view th a t equity  forms an essential 
part of the  fram ework for long-run grow th, of direct relevance to  Latin
3Forbes (2000) and Li and Zou (1998) sought to contro l for these problem s using 
panel regression techniques w ith country  fixed effects and adaptive effects of 
inequality  on  grow th. In bo th  case, it was found th a t the relationship  between 
inequality  and grow th was in  fact positive. Yet, it is likely th a t the lags between dis­
tribu tional changes and changes in grow th rates are too long for standard econo­
metric techniques on 5-year data to be of real significance.
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America. However, ne ither the conceptual approach, nor the types of evi­
dence available, im ply any general em pirical relationship  betw een some 
overall proxy for equity  and grow th episodes. Some ways of providing for 
greater equity can be grow th-sapping, and there are different institu tional 
ways of assuring the greater equity tha t underpins long-run growth.
The chapter is organized in to  tw o parts. The first part elaborates on the  
defin ition  and m easure of inequity  and on  the  theoretical m echanism s 
m entioned  above th a t may provide a link betw een equity  and  grow th. It 
also discusses th e  available evidence of these m echanism s and concludes 
w ith some country  experiences tha t illustrate the  link betw een equity and 
developm ent. The second part turns to  policy. It outlines the im plications 
for developm ent strategy in three areas: policies designed to  expand oppor­
tunities for the  bo ttom  part of the  d istribution; approaches to policy and 
institu tions designed to  reduce the  influence and privileges at the  top  of 
the distribution; and the  m anagem ent of transitions.
Equity and channels of influence on growth 
Equity: concept and evidence
Inequality  refers to  a d istribu tion  of a characteristic in a population , w ith 
incom e being the m ost com m only used characteristic in economic analysis. 
It is thus essentially a descriptive concept of an outcom e variable. Equity, 
by contrast, is an intrinsically norm ative concept, related to some notion  of 
fairness. Drawing on th ink ing  in  the  trad ition  of John  Rawls, Ronald 
Dworkin, Amartya Sen, and John  Roemer, we adopt a concept of equity  
tha t is prim arily concerned w ith equality of opportun ity .4 Every individual 
should have equal opportunities to  pursue a life of their choosing, irrespec­
tive of circum stances outside the ir control, such as the  w ealth of their 
parents, the  social group in to  w hich they are born, the ir gender, and 
country  of birth . W ith equal opportunities, outcom es will differ, owing to 
differences in talent, preferences and effort, as well as pure luck.
We recognize th a t m any societies do care about outcom es, and in partic­
ular suggest a com plem entary criterion of m inim izing absolute deprivation, 
irrespective of causes, in the  spirit of a Rawlsian m axim in principle. This is 
im portan t for policy design, bu t is no t the  focus of this chapter, for w hich 
the prim ary interest is equity in terms of equality of opportunities.
How large is inequity? Direct m easurem ent of a "set" of opportunities is 
difficult because opportunities are not directly observed, and because of the 
inherent multi-dimensionality of this set. But there is widespread indirect evi­
dence of enorm ous inequities in the world (World Bank, 2005). Here we
4The concept adopted is closest to  th a t developed by Sen and Roemer; see, for 
example, Sen (1992) and Roemer (1998).
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Figure 5.1 Divergence in  hum an  capital according to  family circumstances starts in 
early childhood
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Source: Paxson and Schady (2005).
Note: Median values of the test of vocabulary recognition (TVIP) score (a measure of vocabulary 
recognition in Spanish, standardized against an international norm) are plotted against the 
child's age in months. The medians by exact month of age were smoothed by estimating regres­
sions of the median score on age (in months), using a bandwidth of 3.
provide selected illustrations. Inequities start in  early childhood. A measure of 
infant mortality, th a t is a good proxy for the general health  status of young 
children, varies substantially bo th  across countries, and w ithin countries, in 
relation to  measures of parental characteristics, such as w ealth or maternal 
education. The average m ortality rate in Bolivia is almost three times tha t of 
Colombia or Brazil, bu t so is the difference between in fan t mortality of chil­
dren born of uneducated in relation to secondary educated Bolivian mothers. 
Country of birth  and parental characteristics are clearly out of a child’s 
control. Furthermore, the  health  status of young children is strongly associ­
ated with physical and cognitive abilities exhibited later in life.
Paxson and Schady (2005) find a m ajor divergence across Ecuadorian 
children between 3 and 6 years old in  a m easure of cognitive developm ent 
(based on  a vocabulary recognition test), associated w ith a m easure of the 
w ealth of the household  and the education  of the  m o ther (see Figure 5.1). 
As is well-established in longitudinal studies of th e  US, such differences in 
early ch ildhood are typically magnified, ra ther th an  offset, by differences 
in the quality of formal education, in rich and poor countries alike.
It is also well know n th a t investm ents in  education  are strongly influ­
enced by the incom e, w ealth, and educational level of parents. In Brazil, 
the share of th e  variance in th e  years of education  of th e  popu lation  at 
w orking age th a t is explained by paren t's  characteristics ranges between 
37 and 50 percent, depending on gender or year of birth. That share is still 
h igher w hen considering earn ing  rates th a t incorporate in ter alia the
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quality  of education. It ranges betw een 48 and 63 percent. In o ther words, 
around 50 percent of hum an capital form ation may be explained by family 
background, w hether the link is th rough  early childhood developm ent, 
parental preferences, or liquidity constraints faced by the parents.
Parental background continues to  m atter later in life. Still in  the case of 
Brazil, it was found th a t the probability for labor-force participants 30 years 
and more to be employed in  the formal labor market depended on the edu­
cation of their parents, even after controlling for the  age, gender, and own 
education of individuals.5
Liquidity constraints and lack of access to  credit may also lim it opportu ­
nities to  invest in  productive ventures. Here, too, there is p len ty  of evi­
dence on  such limits. The Investm ent C lim ate surveys conducted by the 
W orld Bank in m ore th an  50 countries and approxim ately 60,000 firms, 
show  th a t only 7.6 percent of m icro enterprises had bank loans (against 
m ore th an  60 percent for large firms) (see W orld Bank, 2004).
Examples of inequality  of opportun ities exist in o ther areas -  barriers to  
entry in some sectors of activity or some professions, lack of voice in  public 
decision making, lack of access to  specific infrastructure -  to  give just a few 
categories.
Are inequities such as these of concern? Societies may be concerned w ith 
equity for both intrinsic and instrumental reasons. There is in fact considerable 
evidence of an intrinsic concern with equity, from the teachings of religions 
and other sources of moral leadership, from moral philosophy, from attitudes 
expressed by individuals and from behavioral experiments (for example those 
involving real m oney in game settings). We recognize the importance of such 
intrinsic, moral concerns, and believe they should form part of debates over 
practical policy design. But this is again not the main concern here. Our focus 
in this chapter is essentially instrumental. It is concerned with the relationship 
between equity and growth-related economic processes.
Interactions between equity and economic processes
The thesis is th a t m any inequities interact w ith econom ic processes in ways 
th a t reduce grow th, and th a t th is works th rough  specific inequalities of 
opportun ities and  the ir m anifestation  in econom ic and non-econom ic 
institu tions. It is useful to loosely organize the  interactions in to  two sets: 
opportunity-restricting and privilege-preserving. Opportunity-restricting is used to 
refer to  the  processes th a t curtail th e  econom ic opportun ities for groups, 
especially those in the bottom  and middle of the d istribution.6 This applies
sBoth sets of evidence are draw n from regressions reported in Bourguignon et al. 
(2005), based on data from 1996.
6"D istribution" is used loosely to refer to d istributions of w ealth, power, status and 
influence th a t shape rankings of opportunities across the population.
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bo th  to  hum an  capital form ation (perhaps especially for the  poor) and  to 
investm ent in productive activities (by farmers, the  self-employed and 
entrepreneurs -  often in the  m iddle of the  distribution).
Privilege-preserving refers to processes that favor economic and political elites 
in ways tha t channel the efforts bo th  of themselves and aspirants to  higher 
status into predatory, rent-creating or rent-preserving behaviors, as opposed to 
wealth-creation. These m echanisms typically restrict the opportunities of 
others. Obvious examples include measures tha t restrict entry into activities 
by competitors, or allow entry only against payment. Opportunity-restricting 
and privilege-preserving m echanism s are thus intim ately related, typically 
reflecting different sides of the same political coin. But the distinction is often 
of practical use, and we make use of it in the policy section.
Supporting this intuitive account of processes are three analytical elements: 
first, the  reproduction of inequalities leading to  the persistence of inequality 
of opportunity; second, specific ways in which market imperfections interact 
w ith some particular types of inequality; and third, interactions between 
political inequalities and the formation of economic and non-economic insti­
tutions, that influence both the two preceding processes.
Inequality "traps"
We draw on literature in a variety of disciplines to support the  view that 
inequalities of opportunities, and, therefore, of results, tend to  reproduce 
themselves, bo th  w ith in  a lifetime and across generations. We refer to  these 
processes as inequality "traps." These work through interactions between the 
inheritance and processes of form ation of inequalities of economic resources 
and hum an capital. Lack of access to credit or education is a source of inequal­
ity trap. People w ith limited access to  these facilities end up w ith a level of 
resources that does no t perm it their children to  do better on tha t account. 
Such a reproduction of the inequality of opportunity  ends up being deeply 
embedded in political and socio-cultural processes (see Rao and W alton, 2004, 
for a survey and examples of the interactions between inequalities of power, 
economic and socio-cultural structures.) Absent this persistence we would be 
less concerned about interactions with efficiency and growth.
The persistence of inequalities is a p h enom enon  th a t is com m only 
observed, w hether in terms of wealth differences, social status, political and 
econom ic influence, and of course incom e. This is true across castes 
in India, betw een racial or e thn ic  groups, in  the  US, South Africa, and in 
all Latin American societies w ith  significant Afro- and  indigenous groups 
or h igh  levels of incom e inequality . There is evidence of considerable 
in ter-generational persistence of incom es, in countries as diverse as Brazil 
and  th e  US. Even in  the land of opportun ity  of th e  US, recent work by 
M azumder (2005) finds an in tergenerational elasticity of incomes betw een 
fathers and sons of 0.6. Such a figure implies it would take some five gen­
erations for a family w ith half the average incom e to substantially  close
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the  gap. There is also evidence th a t m obility  is lower at the  bo ttom  of the  
distribution, and especially so for Afro-Americans (Hertz, 2005).
Market imperfections and inequalities
The second analytical elem ent is based on  interactions between inequalities 
and m arket im perfections -  draw ing on a trad ition  of analysis associated 
w ith  the  work of Akerlof, Spence, and Stiglitz. M arket failures, notably  of 
inform ation or agency, are profound in m any markets th a t shape opportu ­
nity, notably for credit, insurance, land, and hum an capital. These interact 
w ith  the  d istribu tion  of w ealth, status, and influence to  reduce efficiency: 
lenders use w ealth or connections to guide lending or provide collateral for 
credit; those w ith wealth have better options for m anaging risk and so on. 
This bo th  increases the  cost of investm ent, innovation , or risk-taking 
am ong groups w ithou t these initial endow m ents, and lowers the cost for 
the privileged. Inefficiencies can occur because good investm ent opportun i­
ties of poor and middle groups don 't get financed and less good investm ent 
opportunities of the rich do.
Evidence for in teractions between m arket failures and inequalities com e 
from a variety of m icroeconom ic evidence. O ne im portan t category of evi­
dence concerns th e  w idespread disparities in lending rates across w ealth  
categories, even after adjusting for risk and repaym ent probabilities. Invest­
m en t in education is system atically biased to w ealthier households. Poor 
people have lim ited access to insurance instrum ents and m anage risks by 
inefficiently diversifying the ir activity. These and o ther categories of evi­
dence lead to  lower and m iddle parts of d istributions having curtailed 
opportunities, leading to  underinvestm en t and foregone innovation . 
By contrast, households in  the top of the  distribution have relatively cheap
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access to  resources, can self-insure and m ay overinvest, as w hen relatively 
un in telligen t rich kids get access to  h igh quality  education, or well- 
connected firms are able to borrow resources at low rates and invest them  
in relatively unproductive projects.
An illustration  of the inefficiency of these m arket im perfections in  the 
presence of in itia l inequalities of w ealth  is provided for a Latin-American 
country by McKenzie and W oodruff (2003). These authors were able to cal­
culate returns to  investm ent across the size d istribu tion  of M exican firms, 
starting with micro-enterprises. They find very large returns (above 10 per­
cent per month) for small firms, th a t decline significantly w ith  firm size 
(Figure 5.2).7 Such enorm ous discrepancies are suggestive of large inefficien­
cies: they should be bid away if equal access to credit markets allowed small 
firms to expand their capital and larger firms to  downsize theirs.
Political inequalities and institutions
The th ird  analytical elem ent flows from trad itions of th o u g h t th a t recog­
nize th a t econom ic opportunities are shaped by formal and inform al insti­
tutions, and tha t institu tions are bo th  endogenous and display persistence. 
This draws on  work in econom ics associated w ith Douglass N orth, as well 
as extensive traditions in o ther social sciences. We em phasize the relation­
ship betw een institu tional design and inequalities of power, recognizing
Figure 5.3  Countries w ith better governance grow faster
Annual Growth rate 1980-2002 CH N
7This result holds w hen contro lling  for the risk of business (cross-sectional variance 
of m onth ly  returns) and for the  quality of the entrepreneurs (using prior wages).
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th a t institu tions are shaped by distributional struggles. Unequal power 
structures are m ore likely to  create extractive, predatory, or rent-preserving 
institutions tha t are good for elites, but are bad for provisioning of property 
rights and investm ent finance.
Note how  these three elements interact. Institutions shape both inequality 
traps and the ways in which societies respond to market failures. For example, 
provision of free and compulsory public schooling is a response to a market 
failure, but whether it is adopted is a function of political choice.
Evidence on the  role of political inequality  and quality  of institu tions 
in grow th and econom ic efficiency has been intensively researched over 
the past years. A po in t of departure is the  correlation betw een measures of 
the quality of institutions in a country -  for example protection of property 
rights or constrain ts on the  executive -  and its level of incom e. W hile 
debate on econom etrics continues, a significant strand of recent literature 
argues for a causal relationship  betw een historically form ed institu tions 
and contem porary levels of incom e.8 In support of this, Knack (2005) finds 
1980-2002 growth rates to be positively -  although less strongly -  associated 
w ith th e  initial value of an index of institu tional quality  after contro lling  
for the  initial level of incom e (Figure 5.3).
The difference betw een evidence on incom e levels and grow th rates is 
im portan t. Results on levels are very m uch of an  historical nature. This is 
the  perspective adopted in the  influential recent paper by Acemoglu et al.
(2002), a perspective th a t is highlighted by the instrum ental variables they 
use to correct for the  endogeneity  of institu tions and support the  au thors ' 
view tha t the relationship is causal. In particular, the use of settlers' m ortal­
ity during the colonial period as an instrum ent for today's institutions, sug­
gests a ra ther long period of gestation. By contrast, using grow th rates for 
recent decades and th e  quality  of institu tions at the  beginning of th a t 
period does not run in to  this kind of difficulty. At the same time, the  corre­
lation  is m uch weaker. It is also n o t clear th a t the  tim e sequencing of the  
dependent and independent variables is sufficient to correct for endogene­
ity. It is possible for instance th a t an unobserved variable is responsible for 
b o th  the  quality  of institu tions at tim e t and the grow th rate observed 
between t and t + 1.
A nother type of evidence comes from in-dep th  case studies -  the  par­
ticularly influential work by Stanley Engerman and K enneth Sokoloff (and 
co-authors), th a t uses the  natu ral experim ent of European colonization 
of the  Americas to  analyze different paths of institu tional and econom ic 
developm ent. Two results are h igh ligh ted  here. First, th is work explores 
the  in teraction  betw een resource endow m ents, political inequalities and
8For exam ples see Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002); Kaufm ann and Kraay (2002); and 
Rodrik et al. (2002). Their in terpre tations of causal influences of historically formed 
institu tions has been contested, in, for example, Glaeser et al. (2004).
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institutions. For the  early period of colonization, the authors argue th a t the 
com bination  of p roduction  po ten tia l for resource-based extraction -  n o t­
ably in silver, gold, and sugar -  plus access to  pools of subordinate, unskilled 
labor, led to  the  form ation of extractive, oligarchic, and inequitable po lit­
ical and social institu tions in  Latin America. By contrast, in N orthern  
America, English colonists tried to impose oligarchic structures and extrac­
tive econom ic institu tions but failed to do so: there was neither the natural 
resource base nor ready supplies of subordinate labor (Engerman and 
Sokoloff, 2002; De Ferranti etal., 2004).
Second -  and perhaps more directly relevant to  contem porary concerns -  
this work discusses how  political inequalities were associated w ith a range 
of choices over institu tional design in the n in e teen th  and early tw entie th  
centuries, w hich tended to perpetuate inequity  or to  a ttenuate  it. These 
included suffrage institutions, property rights in intellectual capital, public 
schooling, taxation and the shape of the financial system.9
Tradeoffs
The framework sketched above supports a potential causative influence of 
greater equity on both efficiency and growth. We see this as an im portant cor­
rective to the dom inant response of economists to questions of equity in 
terms of a tradeoff with efficiency. But we are not suggesting that tradeoffs do 
no t exist. They certainly do. Achieving greater equity (for example through 
public education or more extensive road networks) will often require taxation 
or reallocation of public spending. Taxation (almost) always involves distor­
tions to decision-making. The same is true for reducing public spending in 
public infrastructures that may be essential for productivity gains. These have 
to be assessed in the analysis of policy options.
A specific version of a tradeoff, th a t is of great practical im portance for 
policym aking, concerns the  m anagem ent of transitions from  m ore to less 
inequitable institu tions and policies. To the  ex ten t th a t an inequitable 
initial position  intrinsically protects the  privileges of some, there will be 
losses to those privileged by the  existing system, at least in  the  short-run. 
Such changes will be resisted, and  the ensuing distributional struggle can 
lead to  greater uncertain ty  and lower investm ent and innovation , w ith 
open  conflict only th e  m ost extrem e m anifestation of such struggles.10
9See, for example, Engerm an and  Sokoloff (2005); Haber (2004); and Haber et al. 
(2003); Sokoloff and Zolt (2005).
,0A full framework would deal explicitly w ith th e  role of d istributional struggle and 
conflict. This is an area in  w hich there are likely to  be im portan t in teractions w ith 
growth, especially w ith respect to the m anagem ent of crises (see for example Rodrik, 
1999) and the possibility of perpetuation  of a high-conflict equilibrium  w ith polar­
ized groups fighting over the d istribution  of existing assets or spoils (see Garcia- 
M ontalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2006).
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In addition, even where existing structures are inefficient, for example via 
favored lending to inefficient business elites, or highly unequal landhold­
ings, equity-enhancing reforms may lead to losses of organizational capital 
and econom ic networks, that lead to transitional, but potentially large, 
econom ic losses.
There is a considerable empirical micro-economic literature on the disin­
centive effect of taxes (on labor supply, savings, or investm ent behavior), 
which would seem to provide evidence of the existence of the preceding 
tradeoffs. However, this literature is not without critique. At the aggregate 
level, it is not clear that a higher level of taxation leads to less efficiency 
and slower growth. As emphasized by Lindert (2004), several European 
countries have shown remarkable long-run econom ic successes along with 
high levels of tax efforts. The empirical literature on the productive impact 
of various types of public spending is not without ambiguity either. In both 
cases, the ambiguity arises essentially from the econom etric difficulty of 
identifying precisely the net effects of taxation or changes in the com ­
position of public spending. However, this is not a reason for dismissing a 
priori the existence of short-run tradeoffs between equity-enhancing 
reforms and econom ic growth.
Do com m unist experiences provide evidence of a powerful tradeoff 
between equity-enhancing policies and econom ic growth? This experience 
is only of limited relevance to the above arguments, which refer to market 
rather than command economies. Most communist regimes did indeed do 
a very good job on equity in the domain of social provisioning. But at the 
same time they drastically restricted econom ic opportunities for the bulk of 
the population, preventing them from expressing their econom ic potential 
and condem ning them to econom ic stagnation. In a Latin American 
context, it would be equally inappropriate to consider populist policies that 
have often been pursued in the name of greater equity, but have typi­
cally been bad for growth, as demonstrating an unavoidable tradeoff. The 
problem is that these policies were often oriented towards mere incom e 
redistribution, which we have seen may have a negative impact on growth, 
rather than enhancing the opportunities of the poor, and were macro- 
economically unsound.
Country experiences of the link between equity and sustained growth
The evidence discussed in the previous section is supportive of specific 
channels of influence from equity to econom ic processes affecting growth. 
However, this evidence is only partial. The arguments in this chapter would 
be much stronger if they could rely on a positive aggregate relationship 
between some proxy for equity and medium to long-term growth rates 
across countries. It is unlikely that such a relationship could be identified, 
however. On the one hand, equity is a concept that has many dimensions 
which can hardly be "proxied" by a single indicator. On the other hand, as
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in other cross-country analyzes, country heterogeneity Is extremely difficult 
to take satisfactorily into account. In effect, it is most likely that some com­
ponents of the equity concept are of different relevance depending on the 
country that is analyzed. For this reason, there probably is very m uch to 
learn from case studies, but this is a research line that is still largely to be 
developed. In any case, it is not the purpose of this chapter to promise a 
new, generalized elixir for growth accelerations that would be embedded in 
the goal of equity. For none of these general elixirs work, with the cross­
country work providing little support for the influence of specific policies 
on getting growth going, as recently discussed by Hausmann e ta l. (2005).
The absence of a generalized aggregate relationship need not imply pes­
simism, however. It rather takes us to a diagnostic perspective that empha­
sizes both specific pathways of causation, and the possibility of varied 
institutional resolutions to core principles affecting equity and associated 
econom ic process.11 Scandinavia, Korea, and Taiwan (province of China) 
are obvious and well-documented cases of success in provisioning for 
equity and sustained growth. In particular, it is striking that in all these 
countries, sustained growth relied on heavy initial investments in the edu­
cation of the whole population and a rather egalitarian distribution of 
land. In other words, sustained growth in these countries relied on an early 
drive towards equity. Of course, these may be found to be rather extreme 
examples of the link between equity and growth. But, the same lesson may 
be drawn from the history of econom ic growth in many of today's devel­
oped countries -  starting with the historical experience of the US.
These examples may not constitute specific institutional models for Latin 
America, but the general lesson of successful growth on a foundation of 
equity may be relevant. However, all successful growth stories do not nec­
essarily fit well the equity causation paradigm, countries like China, and 
Chile, in Latin America, being apparent exceptions to that relationship. 
Before discussing briefly these cases and showing that they are not neces­
sary exceptions to the basic ideas in this chapter, we will briefly focus on 
two other categories of country experiences that look, at first glance, to be 
at variance with the analysis presented here: episodes of growth with 
inequity; and the (lack of) association between democracy and growth.
Inequitable growth episodes
Some Latin American countries have experienced periods of sustained 
growth apparently under significantly inequitable conditions. This included 
extended periods of growth in Brazil and Mexico in the middle of the
11 It may be worth noting that the view that there can be different institutional forms 
for the resolution of com m on (equity) principles is broadly consistent with Rodrik
(2003) on the interpretation of growth.
108 Economic Growth with Equity
twentieth century. While specific factors were associated with these episodes, 
there is an overarching account. In each of these cases, econom ic elites had 
significant investment opportunities that were supported by the partial and  
selective provisioning of property rights. For Mexico, Haber et al. (2003) have 
developed the argument that "credible commitments" between political and 
economic elites involved the provision of the selective guarantee of property 
rights to specific elite groups, despite the lack of general protection of prop­
erty rights. This was reflected in a highly concentrated banking system, with 
a significant degree of connected lending. Such inequitable provisioning was 
consistent with periods of growth, but brought dynamic costs through the 
restriction of entry and competition, and raised the stakes for distributional 
struggles over rents. Brazil had an authoritarian closure of the political 
system for extensive periods. Mexico had a semi-authoritarian form of corpo­
rate inclusion that effectively managed conflicts for several decades. But in 
none of these cases did the inequitable growth model prove to be sustainable 
over the long term.
Democracy and growth
We have emphasized that greater political equality should underpin the 
design of institutions that support broad-based investment and innovation. 
Isn't democratization a fundamental means of achieving greater political 
equality? Historical work by Engerman and Sokoloff and Lindert, referred 
to above, does indeed link the tim ing of the extension of the suffrage to 
expanded provision of education and other social programs. But, given the 
high multi-dimensionality of equity, democracy, while desirable, is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for greater equity. In some cases there may have 
been sufficient political or econom ic need to deliver to poorer groups to 
induce greater equity under authoritarian auspices. This may lie at the 
heart of the success of authoritarian East Asian cases: actual communist 
revolutions in China, the political base of the government in a poorer 
ethnic group as in Malaysia, or perceived positive development im pact of 
education as in South Korea in the 1960s. On the other hand, formal 
democracy alone is no guarantee of either sufficient pressures for change in 
favor of poorer or middle groups, or of constraints on the power and pri­
vileges of political and econom ic elites, as Latin America's history amply 
illustrates.
The case o f  China
China looms large in any attempt to interpret development, and especially 
one that seeks to understand the role of equity in development processes. 
Hasn't it moved from a highly equitable form of communism to extensive 
use of domestic and international markets? And didn't this lead to both  
rising incom e inequality (Figure 5.4) and  the most extraordinary pace and 
scale of reduction in poverty and expansion in social welfare in history?
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Figure 5.4  The rise in income inequality in China, 1981-2002
Year
Source: R avallion and  C h en  (2004)
Finally, did this not occur within the context of restricted democratic prac­
tices? This looks, at first glance, like a refutation of the central argument of 
this chapter: that equity, in the political and econom ic arenas, is necessary 
for prosperous development over the long term.
We believe that an account along these lines is an im portant misreading 
of change in China. Take some of the major shifts in Chinese policy that 
the literature interprets as having driven growth and incom e poverty: the 
institutional shift to the household responsibility system allowing peasants 
to produce for themselves (1979-early  1980s); massive indirect effects of 
opening to international trade (whole period); opening to inward FDI 
(especially in the 1990s); and huge internal migration flows. All these were 
essentially "equitable" in the sense of spreading of opportunity, from a 
situation of extensive restrictions on opportunities. In terms of equality of 
opportunities, China was indeed equitable before the reforms, but this was 
an eq u a lity  o f  restr ic ted  o p p or tu n ities .  Reforms undertaken in 1978 and 
after contributed to expand the set of individual opportunities to market 
econom y based opportunities, and th ey  in it ia lly  d id  so  m o re  o r  less  eq u a lly  
among individuals, thus preserving initial equity. Ever since the end of the 
1970s, this has been an important source of growth. At the same time, it 
is remarkable that it may be the initial equity in restricted opportunities 
that allowed for a swift opening of the econom y to trade and FDI. Indeed, 
such a reform might not have been possible in the presence of an eco­
nom ic elite controlling entire sectors of the econom y as in many other 
countries.
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At a somewhat later stage, there were indeed aspects of Chinese develop­
m ent that increased inequity. The prevalence of investm ent linked to 
connections, and extensive corruption, is clearly inequitable, in the sense 
of both unfair process and inequalities of opportunity to all potential 
investors. W hile these have not had a m ajor adverse effect on aggregate 
growth to date, introducing more transparent and fairer process will be 
important to sustained growth in the long term.
There were also periods in w hich policy-related shifts were associated 
with biases either against inner provinces or rural areas. These were factors 
behind the rise in inequality in outcomes and stagnating incom e poverty 
between the late-1980s and early-1990s. This unequal regional develop­
m ent coupled with restrictions on migration was inequitable in terms of 
rising inequality of opportunity. For these cases there may have been some 
tradeoff -  or alternatively a more balanced policy stance m ight have 
achieved greater equity without significant growth losses.
Few observers argue that such policy-induced biases were essential to 
Chinese growth, in contrast to the overall institutional change and eco­
nom ic opening. Moreover, even using the narrower prism of incom e 
inequality, it is noteworthy that the periods when inequality fell (notably 
the early 1980s and the m id-1990s) actually had the highest growth rates, 
not the lowest. Also, provinces that experienced greater increases in 
inequality had lower growth (Ravallion and Chen, 2004).
With respect to patterns, there are also rising concerns within China over 
the adverse consequences for development of areas where there has been 
rising inequality, including in some areas of social provisioning (in health 
for example) and concentrations of wealth through connections. But there 
is no evidence that these brought benefits in incom e growth. On the con ­
trary, for some years the Chinese government has seen this as an area 
where policy could be improved -  see for instance the reference to "co n ­
structing a harmonious society" in the 11th 5-year plan.
Of course, democracy as part of an equitable society remains patently 
absent in China, even though decentralization might seem to be a first step 
towards this objective. W hether the transition towards a more effective 
democracy can take place without growth being temporarily slowed down 
is uncertain. The same is true of whether a democratized China could 
sustain the highest growth rates consistent with its econom ic evolution -  
which at some stage will necessarily involve a slowing down of the pace 
observed today.
A n o te  o n  C h ile
Chile remains the most important successful transition to sustained growth 
in Latin America (growth has been positive over the past 20 years except in 
1999). Did equity contribute? Income inequality, a marker of inequity, has 
remained persistently high -  especially following regressive resolutions of
Is Greater Equity Necessary? I l l
m acroeconom ic shocks in 1975 and 198212 -  and is comparable to other 
high-inequality Latin American countries today. However, on a number of 
dimensions, post-democratization Chile seems more equitable than most 
other Latin American societies: there is greater equality before the law and 
more generalized protection of property rights (according to indices that 
seek to capture these factors); the return to democracy was associated with 
the re-formation of relatively programmatic political parties, in contrast to 
the vertical, clientelistic pattern so typical of Latin America; and, social pro­
visioning is relatively equitable, according to incidence and sectoral 
studies. Judging from school enrollment rates, education is more equitably 
distributed within the population. Fifteen years ago, Chile ranked highest -  
with Uruguay -  in Latin America in terms of net secondary school enroll­
ment, despite lagging behind countries like Brazil or M exico in terms of 
income per capita. This logically implies that education is more equally dis­
tributed w ithin the population today than in other countries.13 W ith 
respect to social spending, a push for more extensive and more equal provi­
sioning was central to the democratic governm ents' political program. 
Work by Bravo et al. (2002) finds that the substantial and progressive levels 
of social spending led to a reduction in an augmented measure of distribu­
tion, which included incomes and the value of transfers, during the 
1990s.14 Also noteworthy are innovative activities, such as the Puente 
program, designed to break poverty traps.
Are the preceding factors sufficient to explain the superior growth per­
formance of Chile in Latin-America over the past 20 years? This cannot be 
excluded. At the same time there also are issues of concern with respect to 
equity in Chile, fully comparable to other countries in the region, notably 
in areas ranging from health provisioning to the role of conglomerates. 
A more thorough comparison of the degree of equity in Latin American 
countries along the various dimensions of that concept is necessary before 
a more robust test can be made of the hypothesis that more equity in Chile 
is an important factor behind the sustained higher growth rates observed in 
that country.
12See Ffrench-Davis (2002), Ch. 9, for a discussion on the evolution of the Chilean 
income distribution, including links to m acroeconomic conditions and policies.
l3Another important difference between Chile and many Latin-American countries is 
the greater ethnic hom ogeneity of society, which logically contributes to more 
equity. However, this difference has been there for a very long tim e and may not be 
the most relevant to explain Chile's recent higher sustained growth rate
14This assumed that the value of social spending to recipients was equivalent to the 
cost to the government.
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Implications for development strategy
The above diagnosis or hypotheses concerning the role of equity in devel­
opm ent has substantial im plications for the design of a growth-oriented 
strategy for Latin America. It implies, in particular, moving away from the 
dichotom y between growth and equity-oriented policy that has been 
a feature of discourse and practice in the region (as elsewhere). This 
dichotom y has scant theoretical support, but persists in the mind of many 
practical econom ists and development practitioners: ministers of finance 
and trade for growth; ministers of social development for equity.
We outline here some im plications for public action. As noted earlier, it 
is useful to divide areas of action into two categories: those that expand 
opportunities for poor and middle groups -  tackling the opportunity- 
restricting policies and institutions of the past; and those that seek to take 
on economy-wide conditions produced by the history of protection of 
privileges of elites (and other corporatist groups).
In moving to considerations of public action we need to consider the 
bogy of determinism. We have emphasized the im portance of history, of 
inequality traps, and of institutional persistence. Does that imply there is 
little or no scope for action, that historically formed power structures and 
market imperfections are given, and that much of Latin America, that had 
a bad historical draw, is condemned to persistent inequity and low growth? 
Answering positively to that question would be a misreading of an ap­
proach informed by history and institutions. First, institutions are always 
products of contested interests and perspectives -  recognizing institutional 
inertia is fully consistent with a role for political and social agency. Second, 
the underlying political and global context for Latin America is arguably 
less constraining than in the past, especially in the political domain -  with 
universal suffrage and the spread of democracy at local levels, there are 
popular demands for both  more equity and more growth. In most Latin 
American countries it is increasingly the case that individual interests can 
be aggregated and political coalitions can be formed that can support alter­
native designs for greater equity. Accordingly, after describing the two cate­
gories of action, we look at the question of managing transitions in relation 
to these categories.
Expanding opportunity for poor and middle groups
The first category involves using public action to remove restrictions on 
opportunities for poor and middle groups. As noted above, restrictions 
on opportunity often flow from interactions between market failures and 
inequalities of wealth, status or power. In econom ic terms, this implies 
measures that either deepen and extend markets (especially credit and 
insurance markets) or involve public action to offset the adverse effects of 
missing and imperfect markets. This involves an agenda of broadening
[s Greater Equity Necessary? 113
Figure 5.5  The impact of early childhood interventions on child development in an 
experiment in Jamaica
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access to the financial system, especially by small and medium entrepre­
neurs, developing comprehensive risk-management structures -  including 
for health- and employment-related shocks -  and educational systems that 
assure access to quality basic education for all, meritocratic entry to tertiary 
education, and effective training systems. For both politically support­
able policies and effective im plem entation, such "technocratic" areas 
of design will need to be underpinned by tackling problems of lack of 
local voice, including inherited structures of social exclusion that curtail 
opportunities for particular groups (notably indigenous and Afro-Latino 
groups).
We illustrate with three specific policy areas where there are evaluated 
results. First, we noted earlier that the restriction of opportunities starts in 
early childhood, citing evidence from Ecuador. This is an area where there 
are known packages of interventions that can offset adverse family con­
ditions through a mixture of nutrition and behavioral interactions and stim­
ulation. Figure 5.5 provides the results of one randomized experiment in 
Jamaica. Infants with a significant developmental deficit associated with 
under- nutrition (and other correlated factors) were provided with different 
mixes of nutritional supplement and stimulation. After 24 m onths in the 
program those who received both interventions had almost caught up with 
children of normal height on an index of behavioral and cognitive develop­
ment, those with no interventions actually suffered an increase in the deficit.
114 Economic Growth with Equity
Second, the use of cash transfers to poor families, conditional on school 
and/clinic attendance, is proving an effective tool for both reducing current 
incom e poverty and improving access of children of poor families to 
school. This was pioneered in the region in the 1990s in Brazil (with Bolsa 
Escola) and Mexico (with PROGRESA, now Oportunidades) .1S
A third example of equity-enhancing policies is provided by rural roads 
that serve to reduce transport costs of isolated poor communities. A good 
example is the expansion of access to rural roads in the Sierra, in Peru. An 
evaluation that sought to obtain a control group through m atching of 
communities without increased road access found significant income gains 
(Escobal and Ponce, 2002).
The preceding examples are only illustrations of the wide variety of inter­
ventions that can expand the opportunities of the poor and middle groups. 
Some of them mostly relate to human capital accumulation in segments of 
the population that did not have access to schools or health care. The 
effects of these interventions on growth will thus be delayed until the gen­
erations that have benefited from them are in the labor force. Other inter­
ventions that correct for existing market im perfections -  improved access 
to infrastructure, to credit, to insurance -  have been shown to have a more 
direct income impact on beneficiaries.
Tackling privilege-preserving mechanisms
The second category concerns institutions and policies that are the product 
of privilege-preserving processes. Because they have more power than 
others, elites are able to bias policy decisions in their own interest. And 
because their own interest does not necessarily coincide with that of the 
community, they are thus responsible for socially sub-optimal situations, 
which most often lead to slow growth. In effect, most of the action by the 
elites consists of creating market imperfections -  for instance through barri­
ers to entry in some sectors of econom ic activity -  from which they can 
draw rents, or influencing tax and public spending decisions in their favor. 
Such privileges often concern political and econom ic elites but also corpo­
rate groups who have achieved success in "opportunity-hoarding," for 
example public sector unions or the beneficiaries of loss-making formal 
social security systems.
Privileges enjoyed by the elites or specific corporate groups have a direct 
im pact on the opportunities offered to the poor and middle-groups. 
Barriers to entry stifle entrepreneurship among the poor and the middle
15See Szekely (ch. 6, in this volume); Skoufias and McClafferty (2001) and Skoufias et 
at. (1999) for syntheses. It is true that a large share of the transfer is going to infra- 
marginal families -  whose children would have attended in any case (de Janvry and 
Sadoulet, 2003). But to the extent a value is placed on the transfer itself -  for its 
effects on reducing the incom e poverty- this is of less concern.
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class, resistance to tax increases prevents im plem entation of opportunity- 
expanding policies for those groups, closed-shop practice by unions or pres­
sure on wages restrict employment opportunities for the non-union part of 
the society. Knowing that they contribute to slow down development will 
not lead the elites to spontaneously forego their privileges, however. If they 
control political power, governments will not undertake equity and 
growth-enhancing policies that reduce the privileges of the elite. This fun­
damental issue of the "transition" towards more equity is tackled in the 
final section of this part of the chapter. Before considering it, however, it is 
helpful to give some examples of reforms that would break some privilege- 
preserving mechanisms and facilitate opportunity-enhancing policies. Such 
reforms do exist. In effect, many of them  have been dealt with extensively 
in the econom ic literature (although generally not in the context of equity) 
from Adam Sm ith's attacks on the trade and entry-restricting impulses of 
powerful industrialists to the recent book on Saving Capitalism  from the 
Capitalists by Rajan and Zingales (2003). In a Latin-American context, we 
look here at three areas: finance and taxation, and more briefly the conduct 
of macroeconomic stabilization policy.
Capture o f  the financial sector
Many of Latin America's financial systems are narrow, and consequently, 
access is relatively restricted. As Figure 5.6 shows, credit to the private 
sector is lower in Mexico than India as a share of GDP. In Brazil it is about 
the same as much-poorer India and less than a third of Korea's. This is an 
indirect indicator of the lack of availability of credit for many new and
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existing firms as well as for households. It is supported by other indicators. 
Only 25 percent of households in Mexico City (a relatively affluent part of 
the country) make use of banking services. Analysis of the historical evolu­
tion of M exico's banking system (Haber, 2004) shows how a narrow 
financial system was a product of an effective deal struck amongst political 
and econom ic elites, that led to a concentrated and protected banking 
system and industrial and service sector, with connected lending im por­
tant, leading to low asset quality.
The standard answer to protected, narrow financial systems would seem 
to be liberalization. But there is a paradox: rapid econom ic liberalization in 
a context of unequal influence can lead to the continued concentration 
among econom ic elites and further distortions (see Claessens and Perotti, 
2005, for discussion of international evidence.) Such an increase in loan 
concentration was observed in Chile after the across-the-board liberaliza­
tion of 1975. This was accompanied with a shortening of credit maturity 
and a surge in the rate of interest (Ffrench-Davis, 2002). This is also the 
story of Mexico's privatization of the early 1990s (Haber and Kantor, 2004). 
The privatization of banks was designed to favor influential domestic 
interests, to the extent that new owners could get away with modest levels 
of own-equity (with lax rules on borrowing to finance purchases). The 
incentive structure favored rapid credit growth, continued connected 
lending, and low asset quality. This was a central conditioning factor for 
the Tequila crisis. The subsequent late 1990s reforms, which led to an over­
whelmingly foreign-owned banking system, led to better asset quality but a
Figure 5 .7  Coverage of micro finance: various countries and regions (micro-finance 
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highly risk-averse, and still very narrow, system. In one interpretation, part 
of the reason is that the context of weak property rights -  for dispute 
resolution and collection of bad loans -  persists (Haber and Kantor, 2004).
There are many dimensions to financial sector reform; the purpose here 
is to emphasize the role of (unequal) political context, and to design reform 
processes in ways that both pursue technical approaches to broadening of 
access (mobile banking, reverse factoring, using Internet platforms) and 
develop the accountability structures to prevent re-capture by narrow 
groups (Claessens and Perotti, 2005). M icro-finance has probably a role 
here, at the same time that it is part of the more targeted opportunity- 
expanding measures discussed above. Currently coverage is very low in 
Latin America, with Bolivia, at 4 percent of the population the highest, 
whereas it is close to negligible in Brazil or M exico (Figure 5 .7 ).16 In con­
trast, three poor Asian societies have attained coverage of the order of 
8 percent. There is opportunity for expansion, it can bring benefits to the 
self-employed and micro-enterprise sector, but is a complement, and by no 
means a substitute for the broadening of access in the core financial system 
(Honohan, 2004).
T ax es
As stated earlier, most opportunity-expanding reforms require an increase 
in public spending, which in turn should be financed either by reallocating 
spending or by raising taxes. To be effective, both policies must necessarily 
reduce the privileges of the elite. In the first case, the elite lose free access to 
some services or infrastructure. In the second case, they suffer net incom e 
losses. The focus here will be on taxes, but most of the argument also 
applies to public spending benefiting the elite.
The central story on taxes in Latin America is that elites get away with 
paying little, sustaining an equilibrium of relatively low provision of social 
and econom ic services, often of low quality, and consequently low 
support in the general population for higher tax efforts. The overall tax 
effort is low as a share of GDP for most countries -  with some exceptions 
(Brazil has high taxes, in part due to high social security contributions, but 
also very unequal spending.) And the most striking difference in tax struc­
tures is the m uch lower take on individual incom e taxes than in rich 
countries: on average Latin American countries get less than 1 percent of 
GDP, while developed countries receive over 7 percent (Table 5.1). Also 
of im portance are the very low receipts on property taxes -  less than half 
the share of rich countries. This contrast has long historical roots, linked 
to the size of local government: in the nineteenth and early twentieth cen­
turies, local governments in the US and Canada accounted for a m ajor
16Note that no distinction is made between public (subsidized) and private m icro­
finance operations in those figures.
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Table 5.1 Tax structure in the 1990s, Latin America and developed countries 






1990-94 1995-99 1 991-2000
Income taxes 3.6 3.4 9.7
Individual 0.5 0.9 7.1
Corporate 1.9 1.7 2.3
Social security 2.5 2.9 7.8
Taxes on goods and services 5.6 7.4 9.5
VAT and sales 3.2 4.8 6.5
Excises 2.1 2.3 3.0
Trade taxes 2 .2 1.8 0.3
Imports 1.9 1.8 0.3
Exports 0.1 0.0 0.0
Property taxes 0.4 0.3 0.8
All taxes 14.2 16.1 28 .7
Source: S totsky a n d  W oldeM ariam  (2002); an d  In te rn a tio n a l M on eta ry  F und (IMF) G o v e rn m e n t 
F inancial S tatistics (GFS) database.
share of total government revenues, with property taxes a primary source 
(Sokoloff and Zolt, 2005). In Latin America, local governments raised 
lower revenues, and primarily from taxes other than on property.
Some of the constraints on taxation are greater than in the past -  espe­
cially with greater m obility of capital and skilled labor. But individual 
incom e tax rates (let alone taxes paid) are in many countries less than the 
US, which would seem to be a reasonable benchmark for skilled labor. The 
more fundamental issue is re-shaping the tax-spending contract within 
society that is central to the overall accountability relationship between 
government and citizenry. The VAT, w hich is also considerably lower in 
Latin America than in rich countries, is reasonably at the core of this, but 
extending income and property taxes, and raising the take from elites, is an 
important com plem ent.17
M acroeconomic policy
The conduct of m acroeconom ic policy may not seem to be a domain in 
which entrenched privileges and associated inequities play a m ajor role.
17Of course, the issue is not only that of the tax code but of its im plem entation. 
A key issue is that of tax elusion and tax evasion in the country itself or in tax 
havens.
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However, recent work indicates that there are significant connections. 
First, there is evidence that distributional conflicts, and weak conflict- 
management institutions, can increase the proclivity of countries to suffer 
crises, and then suffer more long-lasting growth effects of crises.18 Second, 
when crises occur, there is evidence of regressive distributional resolu­
tions. For example, case studies of financial crises in a number of Latin 
American countries, including Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico, find 
that workouts tend to benefit those w ithin the financial system, at the 
expense of those outside, and larger and better connected interests at 
the expense of smaller and less-influential agents (Halac and Schmukler, 
2003). Under these conditions, the conduct of short-run m acroeconom ic 
policy offers scope for equity-enhancing reforms. In particular, the use of 
contra-cyclical instruments, stronger and more independent supervision 
and regulation of financial systems, and ex ante deposit insurance for small 
and medium depositors (De Ferranti et al., 2004) could go a long way in 
avoiding crises that reinforce the privileges of the elite and reduce the 
opportunities of the poor.
Managing transitions
The central message of this chapter is the need to shift from inequitable 
initial conditions and institutions in ways that broaden econom ic opportu­
nities. Some of these changes may benefit all groups in society. Such 
Pareto-improving reforms should be im plemented spontaneously by gov­
ernments, unless all groups in society are not well informed about the 
direct and indirect effects of these reforms. Analysis and dissemination 
would then be all that is needed for a transition to a more equitable and 
faster growing society. But many of the changes we discussed will typically 
not be Pareto-improving, at least in the short to medium term. The polit­
ical econom y of transitions is thus central. There is a difference between 
the two categories of intervention -  especially under contemporary democ­
ratic conditions, and we look at each in turn.
Many of the opportunity-expanding interventions involve additional ser­
vices to the poor, or improving the quality of universal services. Over the 
long term they should improve the productivity of poorer groups, and this 
is potentially complementary to the interests of econom ic elites. Measures 
such as these have the potential to command broad support. They typically 
do not involve direct attacks on privileges, but often do require spending. 
This implies raising taxes or reduce other spending, imposing a squeeze on
l8Acemoglu et al. (2002) argue that there is a causal relationship between the histori­
cally shaped part of institutional weakness and m acroeconom ic instability; Rodrik 
(1999) finds that countries with greater latent distributional conflicts and weak 
conflict-m anagem ent institutions do a worse job in managing exogenous shocks, 
with adverse effects on subsequent growth.
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privileged groups now, but with the prospect of future gains for all. There is 
at least the possibility of shifts being Pareto-improving over the long term.
W hile this eases the overall structure of the political econom y challenge, 
the politics of institutional change can still be complex. The introduction 
of PROGRESA/Oportunidades illustrates. This program was designed in the 
wake of widespread political reaction against the earlier PRONASOL pro­
gram, a form of social fund that was an instrum ent of President Salinas' 
strategy to build political support via traditional patronage mechanisms. 
The reaction created the political space for a more "technocratic" program, 
space that was most skillfully used. Transfers in return for more education 
and health of poor children is more politically acceptable to both the broad 
populace and the elite than straight subsidies, since they have the potential 
to increase the productivity of the population and accelerate growth, pos­
sibly leading to some dynamic Pareto-improvement. Moreover, the care­
fully documented positive results from the randomized evaluation 
contributed to the credibility of the program and its bridging to the new 
administration. The Fox adm inistration embraced and expanded the 
program under the new name of Oportunidades.
W hat of the second category of intervention, where reducing privileges is 
central to a shift to sustained growth? Change here is less likely to be 
Pareto-improving even in the long run, and even if growth does take off. 
Indeed, an essential part of a more dynamic Latin America society is likely 
to be greater downward m obility from the top than at present, as well as 
more upward m obility from the bottom  and middle. W hat factors may 
influence politically feasible changes?
First, in some areas, some compensation of losers is relevant, though the 
relevance may be restricted by the need to reduce permanent privileges. One 
example, already com m only used, is the use of severance pay to com pen­
sate for layoffs in privatizing companies. Where the issue is protection from 
risks, a promising approach is to shift to ex ante insurance. Leaving risk 
management to the ex post working of unequal influence is highly in­
equitable and often econom ically costly. This is vividly illustrated by the 
typically unequal patterns of loss allocations via bailouts in Latin American 
financial crises (Halac and Schmukler, 2003). Shifting to defined rules of 
the game, notably over deposit insurance, can help ameliorate this.
Second, forming coalitions for privilege-reducing change has to be central 
to the structure of a political econom y resolution. These may involve 
alliances between the bottom and middle, or with parts of the elite, since in 
most countries the elite is unlikely to be m onolithic. In theory, the exis­
tence of some minimum democratic mechanisms should permit such out­
comes to emerge. But forming such alliances for change may be one of the 
challenges within Latin America's political system. The dominant heritage is 
of vertical political structures, working through both the state and political 
parties. This takes the form of clientelism and patronage, or the inheritance
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of corporatist structures of inclusion of the twentieth century. W ith such 
practices, democracy is incomplete and forming alliances for change is more 
difficult. The transition to programmatic parties, that was central to success­
ful transitions from clientelism in Europe and American cities, remains 
incomplete and weak. Chile is relatively unusual in having essentially 
programmatic parties, in a tradition going back to before the Pinochet 
regime.
As members of the elite partly control the way the political system works, 
they may impede or at least delay such a transition from clientelism  to 
more democratic political practices based on programmatic parties. W he­
ther they would actually oppose such a change depends on what costs 
them more: keeping a patronage system that perm anently will draw on 
their resources or shifting to more democratic m echanisms that will ter­
m inate some of their privileges. This situation differs from the Pareto- 
improvement case considered earlier. It essentially involves the elite 
maximizing its long-run welfare, by choosing the least costly of various 
possible institutions. Here, too, information is essential. The main actors in 
that game may not always have perfect knowledge of the actual cost for 
them of various reforms that would expand opportunities in the rest of the 
population.
A third set of factors for change are exogenous or controlled by external 
actors. For instance, technological change imported from abroad may in 
some cases modify the costs and benefits of equity-enhancing reforms. 
Also, external competition through international trade or capital flows can 
be a potent force for lowering internal barriers to entry and increasing 
access to finance (for developed countries see Rajan and Zingales, 2003). 
The increasing easiness with which societies can compare with each other 
due to rapid progress in inform ation technology should also contribute to 
facilitating equity-enhancing reforms by expanding the inform ation set of 
all local political actors.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have argued that one of the major issues faced by Latin 
America is not about how to achieve growth with equity. It is rather about 
understanding the relationship between equity -  understood in terms of equal 
opportunities in the econom ic, social, and political realms -  and the 
growth process. This relationship works through specific inequalities, 
shaped by market and political institutions. There are im portant positive 
links between equity and efficiency, and between equity and incentives for 
investment and innovation. Latin America is characterized by a wide array 
of institutional structures that are both opportunity-restricting for the poor 
and middle groups and privilege-preserving for elites and corporatist groups 
(including some unions), at national and local levels. Failure to address
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these inequities undercuts long-run growth, and this is a central part of the 
long-run Latin American malaise.
The transition to democracy, the broadening of inform ation flows, the 
vitality of the press and deepening of civil society, all these phenomena 
provide a more hospitable political basis for tackling inequities in ways that 
are supportive of sustained growth. But there are many ways of striving for 
equity: some, such as com m unist econom ic strategies and populist macro 
policies have proved to be disastrous for growth, the former by eliminating 
market opportunities and the latter by ignoring basic macroeconomic con­
straints. It is of great im portance that policy design and public debate 
be shaped by an understanding both of the fundamental positive links 
between equity and growth and the risks of misguided strategies. Getting 
rid of the typical dichotom ization of analysis of growth and equity -  at 
least in econom ic discourse -  is a necessary step.
Finally, we would note that this analysis has im portant im plications 
for empirical work in the future. The approach presented here has argued 
for a relationship between equity and sustained growth exclusively through 
interactions between specific inequalities (including political inequalities), 
market functioning and econom ic and non-econom ic institutions. Future 
work needs to build on analysis of m icroeconom ic, political and social 
processes, both to deepen our diagnostic base and to inform policy design.
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Most governments in the developing world explicitly consider absolute 
poverty reduction as their main -  or at least as one of their main -  priorities 
in the agenda. In fact, all those endorsing the eight Millennium Develop­
m ent Goals (MDGs) have com m itted publicly to cut poverty by half 
between 1990 and 2015.2
The endorsement of the MDGs, and in particular, of the goal which is 
directly related to poverty, is in itself an advance in terms of acknowledg­
ing that poverty reduction should be at the center stage of policy decisions. 
Agreeing to specific targets and to the generation and use of concrete indi­
cators to monitor progress, has additionally contributed to a revived debate 
on how to achieve the objective.
The level of poverty at any point in time depends, on the one hand, on 
the amount of resources available in an economy, and on the other, on the 
ways in which such resources are shared among the population. Therefore, 
most of the discussion about how to achieve the first of the MDGs has 
revolved around the use of policy tools that affect the level of econom ic 
growth and/or the distribution of resources over time -  and, therefore, 
inequality.
Although few would argue that the policy choice is either to focus exclu­
sively on growth-promoting policies, or alternatively, to focus only on 
redistributing the existing resources for reducing inequality, these two 
extremes tend to be in the background of the debate. For instance, there is 
a strand of literature that sustains that "growth will mostly do the job ,"
’This chapter was initiated while the author served as Deputy M inister for Planning 
and Evaluation at the Ministry of Social Development of Mexico. We thank partici­
pants in the Conference organized by ECLAC for useful comments and suggestions.
2See, for instance, M achinea et al. (2005) for a more detailed description of the 
MDGs.
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since there is evidence that when there is growth, the incomes of the poor 
generally rise, and there is poverty reduction.3 Under this perspective, 
specific policies directed to the econom ically disadvantaged are not neces­
sarily a priority. The priority is to guarantee growth in mean incomes.
The matter is much less clear in the case of the relationship between 
poverty and changes in the distribution of resources. At first sight it would 
seem straightforward that given a certain incom e level, a redistribution 
of resources to low incom e groups -  with the consequent reduction in 
inequality -  would reduce poverty, while regressive redistributions would 
make poverty rise.4 The complication comes when it is realized that usually 
there are feedbacks between changes in the distribution and econom ic 
growth itself.
The literature has not been able to settle entirely on the question of 
which way the feed back goes, and there are mainly two opposing views:5 
one sustaining that more inequality is good for growth, and, therefore, 
good for poverty reduction at least to some extent, and another arguing 
that inequality is bad for growth and, therefore, bad for poverty reduction. 
The main argument behind the first of these positions is inspired by the 
Kaldorian view that since the rich generally have higher savings rates to 
finance investment, redistributions of resources towards these groups tend 
to trigger economic growth, which in turn reduces poverty by increasing all 
incomes through a trickle down effect. Under this argument, regressive 
redistributions may affect the poor negatively in the short run, but they 
will eventually be beneficial when growth spurs. Following this line of 
argument, incom e redistributions towards the poor will not only deviate 
resources towards those with lower propensity to save and invest, but will 
also introduce a series of distortions including adverse labor supply deci­
sions, deadweight losses, and other inefficiencies in the economy that will 
reduce "the size of the cake" for all, and will, therefore, lead to greater 
poverty.
The second position is that higher inequality or regressive redistributions 
are bad for poverty, not only because they may reduce the lot of the poor 
directly, but also because inequality is bad for growth. As shown by 
Bourguignon and W alton (ch. 5, this volume), there are several theoretical 
arguments that explain why this may be the case, including imperfect 
markets, the political econom y of redistribution, and the risks of social
3The paper by Dollar and Kraay (2002) is a good example of this. The authors argue 
that on average, the incomes of the poor rise at least proportionally with increases in 
GDP.
4Strictly speaking, this depends on the exact section of the distributions where the 
changes take place. For instance, there might be increases in inequality due to redis­
tributions at the top end that do not affect the poor.
5See Aghion et al. (1999) for a review of the literature.
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unrest. The central one for our discussion -  put forward initially by Galor 
and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee and Newman (1993) -  states that when 
inequality is the result of market imperfections affecting the poor, such as 
credit constraints, high return investm ent projects will not be undertaken 
by this group of society, and the potential of the econom y will be 
restrained by inefficiency. If the market im perfection is relaxed or elim i­
nated, the poor will increase their incom e through hum an and physical 
capital investment, and this in turn will increase overall output and will 
improve the distribution of resources at the same time. In other words, 
having a sector of the population with low econom ic capacity and produc­
tivity due to market im perfections (and not due to labor supply, invest­
ment, or other individual preferences), restrains econom ic activity through 
the impossibility of taking advantage of the opportunities offered by the 
environment.
As clearly explained by Bourguignon and W alton (ch. 5, this volume), 
the real world is somewhere in between the two extreme positions. There 
are continuous feedbacks between poverty, inequality and econom ic 
growth that depend on specific country conditions and that can vary over 
time. This makes it difficult to generalize on which of the effects is 
stronger, and, therefore, which way the net relationship goes. For instance, 
econom ic growth can directly or indirectly benefit the poor, and is cer­
tainly a pre-condition for sustained poverty reduction, but the extent to 
which the poor benefit varies widely across space and tim e.6 It depends on 
changes in payments to factors of production, on the geographic location 
of econom ic activity, on the initial distribution of assets, and so on. 
Inequality also affects growth and poverty in different ways depending 
on the specific context, and leads to more or less poverty reduction in dif­
ferent circumstances. In the end, the relationship between these three vari­
ables can be viewed as a triangle, where poverty, inequality, and growth are 
in each of the axes, with multiple back and forth country- and time-specific 
effects.
The public policy question under this scheme is how to use policy tools 
to affect one or more of these dynamic relationships. In the case of poverty, 
one would want to identify interventions where apart from having no 
growth-equity tradeoff, or a low tradeoff, the intervention is pro-growth in 
the sense that by benefiting the poor, there is a positive net effect on 
overall output.7 Following Bourguignon (2004), this can be achieved 
through reducing wealth inequality by elim inating or relaxing the market
6Foster and Szekely (2000) present empirical evidence along these lines.
T o r a discussion on the definition of pro-poor growth, see for instance, Kakwani 
et al. (2000).
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im perfections that inhibit the accum ulation of incom e-earning assets 
among the poor. By creating the conditions for enhanced hum an and 
physical capital accum ulation among this group of society, overall invest­
m ent and output increase, and the poor will be better equipped to take 
advantage of the opportunities that the econom ic context generates:8 that 
is, greater hum an and physical capital accum ulation among the poor 
increases their productivity, and with it, overall productivity rises and 
greater growth rates can be achieved.9
One of the most promising policy mechanisms explicitly designed along 
these lines, are the Targeted Conditional Cash Transfer Programs (TCCTPs). 
These kinds of programs have recently flourished in Latin America, and are 
now being considered by a wide set of countries in other regions. TCCTPs 
have been subject of growing interest precisely because they entail a long­
term view on poverty reduction based on human capital accum ulation 
for the new generations. They com bine short-term relief with long­
term investments aimed at breaking the poverty cycle among chronically 
poor families, and since they are financed through public budgets, they 
entail a redistribution of resources in favor of the poor through asset 
form ation and greater productivity. In other words, they are pro-growth 
social policies.10
As with any new policy intervention, the im plementation and operation 
of TCCTPs inevitably generates discussions about fundamental aspects of 
policy making. This chapter points out the issues that have been prone to 
the most intensive debates during their adoption and that are critical 
factors that determine the success or failure of these initiatives. The contri­
bution is to highlight the paradigms that are challenged during the plan­
ning and im plem entation of these interventions, and that becom e either 
the obstacles or the keys for success.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section describes TCCTPs 
and summarizes some of their effects on hum an capital accum ulation and 
poverty. The following section identifies and discusses the paradigms that 
are usually challenged during their im plem entation and the final section 
presents some of the main challenges for TCCTPs for the future.
®This argument has also been developed in Székely (1998) and Attanasio and Székely 
(2001). The argument is supported by empirical evidence from Mexico.
9See Aghion and Armendáriz de Aghion (2004), and Hernández and Székely (2005) 
for the development of this argument.
10Evidently, TCCTPs cover one important part of the policy spectrum, but not all of 
it. They have been usually com plem ented with programs aimed at working age 
adults (i.e. training programs), and other interventions such as credit for small and 
medium enterprises.
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TCCTPs: A new generation of pro-growth social policies
There is a long tradition of cash transfer programs around the world. 
According to Tabor (2002) the earliest of these types of interventions are 
the disability allowances introduced in the 1890s in industrialized nations. 
Cash transfers have evolved considerably ever since, and they are now 
quite widespread in developed and developing nations.
Cash transfers are part of safety-net systems that include social insurance 
and/or social assistance policies. Social insurance transfers tend to be linked 
to the formal sector of the economy, and they are characterized by playing 
an insurance role by preventing individuals and families from falling into 
poverty. They are typically financed by individual contributions, govern­
ment funds, and employers. Com m only used mechanisms include unem ­
ployment insurance, disability benefits, pension funds for old age security, 
and medical and life insurance, among others. Social assistance transfers 
play more of a "corrective" role by supporting families and individuals 
either to alleviate poverty, or to exit poverty. They are typically not related 
to formal labor market participation, and they are financed from public 
budgets.11
TCCTPs are within the realm of social assistance transfers, but apart from 
providing immediate relief through cash, they introduce an innovation by 
imposing conditionality for beneficiary families, which is directly related 
to the accum ulation of hum an capital. By imposing conditionality, they 
shift the scope from social assistance, to social investment. W hile standard 
social assistance is mainly linked to certain socioeconom ic status, TCCTPs 
are also linked to this criteria, but they additionally require a change in 
behavior by the recipient -  specifically, they condition cash to school 
attendance by children, greater use of health services by family members, 
better nutrition practices, etc. -  in order to become and remain eligible for 
the benefit.
Conditionality is the key factor that distinguishes social assistance 
from these developmental policy instruments, because the accumulation of 
assets that it entails leads to long-term effects rather than only alleviating 
poverty until the cash transfer is consum ed.12 Families receiving standard 
pure cash transfers are likely to return to their original standard of living if 
the transfer is discontinued, or they might even end up worse off if the 
transfer generates dependency, lower labor supply, or other reactions that 
cannot be reversed immediately. In contrast, TCCTPs lead to the accumula­
tion of a type of capital that is inherent to individuals, and so if they are
n Tabor (2002) provides a review of social insurance and social assistance programs 
around the world.
12This argument is well developed in Coady and Morley (2004).
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discontinued, they nevertheless leave some kind of asset behind that can 
be used permanently (for example, one cannot take away an extra year of 
schooling when someone has already acquired it).
Another reason why TCCTPs are an attractive instrum ent to reduce 
wealth inequality, and in particular hum an capital inequality, is that 
hum an capital cannot be accumulated infinitely, in contrast to physical 
capital. Individuals can only accumulate a limited am ount of this type of 
asset over their life time, so when successful conditionality is build in a 
transfer program and this is combined with a targeting criteria, the educa­
tion gap between the rich and poor will close through speeding up the 
accumulation rate by the poor.
TCCTPs fit in naturally into the poverty-inequality-grow th debate dis­
cussed in the introduction. As already explained, one of the theoretical 
explanations for inequality and poverty is the existence of market imper­
fections that impede the poor from investing in econom ically viable and 
profitable activities, such as hum an capital accum ulation. The cash pro­
vided by TCCTPs is designed precisely to strengthen the demand for educa­
tion, health, and nutrition services by the poor. Take for instance, the case 
of education; it is well known that even when public schools, teachers, 
school materials and other inputs for hum an capital accum ulation are 
available at no cost, many of the poor can still not afford to send their chil­
dren to school because under imperfect capital markets, they are unable to 
access resources to cover the private expenses and forgone incomes that 
schooling assistance entails. By providing them  with cash to cover these 
expenses (investing from the demand-side) households are empowered to 
benefit from the service and to engage into accum ulating income-earning 
assets for the future. The same applies for health services, and for access to 
quality food for nutrition.
D escription o f TCCTPs
Large, cash driven, and comprehensive programs have been recently intro­
duced with different variations in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Honduras, Jam aica, Mexico, and Nicaragua. The first of these programs 
were introduced in M exico and Brazil in the m id-1990s, and the others 
have proliferated ever since.
Figure 6.1 describes a prototype of what would be the most comprehen­
sive version of a Latin American TCCTP. The first step in the im plementa­
tion of these programs is geographic targeting. By mapping incomes, 
poverty rates, schooling levels, health outcomes, nutritional levels, house­
hold infrastructure, access to public services, and other indicators, the 
regions with the greatest needs are identified. A second step consists on 
identifying through means testing the households in the selected areas that 
fall below certain predefined standard. In many cases, community participa­
tion is used to validate and refine the selection of the neediest households.
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Figure 6.1 Prototype of a Latin American TCCTP
The third step in targeting introduces another innovation. It identifies 
the female head of the household, and entitles her to receive the cash 
transfers directly, and to verify the com pliance of the conditionality. 
Conditionality is directly linked to the contents of the benefit package: 
transfers for education are linked to school attendance, transfers for health 
are conditional on using health services periodically, nutrition and food 
support requires m onitoring of height and weight of children and atten­
dance to training and workshops by the female head, while savings benefits 
are also aligned to school attendance. Apart from cash transfers, several 
programs provide in kind benefits such as food allowances. In some coun­
tries, support for families is also combined with mechanisms to strengthen 
the supply of education and health services including allowances for teach­
ers, infrastructure provision, or incentives on performance.
Specifically, the educational com ponent of TCCTPs include cash scholar­
ships that in some cases vary by gender and by schooling level, and some­
times they additionally include in-kind support through the provision of 
school materials. The health com ponent normally consists on providing a 
prevention health package with some curative basic services, and weight 
and height m onitoring for young children. Food support usually combines 
cash allowances with in-kind transfers of enriched products aimed at young 
children. Typically, cash and in-kind benefits are designed in such a way 
that they cover the opportunity cost of each activity. For instance, school 
grants are calculated by acknowledging the opportunity cost of time spend 
at school instead of in the labor market, health and nutrition benefits
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include the value of forgone time spent by females in taking their children 
to clinics and attending workshops, etc.
The savings com ponent was recently introduced in Mexico. It consists of 
cash deposits to individual savings accounts in the banking system that can 
be accessed upon high school graduation. The funds can be used to finance 
higher education, for deposit as collateral in a financial institution to access 
a loan, for purchasing health insurance, or as down payment to purchase a 
house through a specific public housing program.
Finally, TCCTPs normally have impact evaluation and monitoring systems 
built in. These systems feed back into the operation of the program by 
identifying corrective measures to improve the operation, and for verifying 
the cost-effectiveness of each of the interventions.
As mentioned, Figure 6.1 describes a version of TCCTPs that is a proto­
type from several of the existing programs. In reality, there is no program 
with all the features described; all are variations around it. For instance, in 
Mexico, the Oportunidades program includes all the elements of direct 
support to households -  with the school grants going all the way up to 
high school -  but does not have mechanisms to strengthen the supply of 
education and health services.13 Programs in Honduras and Nicaragua do 
include supply-side components.
Rawlings and Rubio (2003) provide a more detailed description of 
TCCTPs in Latin America, including Bolivia's Beca Futuro (BF), Brazil's Bolsa 
Fam ilia  (BF), Colombia's Fam ilias en Acción (FA), Ecuador's Bono de D esar­
rollo Humano (BDH), Honduras' Programa de Asignación Fam iliar (PRAF), 
Jamaica's Program o f  Advancement through Health and Education (PATH), and 
Nicaragua's Red de Protección Social (RPS).14
The impact of TCCTPs
A key feature of many Targeted Conditional Cash Transfer Programs is their 
emphasis on impact evaluation through experimental and quasi experi­
mental designs. There is now a solid literature showing the positive effects 
of TCCTPs on school attendance, progression rates, better health, and
13Originally created in 1997 under the name of PROGRESA (Programa de Educación, 
Salud y Alimentación), the program has been evolving through some changes in 
design -  the savings com ponent was included in 2003 -  and a massive expansion of 
coverage, reaching around 5 million families. Rodriguez and Levy (2005) describe the 
design and implementation of the program.
14Other good reviews can be found in Coady and Morley (2004), Rawlings (2004), 
and Sedlacek et al. (2000). As noted by Rawlings (2004), there are other programs, 
such as the Bolsa Escola and the Programa de Erradicacao do Trabalho Infantil (PETI) in 
Brazil, and the Agente Joven  in Chile, that only include educational support, and 
Brazil's Bolsa Alim entacao  and Cartao A lim entacao, which include only health and 
nutritional components.
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improved height and weight among previously undernourished children. 
The main feature of these outcomes is that they have permanent effects 
on beneficiaries. As already m entioned, one or more additional years of 
schooling are life-time irreversible assets and the same applies for health 
prevention and to nutritional support provided at early ages. These early 
interventions generate long-lasting consequences for cognitive ability, 
health, and productivity in general. The human capital assets acquired with 
the support of these interventions are what make them pro-growth.
Furthermore, since the programs entail cash transfers and other immedi­
ate in-kind benefits for households, they also have short-term effects 
on poverty. For instance, Székely and Rascón (2005) estimate that about 
one half of the seven percentage point poverty reduction in Mexico 
between the years 2000  and 2004  can be attributed to cash transfers from 
Oportunidades.15
As for the expected impact on human capital accumulation, perhaps the 
most solid evidence is from Oportunidades, which is the most evaluated of 
these programs. Evaluations for the first two years of operation by Behrman 
e ta l.  (2001) show that the intervention considerably reduces drop-out rates 
and that it increases school progression especially between primary and 
secondary levels. The program also increased secondary attendance by 
19 percent. There is also evidence that Oportunidades in its first phase 
increased secondary school enrollment rates for females by 7.2-9.3 percent­
age points and by 3 .5 -5 .8  percentage points for males, in urban and rural 
areas, respectively. In another detailed analysis, Schultz (2001) shows that 
higher enrollm ent rates in the end result in higher education levels. In 
a two year period only, they generated an increase of two-thirds of a year 
of education among beneficiary children, and this reduces education in­
equality in the communities where the program operates.16 Moreover, the 
increase of two-thirds of a year, projected to the future schooling progress 
of the average child, is estimated to augment future incom e flows per­
manently by 8 percent per year when children access the labor market. This 
is due to the higher productivity achieved through the additional edu­
cation. Progressing through the program for a larger number of years is 
likely to generate even greater impacts.
Positive educational effects have also been found for the FA program in 
Colombia. A recent impact evaluation by Attanasio e ta l.  (2005), shows that 
school attendance rates have increased by an average 5.5 percentage points 
among 14 to 17 year olds -  with increases by 10.1 and 5.2 percentage
15Extreme poverty in Mexico declined from 24.2  to 17.3%  between these years.
16The result is consistent with the findings in Behrman et al. (2001).
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points in rural and urban areas respectively -  and by 3 percentage points 
among 8 to 13 year olds after about one year of receiving conditional cash 
transfers.17
Maluccio and Flores (2005) also use experimental data to show that the 
RPS in Nicaragua has generated even greater effects on school enrollment, 
with increases of about 23 percentage points during the course of less than 
two years. In a similar study for Honduras, IFPRI (2003) finds that the PRAF 
program increased the originally very low primary com pletion rates by 
about 50 percent after only two years of operation, through cash transfers 
that represented increases of about 18 percent in household consumption.
The World Bank (2001a) reports positive educational effects from the 
Bolsa Escola program in Brazil. The report shows 5 percent reductions 
in drop out rates among beneficiaries, as well as greater grade-promotion 
rates -  with differences of about 8 percentage points as compared to non 
beneficiaries. There is also considerable improvement in the proportion of 
children attending the grade that corresponds to their age.18
The experimental data collected during the operation of some of the 
TCCTPs also reveals considerable impacts on health outcomes. Gertler and 
Boyce (2001) find that in Mexico, the Oportunidades cash transfers -  which 
on average increased household incomes by 20 percent -  generated a 
23 percent reduction in illnesses among children, while anemia declined 
by 18 percent among beneficiary children due to the support of the 
program.
For Colombia, Attanasio, Battistin, et al. (2005) find considerable increases 
in the use of preventive health facilities and services due to the support of 
FA, and a decline in diarrhea cases by more than 10 percent among young 
children. For Nicaragua, Maluccio and Flores (2005) register a 30 percent 
increase in growth m onitoring by beneficiary families, and an increase of 
around 20 percent in child im munization, due to the intervention of the 
RPS.
There are also significant changes in consumption patterns derived from 
cash transfers, but also from the attendance of female household heads to 
workshops that provided with information on nutrition practices (which is 
one of the elements of conditionality). Hoddinot and Skoufias (2003) find 
im portant changes in consumption among beneficiary households in
I7Impacts are lower at younger ages due to the initially higher school enrollm ent 
between 8 and 11 years of age.
18Positive education results have been also documented by Ahmed and del Ninno 
(2001) for the Food for Education Program in Bangladesh. According to the author’s 
results, school attendance increased by 35% , while enrolm ent rates increased by 
32.5% . Coady and Morley (2004) discuss some of the caveats of this particular study.
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Mexico, which result in a 7.1 percent increase in caloric intake by family 
members, due to improved food selection, especially of vegetable and 
animal products. Attanasio, Fitzsimons, et al. (2005) find that the impact 
of the FA Program on household consum ption is of 19.5 percent and 
9.3 percent in rural and urban areas, respectively, and that most of the 
increase is due to more food consum ption. Expenditures increase par­
ticularly in nutrient-rich food and in healthcare, education, footwear, and 
clothing for children. M aluccio and Flores (2005) find similar effects in 
Nicaragua.
The changes in consum ption patterns combined with greater access to 
health services have strong im plications for nutrition. The TCCTPs that 
have been scientifically evaluated also provide solid evidence in this 
respect. Behrman and Hoddinott (2001) find that in its first phase of its 
im plementation Oportunidades increased children's height by an additional 
one-sixth of an inch per year due to the program, which yields an increase 
in lifetim e earnings through productivity by 2.9 percent per year when 
children reach working age. According to Attanasio, Fitzsimons et al. (2005) 
the FA program has increased growth rates of around 0.5 cm among ben­
eficiary children, while M aluccio and Flores (2005) register a 5 percent 
decline in child stunting due to the RPS -  which is equivalent to a rate of 
decline that is 1.5 times faster than the improvement observed at the 
national level.
Although there are certainly challenges and scope for improvement -  
which will be discussed in the final section -  the results so far support the 
view that TCCTPs are powerful mechanisms for improving human capital 
accum ulation among the poor. Since they are financed through public 
spending, they entail a redistribution of wealth toward the poor, which 
increases the econom ic potential of this group of society in the short and 
long run.
Implementing TCCTPs: Challenging the status quo
As in the case of any new public intervention, TCCTPs are not im ple­
mented without their problems. Since they normally challenge the status 
quo in program design and operation, they face a number of obstacles 
at the initial stages of their introduction and also further along the 
way. The outcom e of the debate on several crucial issues determines 
the success or failure of these interventions. This section discusses seven 
of the key aspects that the im plem entation of TCCTPs have faced (and 
continue to face) in the countries that have adopted them. These are: 
targeting vs universal benefits; building beneficiary registries; inte­
grality; conditionality; cash vs in-kind benefits; evaluation; and con­
tinuity.
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Targeted vs. universal benefits
One of the first hot debates triggered by the introduction of TCCTPs is 
the need for targeting due to the scarcity of resources.19 As explained by 
Gelbach and Pritchett (2002), it is natural that if a particular public policy 
is financed through public resources, there will be political interest groups 
that will support the action or not, depending on whether they are able to 
reap some of the benefits. Therefore, a universal benefit will most likely be 
supported by the majority of voters, while at the other extreme, a finely tar­
geted intervention for a small group will most likely be supported by that 
specific constituency, but may have much less support from the majority.
The fact that targeting inevitably leaves some groups of society "out" 
from receiving support of the kind that TCCTPs provide, added to the 
recent history of Latin America of a long tradition of universal benefits 
helps understand why this aspect of TCCTPs has generated such hot 
debates in several settings. An additional element is that in practice, target­
ing has not always been efficient and accurate in the region.20
One good example of these types of problems is the case of Opor­
tunidades. Even though Skoufias et al. (2004) find that technically speaking 
targeting worked quite well in this program in terms of reducing under­
coverage and leakage, Adato et al. (2000) present strong evidence that 
leaving out some families in the participating communities generated con­
siderable distress and even opposition to the program from those left out. 
Paradoxically, this effect is precisely due to the success of the targeting 
process, since it reveals that families that were even marginally above the 
threshold for eligibility, were not included as beneficiaries.
19The concept of targeting is quite simple. It suggests that when budgets are limited 
the policy problem consists of identifying the poorest individuals or families to allo­
cate the scarce means to them  in order to obtain the largest possible poverty reduc­
tion per unit spent. To find the poor, one has to look for them , so, there has to be a 
balance between administrative costs that need to be incurred to find the target pop­
ulation, and the benefits of finding the poor. Under this framework, universal 
benefits incur in "leakage," since many of the non-poor, or the not so poor can 
benefit from resources that should perhaps be allocated only to the poorest of the 
poor. Most of the gains from targeting originate precisely in reducing leakage. How­
ever, this comes at a cost. Since finding all the poor would be too costly, almost 
inevitably, some of the poor will be "m issed.” Thus, the main challenge is to find a 
balance between administrative costs, leakage, and under-coverage. The papers by 
Ravi Kanbur (1985, 1987a, 1987b) are among the first to address the issue of target­
ing formally.
20Coady et al. (2004a, 2004b) provide what are perhaps the largest reviews of target­
ing methods and outcomes, and show that there has not been widespread success in 
terms of reaching the poor at low cost in developing countries. Coady and Morley
(2004) also discuss targeting methods, and describe the procedures used by five 
TCCTPs.
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There are several ways of ameliorating this kind of opposition to targeted 
programs. One alternative has been community-based targeting, where 
there is an open consultation to the com m unity for identifying bene­
ficiaries, or where the community is asked to validate the list of participat­
ing families. The main drawback of this method is that those selected 
m ight not be the same as those that would be chosen, say, through a 
means test to identify the neediest. Another method is to define a thresh­
old in each community after which targeting is no longer applied, and full 
coverage is granted. Both of these options have in fact been used in 
Mexico, and they have been an escape valve for political opposition to the 
program at the local level.
Another problem that arises with targeting is that beneficiaries might 
change their behavior in order to be eligible for participation -  for instance, 
not acquiring household appliances or not improving housing conditions 
in order to stay below the eligibility threshold. At an extreme targeting may 
introduce perverse incentives. For instance, those situated marginally 
around the threshold for eligibility may reduce labor supply and household 
income in order to become eligible. In the case of TCCTPs one advantage is 
that participation implies complying with conditionality, and as discussed 
later, this elem ent reduces the risk of generating large undesirable changes 
in behavior. Although theoretically im portant, the available evidence 
shows that labor supply decisions by adults in the household have not 
been significantly modified by participation in programs in Mexico and 
Nicaragua.21
As for the direct costs of targeting, Caldes et al. (2004) have estimated 
that they initially represented on average, around 18 percent, 26 percent 
and 10 percent of total costs in Mexico, Honduras, and Nicaragua, respec­
tively. However, as programs expand, there are significant econom ies of 
scale in this activity. For instance, in Mexico, after four years of operation 
targeting costs represent only 3 percent of total costs, while in Nicaragua 
they reached 1 percent after years.
So, the existing evidence on the cost and benefits of targeting in TCCTPs, 
suggests that it is possible to reduce political and monetary costs in identi­
fying the neediest households in order to provide them with their benefits.
Building beneficiary registries
Universal interventions are by definition, open to the whole population 
and it is not necessarily crucial to know who exactly benefits from them, 
precisely because they are intended to have widespread coverage. TCCTPs
21See Parker and Skoufias (2000) for the case of M exico, and M aluccio and Flores
(2005) for Nicaragua. A theoretical analysis of labor supply responses to the intro­
duction of welfare programs can be found in Kanbur et al. (1994).
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modify the status quo in this respect because by their nature, they require a 
precise list of beneficiary families and individuals in order to verify condi­
tionality compliance and for keeping systematic administrative controls of 
cash transfers.
The construction and update of a registry of beneficiaries commonly gen­
erates discussions in the im plem entation phase of TCCTPs mainly for two 
reasons. The first is that they make program operation transparent, as 
opposed to a situation where public funds are spent with no evidence or 
only scarce evidence of where they end up.22As explained by Szekely 
(2006), social programs in Latin America have traditionally been prone 
to political m anipulation and have been applied discretionally by public 
officials in many cases. W ith the introduction of a clear registry, these prac­
tices are discouraged.
The second reason is that registries indicate the exact benefits that each 
family or individual is entitled to receive, which leaves little room for polit­
ical m anipulation at the local level. Since TCCTPs do not require a large 
administrative apparatus to transfer cash -  this is normally done through 
the banking system or specialized firms -  they end up elim inating inter­
mediaries between the government and each beneficiary. In a context 
where the tradition has been for local leaders and organizations to appro­
priate social programs, intermediaries and interest groups are usually 
an obstacle at the initial stages of the im plem entation. It is practically 
impossible to prevent local actors from reaping political benefits from cash 
transfers, but registries considerably reduce this possibility.
In spite of these difficulties, once registries start to be built and made 
public, in many cases there has been scope for using such registries as a 
policy tool for the design and planning of other interventions.23
Integrality
One of the most challenging issues in the im plem entation of TCCTPs, is 
the coordination across government ministries and entities. Coordination 
is needed since these programs entail a view of integrality -  a com bination 
of education, health, and nutrition benefits -  that requires a clear mandate 
by a top level institution to guarantee that benefits are provided in a syn­
chronized way and that the information flow on conditionality compliance 
flows harmonically. There is no question that investing in these three items
22As noted by Irarrázaval (2004) only six Latin American countries have more or less 
com plete registries for social programs: Argentina, Brasil, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Chile, and Mexico.
23For instance, in the case of M exico, the Oportunidades registry has become the 
corner stone for providing the beneficiary population with other benefits, such as 
public services, credit, etc. They are also being used to tailor a package of other 
benefits for non-participating families.
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simultaneously has im portant multiplicative effects -  for instance, a child 
that is healthy and well fed will most likely have better possibilities of 
taking advantage from education services -  but the problem is that Latin 
American governments are designed and organized on a sector basis that 
makes coordination difficult. Each sector has its own objectives and targets, 
which are not necessarily aligned to the operation of a TCCTP.
Usually, the solution to the synchronization problem has been to cen­
tralize coordination directly through the Presidential office, or to link it to 
budgetary decisions, but due to the limited degree of institutionalization of 
social policies across the region, these kinds of arrangements are not always 
solid enough to survive during political changes.
Conditionality
As mentioned earlier, the introduction of conditionality in the provision of 
cash transfers is perhaps the main innovation of TCCTPs. W hen condition­
ality is relaxed or is not verified these programs turn merely into cash 
grants similar to the more traditional social assistance interventions.
Even though it is quite clear that conditionality is the key for turning 
cash transfers into investments in hum an capital, imposing it is not 
without its problems. Apart from the operational complexities involved in 
their application, there has been more of an ideological discussion around 
how strict one should be in imposing it, and in several settings the ques­
tion of introducing it at all has been hotly debated.24 The main underlying 
argument against introducing conditionality and verifying it strictly, is that 
it is anti-ethical to condition support to the poor through a set of actions 
that impose direct and indirect costs for them . As is clearly discussed in 
Coady and Morley (2004), the com pliance of conditionality often makes 
beneficiaries incur private costs such as time devoted to queuing for ser­
vices, the opportunity costs and transportation for attending workshops, 
and even the opportunity and direct costs from obtaining certifications, 
among others. All these actions impose an additional burden on the 
poor.
However, there are two strong arguments in favor of conditionality, 
which lead to think that rather than discussing whether it should be intro­
duced or not, the main question is how much of it should be imposed. The 
first argument, which has been already put forward, is that conditionality 
induces higher investm ent in human capital for the poor, than would be 
present without the program. Since the poor have higher propensity to 
consume, the relative prices that they face are artificially biased versus 
longer-term investm ents that may be much more rewarding than current 
consum ption. C onditionality simply changes relative prices in favor of
24Two good examples of this are the cases of Mexico and Brazil.
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hum an capital investment (lowering its cost through the cash transfer), at 
the cost of sacrificing potential current consumption.
There is also a political econom y argument. It might be more difficult to 
achieve political support for a publicly funded cash transfer that only alle­
viates poverty in the short run, than for a publicly funded program that 
"helps the poor help them selves”: the second generates a (human) capital 
stock that will generate returns in the future, and lower the need for future 
income transfers.25
A second argument in favor of imposing conditionality is that it is also 
a self-targeting device. Since conditionality imposes (opportunity and 
other) costs, only those that value the benefit more than the cost will 
actually participate. If better off individuals have higher opportunity cost 
for participating, then they will exclude themselves from the program.
Clearly, the main challenge is to design the conditionality in such a way 
that the marginal benefit of participating for the poor is higher than the 
marginal cost. As judged by the overwhelmingly high program take-up 
rates in Latin America, the benefits of participating in TCCTPs are higher 
than the costs imposed by the conditionality, but even so, the tem ptation 
for relaxing conditionality is still present in many countries. The problem 
is that eliminating or relaxing it may put the positive hum an capital gains 
at stake.
Cash vs in-kind benefits
Another of the elements of the status quo com m only challenged by 
TCCTPs in Latin America is the introduction of cash benefits. After a tra­
dition of expanding in-kind subsidies for goods and services across the 
region for decades, it is not surprising that the use of cash transfers has also 
generated debate. Most of the debate has revolved around the question of 
whether cash will be spent on "adequate" goods or not. However, another 
im portant underlying issue is that many Latin American governments 
created large apparatuses -  with their corresponding bureaucracies -  for 
providing in-kind benefits, w hich are displaced by the simplicity of a cash 
transfer.
There are several theoretical arguments in the discussion of cash vs. in- 
kind transfers. The main econom ic argument in favor of cash transfers is 
that they provide beneficiaries with freedom of choice to satisfy what they
25The papers by Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994) are 
among the first to model the perverse effects of inequality on growth due to the pres­
sure that inequality imposes on public spending. Following these models, one would 
expect the median voter to support social investments that lower the need for redis­
tribution in the future, rather than supporting continuous flows of transfers that 
require permanently high taxation rates.
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consider to be their most im portant needs -  with the consequent increase 
in welfare. An in-kind transfer implies that the policy maker chooses for 
the beneficiaries, and even though the policy maker's choice may well 
coincide with that of the beneficiary, this is not necessarily the case in all 
situations.
Apart from the latter issue, there are other econom ic, administrative and 
political considerations in the cash vs in-kind debate. As explained by 
Tabor (2002) one of the main econom ic arguments is that since in-kind 
benefits distort relative prices in the markets where they intervene, they 
introduce inefficiencies in the econom y by providing incentives for indi­
viduals and firms to consume or produce more of a particular good, respec­
tively, than would be desired in a com petitive m arket.26 This reduces 
overall efficiency in the specific market where the intervention takes place, 
but it may also generate inefficiencies in the markets of complementary 
and substitute goods.
The administrative considerations mainly have to do with the cost of 
providing cash vs the cost of providing goods or services. W hile in-kind 
benefits have the advantage of not requiring targeting -  beneficiaries self­
target by demanding the good or service -  their main drawback is the need 
of a (usually) costly apparatus to deliver the benefit, while cash can be pro­
vided under simple schemes that do not require large bureaucracies.27 From 
the point of view of beneficiaries, an advantage of cash is that cash is fungi­
ble, while in-kind benefits are much less so.
The main political consideration seems to support in-kind vs. cash transfers. 
The argument is that in-kind benefits guarantee the financing of "desir­
able" goods or services, while cash can freely be spend by beneficiaries, 
even on "non-desirable" goods.
In practice, most TCCTPs have actually included a mix of cash (with con­
ditionality) and in-kind benefits. As illustrated by the cases of Mexico and 
Nicaragua, there is even scope for com plem entarities between these kinds 
of benefits, and in fact, their com bination has contributed to ameliorate 
the debate of whether one or the other should be preferred.
Evaluation
Serious impact evaluation is perhaps the best tool for a continued 
im provement in the operation of programs, it is certainly one of the 
most im portant inputs into the decision-making process for the distri­
bution of public budgets, and it is one of the best ways for promoting
26See Blackorby and Donaldson (1998) for a detailed theoretical discussion of this 
aspect.
27Caldés et al. (2004) show that the cost of transfering cash in the Oportunidades 
(PROGRESA), PRAF and RPS programes in four years of operation averaged 22%, 10% 
and 6% of total costs, respectively.
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accountability. However, evaluating the impact of poverty alleviation 
programs has wot been a tradition in most developing countries, and it has 
certainly not been a tradition or a standard practice in Latin America. 
In fact, there seems to be an im portant evaluation gap in social develop­
m ent programs in general.28 In the case of the large number of social pro­
grams that have proliferated across Latin America, and in particular, in the 
case of poverty alleviation programs, very few im pact evaluations can be 
found.
There are several explanations for this gap. Some of them are purely eco­
nom ic and most of them are political. One econom ic argument is that 
since evaluations are a public good, there are few incentives for investing in 
it in each independent program. Furthermore, since impact evaluations 
require investing public resources, it is not clear whether the benefits of 
performing an evaluation will be greater than the benefit of supporting a 
larger number of families or individuals through the same budget.
As for the several political aspects, perhaps the most im portant are, first, 
that impact evaluations take time to generate results -  in many cases they 
require several years -  so it is not clear that the specific public official or 
agency that finances it, will be able to benefit from its results; second, some 
policy actors can preserve greater discretion when there is less knowledge to 
distinguish good programs from bad ones; third, the design and implemen­
tation of impact evaluations requires technical capacity, which is not 
always available in public institutions. But perhaps the main political argu­
ment, which is relevant for experimental or quasi-experimental evalu­
ations, is that when an evaluation requires for the definition of control and 
treatm ent groups, a sub-group of the population will be excluded from the 
program arbitrarily.
The PROGRESA program (transformed later into Oportunidades) was 
a pioneer in im plem enting impact evaluations for poverty alleviation 
programs right at the start of its operation. The controversy around this 
decision was highly visible and hotly debated. Most of it revolved around
^T his is shown at length in the docum ent by Savedoff et al. (2006). For instance, 
these authors docum ent that the ILO's Universitas Programme reviewed 127 studies, 
studying 258 com m unity health schemes, and found that only 2 of these cases had 
internal validity, while several other reviews on com m unity health schemes by 
Ekman (2004) Jakab et al. (2001) confirm the methodological weakness of the litera­
ture identified in the 1LO Report. Similarly, systematic reviews of UNICEF projects by 
Victora (1995) find that only 15% of them included impact assessments, but many of 
these have serious methodological limitations. Informal surveys by the authors doc­
um ent that at the Inter-American Development Bank, merely 16% of all active pro­
jects by July 2004 collected data that allows for some kind of evaluation. Similarly, in 
1998 the World Bank reported that only 5% of its projects had associated impact 
evaluations, while in 2000, this share increased to 10% (World Bank, 1999, 2001b).
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expansion, it is desirable to tailor the benefits to the needs and conditions 
of new areas, population sub-groups, or even individual households.29
A related issue, brought up recently by de Janvry and Sadoulet (2006) is 
not only to review the size of cash transfers in different settings, but to 
analyze the optimal coverage in terms of schooling levels. These authors 
argue that in countries like Mexico, where primary attendance rates are 
already high, it m ight not be necessary to introduce scholarships for pri­
mary students. They suggest elim inating transfers in primary in order to 
increase post-primary transfers, where drop out rates are higher. Although 
this argument sounds reasonable, and should be analyzed in each particu­
lar setting, there are at least two counter arguments. One has to do with 
other research by the same authors (in Sadoulet et al. (2004)) where it is 
argued that TCCTPs have also been used as risk-coping mechanisms for 
poor families. If this is so, elim inating primary school scholarships may 
have effects well beyond primary attendance rates, especially, in terms of 
the ability of households to manage shocks. Still another argument, is that 
even though primary scholarships may not affect school attendance in the 
short run, they might have positive effects on cognitive capabilities (i.e. 
through better nutrition and health), which have impact on the longer-run 
ability to progress through the schooling system. This argument, however, 
is still to be verified.
Another area for fine-tuning, is evaluation. Since TCCTPs are still 
"young" it is reasonable to evaluate their short- and medium-term impacts, 
such as changes in school attendance, or child weight and height, etc. 
However, in the end, these programs are intended to increase productivity 
and incom e-earning capabilities after school age, which still needs to be 
verified. This will be possible when the first generation of fully covered 
individuals will reach working age and will reap the benefits of the human 
capital investment promoted by TCCTPs.
There is definitely also scope for fine tuning on the supply side in terms 
of the quality of education and health services. TCCTPs have now achieved 
their first objective of enabling poor households to use these services, but 
these services are generally prone to large improvements in quality.30 
Improving quality requires deep reforms in the education and health 
sectors, and this remains an outstanding issue across the Latin American 
region (Savedoff, 1998).
As for the structural challenges, there are at least three im portant issues. 
The first is that TCCTPs have been quite successful in defining eligibility
29For instance, Attanasio et al. (2004) show that scaling up the Oportunidades program 
to areas with different characteristics, generates lower impacts if the same incentive 
structure is provided to a different environment.
30See for instance Navarro (2003), Di Telia and Savedoff (2001).
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criteria and developing mechanisms for targeting at the stage of incorpora­
tion of beneficiaries. However, most of these programs have no incentives to 
exit. Even though demographic changes within the family naturally modify 
the amount of cash and benefits that each household receives (for instance, 
scholarships are only provided until a certain age), these programs have not 
been able to build in "exit doors" or "graduation" mechanisms in their design 
so that families can evolve to other types of support once they have past the 
human capital accumulation phase. One first attempt has been the introduc­
tion of the savings fund in Mexico (the fourth component of the program), 
which is only accessed upon high school graduation, but still other mecha­
nisms are needed to assure that TCCTPs will not become a "trap." Linkage to 
other programs where the accumulated human capital can be used to generate 
incomes might be a possibility.
Another challenge along the same lines is that TCCTPs were originally 
designed to combat structural poverty, but not to protect and benefit fami­
lies that transit in and out of poverty at higher frequency. The main chal­
lenge in order to evolve from structural to dynamic poverty is to evolve 
into permanent and institutionalized safety nets. This requires linking 
beneficiary registries (which are now in place in the countries where these 
programs exist) with the tax records that allow identifying which house­
holds or individuals are in need at a point in time. The challenge problem 
is that most developing countries have very large informal sectors that are 
not linked to tax records. Tax systems would need to be considerably 
expanded before a safety net of this type is consolidated.
Finally, TCCTPs have set the conditions for a much more orderly and 
structured social policy in the countries where they have been im ple­
mented. Once beneficiary registries are in place, and evaluations have been 
assimilated into the operation of the programs, they have positive external­
ities on other programs. A next step is to consolidate registries for all 
poverty alleviation programs, so that TCCTPs can be complemented with 
other actions, such as housing support, credit for production, etc., and the 
population that is not eligible from the program can also participate 
through other interventions tailored to their needs. As for evaluation, once 
a greater stock of impact evaluations are in place, policy makers will be able 
to compare impacts across programs to ensure that each unit of public 
resources spend, has the greatest possible impact. Perhaps in the future it 
will be possible to assess which of the available poverty alleviation pro­
grams is more pro-growth. This would definitely be a great improvement 
with respect to the existing status quo.
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P a r t  III
Financial M arket Developm ent for 
Growth and the Capital Account

7
Financial Development, Growth and 
Equity in Brazil
A rm an do C astelar Pinheiro an d  Regis Bonelli
Introduction
Criticism of the W ashington Consensus has increased in Latin America 
(LA) since the m id-1990s owing to the frustration with the region's 
slow GDP growth and the failure to promote equity. Although growth in 
the past decade accelerated vis-à-vis 1981-93 , the gain was less than 
expected. The same applies to the comparison with the recent expansion 
of China and India, which have accomplished high growth while ap­
parently disregarding -  or even confronting -  the Consensus's recom­
mendations.
Inasmuch as the diagnosis that motivated first-generation reforms 
remains valid, it seems correct to blame the insufficient depth of reforms 
for at least part of the responsibility for LA's lackluster performance in the 
past decade. But this seems to be an insufficient explanation. Lindauer and 
Pritchett (2002) noted that reforms are rarely fully or perfectly im ple­
mented. This has reinforced the view that the insufficient breadth of 
reform has been another cause for the small growth gains with respect to 
output growth. Alternatively, critics blame the attempt to im plem ent a 
single set of policies to all developing countries, disregarding their individ­
ual characteristics and stage of development, for the poor growth record 
and fear that institutional reforms are about to repeat the same mistake. 
Thus, each country should pursue its own development strategy, tailored to 
its own characteristics.
How does financial sector reform fit into this discussion? The literature 
stresses that financial development -  broadly understood as improved 
access to finance -  and growth are associated (Levine, 1997; W achtel, 
2003). It is also acknowledged that financial systems are not sufficiently 
developed in most countries of LA, partly on account of lack of reform, 
partly due to the absence or poor quality of supporting institutions, includ­
ing the laws and organizations that regulate the financial system. A 'growth 
diagnosis' approach also indicates that financing constraints are a main
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im pedim ent to growth. As advanced by Rodrik (2004, p. 11) in the case of 
Brazil:
All the indications are that this [Brazil] is an econom y that is bumping 
against a financing constraint. Real interest [rates] are extremely high 
despite a reasonable investment rate, and the current account balance is 
driven by the willingness of foreign creditors to lend ... Brazil, therefore, 
is a high-return country where the domestic financial system and ex­
ternal capital markets constrain the equilibrium level of investment. 
The solution therefore lies in improving financial interm ediation and 
in increasing Brazil's external creditworthiness (in part by tight fiscal 
policies).
This is consistent with the view that the financial market has been one area 
in which reform progressed the least in Brazil -  although the country's 
overall reform process was significant. W ith the country's high marginal 
productivity of capital, more and less expensive credit would help to spur 
growth. As noted by W achtel (2003), however, "the observed association 
between financial sector deepening and growth does not" warrant ... 
"a simple prescription to encourage the unrestricted growth of financial 
interm ediaries." Indeed, these expanded during the high inflation period 
without doing m uch financial interm ediation or promoting growth or 
equity. What is needed, then, is to promote the "specific institutional char­
acteristics and financial sector channels that contribute to growth" and 
equity. And these, as well as the barriers that prevent the expansion of 
credit and capital market activities in most of LA, are far from being per­
fectly understood.
This chapter examines the links between financial development, growth 
and equity focusing on the Brazilian case, with the objective of contribut­
ing to a broader discussion on the role of financial markets in fostering eco­
nomic development in LA. The first section discusses Brazil's recent growth 
record and changes in financial interm ediation in the region. The next 
section analyzes the growth-finance interface. This is followed by an evalu­
ation of the issue of access to financial services, including mechanisms 
directed at small and medium enterprises (SME). The final section con­
cludes on the impediments to financial deepening and inclusion drawn 
from the Brazilian experience.
Growth and financial depth in Brazil: Some stylized facts
In 1981-93 GDP growth rates in Brazil dropped to almost a fifth of those 
observed in 1946-80  (Table 7.1). This decline resulted essentially from: 
(1) a slowdown in the rate of capital accumulation; (2) a substantial drop in 
annual TFP growth, reflecting a decline in both labor and capital productivity;
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Table 7.1 Brazil: GDP growth and the contributions of capital, labor and TFP, 
1931-2004
Period A=B+C+D C apita l (B) Labor (C) T o ta l Factor P roductivity  (D)
1 9 3 1 -4 5 4.3 1.7 1 .0 1.7
1 9 4 6 -8 0 7.4 4 .6 1.4 1.4
1 9 8 1 -9 3 1.6 1.3 1.1 -0 .7
1994—0 4 (a) 2.7 1.0 0 .6 1.1
C h a n g e  fro m
1 9 8 1 -9 3  to  1 9 4 6 -8 0 -5 .8 -3 .3 -0 .3 -2 .1
1 9 8 1 -9 3  to  1 9 9 4 -0 4 1.1 -0 .3 -0 .5 1.8
Sources: P inhe iro  et al. (2001), u p d a ted  using  IBGE da ta  using  a typical Solow  d ecom position , w ith  
c o n s ta n t re tu rns  to  scale a n d  cap ita l a n d  labo r o u tp u t e lasticities o f 0.5.
Note: (a) For labor, average 1994-2003.
and (3) a slower expansion in employment, partly as a result of demographic 
transformations that are still unfolding. The reforms of the 1990s succeeded 
in accelerating GDP growth only modestly in the past decade. Moreover, all 
this acceleration resulted from a rise in TFP growth, whose contribution to 
output growth increased by 1.8 percentage point. The contributions of capital 
and labor, on the other hand, declined.
The slowdown in capital accum ulation has not been the result of a 
decline in savings: the total savings rate, approximated by the gross capital 
form ation rate, has remained relatively stable since the early 1990s (see 
Bacha and Bonelli, 2005). Total savings oscillated since price stabilization 
in 1994 in a range -  20 -22  percent of GDP -  that is above the mean thresh­
old observed in the 1950-68  period and not that m uch lower than in the 
1970s.
There have been, though, significant shifts in the composition of savings. 
Foreign savings, for instance, expanded after price stabilization in 1994. 
They fell in the aftermath of the 1999 m acroeconom ic policy mix change, 
with the floating of the Real and the significant adjustment in the primary 
fiscal accounts: in 2004 the current account surplus reached 2 percent 
of GDP.
The recovery in national savings in 1999-2004  (Giambiagi and Montero, 
2005) highlights the almost one-to-one relation between the shifts in 
foreign and public savings in the past decade: in 1995-98 , foreign savings 
increased by 3.9 percent of GDP, while public savings declined by 8.1 per­
cent of GDP. In 1999-2004  the former dropped by 6.2 percent of GDP 
and the latter increased by 6.5 percent of GDP. Thus, contrary to the late 
1960s and early 1970s, foreign savings crowded out public savings, rather 
than boosting investment. This suggests that in 1995-98  the financial 
system concentrated on transforming these additional funds into public 
debt.
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To some, the recent upsurge in public savings may be enough to put 
Brazil back on a path of rapid sustained growth, once the country can again 
rely on positive foreign savings, thus reverting the current status as a 
capital exporter (Giambiagi and Montero, 2005). We have a less sanguine 
view, one that stresses the role of financial markets in funneling these 
savings into investment, rather than just substituting for public savings. 
Furthermore, the relative price of investment goods has risen substantially 
since the 1970s, so that the same pool of savings generates less real invest­
ment. Brazil's underdeveloped financial system can be blamed for part of 
this rise in investm ent goods prices: with little financial interm ediation 
going on outside the acquisition of public bonds, firms and households 
have to rely on own generated funds to finance investment. This usually 
means that investm ent projects are implemented little by little, foregoing 
the gains from scale and specialization, and implying higher costs with 
unproductive capital due to longer im plem entation periods. Poor house­
holds and small business are more affected by these processes, because of 
their greater difficulty in accessing financial markets and self-accumulating 
resources -  implying less equality in the access to finance than otherwise. 
Finally, the recent upturn in public savings was accomplished through a 
major rise in the tax burden, currently at 36 percent of GDP, well above the 
1970s average of 25 percent of GDP. This too has im portant im plications 
for the economy as a whole and the financial sector in particular.
In most dimensions, financial markets in LA are relatively underdevel­
oped, compared to both developed and Asian countries. Except for Chile, 
in most countries in the region the volume of bank credit to the private 
sector is low and has not increased in recent years. Brazil is no exception. 
At the end of 2004, bank credit to the private sector amounted to 24.4 per­
cent of GDP, compared to multiples of that in developed and Asian coun­
tries. The bond market in LA (as in Brazil) is dominated by the public 
sector, which accounts for 81 percent of the total value, with financial 
institutions answering for another 14 percent. For the average of developed 
and emerging econom ies, the share of com pany bonds in the market is 
significantly higher, ranging around 14 percent. Although the stock of 
bonds issued by LA companies increased by 1 percent of GDP from 1995 to 
2001 -  from 0.5 percent to 1.5 percent of GDP -  the volume of government 
bonds rose by 10 percent of GDP in the same period. The market capitaliza­
tion of LA's main exchanges is also relatively small, compared to their 
counterparts in the US, Germany, and Asia. Chile and, to a lesser extent, 
Brazil are the exceptions. The number of listed companies and liquidity 
(measured by the turnover ratio) in LA also compare unfavorably to Asia, 
the US, and Germany. LA's exchanges are not, though, abnormally concen­
trated, regarding both market capitalization and traded volumes.
The market size for insurance in Brazil is relatively small as well. Per 
capita expenditures on insurance in Brazil are only a fraction of that in
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OECD countries, notably the US and Japan, and lower than in other middle- 
income countries such as South Africa, Chile, and Mexico; but similar to that 
in Argentina, Uruguay, and Costa Rica. The Brazilian private pension fund 
industry, in turn, is reasonably large for developing country standards, with 
the assets of closed (individual company) pension funds alone mounting to
18.2 percent of GDP in 2003, up from 3.3 percent in 1990.1
Brazil has a well-developed financial infrastructure inherited from the 
high inflation period, when banks tried to maximize their floating incom e 
by speeding up financial transactions as much as possible. Since the 1970s 
it has also had relatively large public bond and stock markets, the latter 
mostly geared towards trading state-owned enterprises (SOE) shares. For 
these reasons, it was expected that with the lowering of inflation, the pri­
vatization of public banks, a jump in the market share of foreign financial 
institutions, improved prudential regulation, the enactment of a new bank­
ruptcy law and other macro, structural and institutional reforms adopted 
since the mid-1990s, financial markets would experience a large expansion. 
This did not happen,2 although there have been noteworthy changes in the 
financial system.
The large public sector deficits since 1995 have been one of the main 
reasons why low inflation and changed bank ownership failed to generate a 
greater expansion of the financial sector. This can be seen in Table 7.2, 
which shows the structure of the financial sector from the point of view of 
different sources of credit to the public and private sectors. The figures 
highlight that credit has expanded since the m id-1990s, but entirely on 
account of the rise in the public debt: the (net) domestic debt of the public 
sector more than doubled between 1994 and 2003. Private sector debt, on 
the other hand, rose after price stabilization, largely through increased 
foreign borrowing, but declined afterwards. The table also shows that:
1. The private sector relies relatively more on foreign creditors, although, 
like the public sector, its debt is mostly domestic. The im portance of 
bank loans to the public sector declined after 1996, on account of both
'The open pension fund industry also expanded remarkably after stabilization. This 
expansion is closely linked to the various changes implemented in the second half of 
the 1990s in the social security systems of private and public sector workers, as well 
as the establishment of tax incentives for workers investing in those funds (through 
the postponement of tax payments until retirement).
2The adjustment processes associated to the end of high inflation partly explains this 
failure to expand the financial sector. In 1994-2002 , 57 banks in distress were closed 
down and 46 sold to other institutions, including two of Brazil's top ten banks. 
Fearing a systemic crisis, the Central Bank launched the Program of Incentives for 
Restructuring and Strengthening the National Financial System (PROER). Similar 
programs were adopted to deal with the issue of state and federal banks in distress.
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Table 7.2  Brazil: Sources of finance, 1994-2003 (selected years, end of period, % of 
GDP)
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003
Public sector (net) 30.0 33.3 41 .7 48.8 55.5 5 8 .7
Domestic (net) 21.3 29.4 35.5 39.1 41.2 46.7
NFS credits (gross) 5.5 5.5 2.3 1.1 0.9 1.0
Foreign (net) 8.7 3.9 6.2 9.6 14.3 12.0
Private sector (gross) 44.4 42.2 5 0.0 53.3 50.2 45.0
Domestic 38.4 33.1 32.2 30.6 27.4 28.9
Private bonds 2.0 2.1 2.5 2.6 3.1 2.8
Debentures 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.9 2.7
Promissory notes 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.0
Banks 30.9 25.5 27.4 26.9 23.4 25.1
Firms (Non-financial) 20.2 16.8 17.9 16.8 16.7 17.5
Non-directed loans 7.3 6.6 9.0 8.7 8.7
Directed loans 7.9 8.2 8.7
BNDES 4.9 5.3 5.8
Individuals 10.8 8.7 9.6 10.1 6.7 7.7
Non-directed loans 1.3 1.5 4.5 4.9 5.6
Directed loans 5.7 1.9 2.0
Foreign 6.0 9.1 17.8 22.7 22.8 16.1
Memo
Total bank credit 36.4 31.0 29.7 28.0 24.3 26.1
Leasing 1.2 0.6 0.6
Federal government bonds 14.9 21.8 35.0 44.2 39.3 45.8
Bovespa's market capitalization 27.9 21.0 38.2 27.6 42.4
Primary stock issuance (Bovespa) 1.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0
Exchange rate (R$/US$) 0.85 1.04 1.21 1.96 3.53 2.89
Sources: C en tra l Bank, C etip  (C am ara de  C ustod ia  e L iquida^ao) and  Rocca (2001).
Notes:
1. For 2000-3 , ra tios to  GDP o b ta in e d  d irec tly  from  C en tra l Bank. For 1994-9  th ese  w ere derived  
u s in g  GDP figures in flated  to  end  o f D ecem ber prices u s in g  th e  cen tered  IGP-DI, as calcu lated  
by th e  C en tra l Bank.
2. Total c red it by th e  SFN to  th e  p riva te  sec to r equals d irec ted  an d  n o n -d irec ted  credit plus 
leasing.
3. Assum es all loans by  BNDES are aw arded  to  firms.
4. Stock o f Federal g o v e rn m e n t b o n d s  excludes th o se  he ld  by  C en tra l Bank.
the privatization of large SOEs, the sale and closing down of local state 
banks, and the measures taken to lim it the indebtedness of the public 
sector as part of the fiscal adjustm ent process. Also im portant was the 
'federalization' of state and municipal debts (some of which owed to 
financial institutions), which were transformed into public bonds.
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2. The public sector borrows mostly by issuing bonds, whereas private 
bonds represent just about one-tenth of the domestic private debt. The 
importance of the latter increased after the Real Plan.
3. Roughly two-thirds of the bank loans to the private sector are granted to 
firms and one-third to individuals. For the former, about half consists of 
the so-called 'targeted' or 'directed' loans, that is, loans that are targeted 
to specific uses and/or funded with compulsory savings. Of these, the 
federal development bank, BNDES answers for over one half, accounting 
alone for about a third of all credit extended by banks to firms. The non­
directed, or freely allocated loans have gained im portance since 2000, 
partly on account of a decline in reserve requirements on sight deposits 
and a lowering of the IOF (Im posto sobre Operaçôes Financeiras, a tax on 
financial transactions).
Finance and growth: The missing link
A recent survey by W achtel (2003) states that "there is ample empirical evi­
dence to make a convincing case that financial sector development pro­
motes econom ic growth." But financial development cannot be simply 
equated to a large financial sector, as evidenced by the expansion in the 
number and size of financial institutions in LA during the high inflation 
period, despite a concom itant reduction in financial interm ediation. It is 
the expansion and sophistication of growth-augmenting financial activities 
that matter.
There are two com plem entary approaches to analyze the financial 
sector institutions and channels that stimulate these growth-augmenting 
activities. The traditional approach stresses the role of financial systems 
in reducing inform ation and transaction costs, and in that way fostering 
investm ent and productivity growth. Thus, Levine (1997) emphasizes five 
functions played by financial systems: "facilitate the trading, hedging, 
diversifying, and pooling of risk; allocate resources; m onitor managers and 
exert corporate control; mobilize savings; and facilitate the exchange of 
goods and services." This approach is also adopted by Stiglitz (1994, p. 23), 
for whom "enforcing contracts; transferring, sharing and pooling risks; and 
recording transactions, [are] activities that make them  [financial markets] 
the 'brain' of the entire econom ic system, the central locus of decision 
making."
Pagano (1993), in turn, adopts a production function approach to  look 
at how the system affects capital productivity, the cost of financial inter­
m ediation and the savings rate. Financial development enhances capital 
productivity by: (1) fostering riskier, less liquid and larger investment pro­
jects, which also tend to  be more productive; and (2) better screening 
projects and m onitoring their im plem entation, thus alleviating problems 
of adverse selection and moral hazard. More developed financial systems
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also consum e fewer resources to interm ediate savings, and thus make a 
higher proportion of them  available to investors. Finally, the financial 
system affects the savings rate, but the direction is ambiguous (Edwards, 
1995; Loayza et al., 2000): the greater availability of financial services 
helps m obilizing savings, because it allows savers to invest in more 
profitable and less risky projects; but to the extent that they are able to 
insure themselves in the financial market, their precautionary savings tend 
to decline. Moreover, an increase in the supply of credit to financially con­
strained agents, such as low-income consumers, should reduce savings, as 
they anticipate their consumption. On the other hand, greater investment 
lending, including greater access to housing finance, could help to boost 
savings, to the extent that it lowers the relative price of these assets (due 
to lower production costs).
The relatively small contribution of the Brazilian financial system to 
long-term growth can be examined using either approach. Of the functions 
highlighted by Levine, only the last one is reasonably well performed by 
financial institutions, thanks to the large and sophisticated logistics and 
physical infrastructure inherited from the high inflation period. In part, 
this follows from the limited role of financial institutions in mobilizing and 
allocating long-term savings.
The Brazilian financial system intermediates three types of savings: com ­
pulsory, contractual, and fully voluntary. The first consists of funds con­
trolled by the government and financed by savings schemes to which 
workers and firms have to contribute compulsorily. These funds finance the 
operation of public federal banks engaged in supporting sector or regional 
development activities, and it is often the case that projects are selected 
and monitored with an eye on politics as much as on econom ic funda­
mentals. This is particularly serious because these are essentially the only 
domestic sources of long-term credit available to firms and housing 
finance.
Contractual savings include the funds held by pension funds and insur­
ance companies. These institutions are in principle well placed to provide 
long-term and illiquid finance, since their liabilities are also long-term and 
predictable. But in Brazil they invest most of their assets in Treasury 
bonds.3 Only closed pension funds have significant resources invested in 
stock (19 percent of total assets), part of which as partners in controlling 
blocks of large companies. But this is mostly the case of pension funds 
linked to SOEs, in which political interference is common, hampering their 
incentives to exert corporate control and improve the allocation of
3At the end of 2003, 95%  of the reserves of insurance com panies were invested in 
fixed incom e assets, mostly governm ent bonds, against 57%  in the case of closed 
pension funds and 91%  for open pension funds.
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resources. Thus, these institutions play a limited role in improving resource 
allocation through the screening and monitoring of investment projects.
Fully voluntary savings are sight and time deposits and investments in 
mutual funds, which are also managed by banks. Like other institutional 
investors, mutual funds concentrate their assets on Treasury bonds, playing 
an equally limited role in raising the econom y’s capital productivity. Part 
of the savings mobilized by banks as sight and time deposits is sterilized by 
the Central Bank as reserve requirements; part is compulsorily used to 
finance housing, rural and micro-credit activities; and the remainder is left 
for the banks to allocate as they wish. Together with part of the banks' own 
capital -  the other part is largely invested in Treasury bonds -  and funds 
borrowed abroad by banks, these resources are used to fund the so-called 
"freely allocated loans." At the end of 2004, loans to the private sector 
amounted to 24.4 percent of GDP, 60 percent of which are freely-allocated 
loans. It is through these loans that banks could in principle contribute 
more directly to improve resource allocation and m onitor managers. But, 
in practice, these loans are geared mostly to finance household consump­
tion and firms' working capital in approximately equal proportions, having 
maturities of less than ten and six m onths, respectively. Thus, the impact 
of financial interm ediation on capital productivity is constrained, on the 
one hand, by public meddling with the funds channeled into investm ent 
finance, and on the other by the concentration of freely allocated loans on 
financing consumption and working capital.
Capital markets also play a limited role in investment finance: companies 
issued an average 1.4 percent of GDP in stocks and bonds in 1999-2003, and 
not all of these reached the market. Moreover, only a small number of large 
companies have access to finance at reasonable terms. Claessens e t a l .  (2000) 
show that the proportion of funds external to the firm remained highly 
concentrated in the largest firms. Firms in the highest quintile obtain about 
70 percent of all finance. Companies in the first three quintiles, in turn, secure 
less than 10 percent of total funds, depending mostly on retained earnings. 
Therefore, small firms and households rely almost entirely on internally
Table 7.3 Brazil: Interest rates and spreads on non-government-directed bank 
loans, 200 1 -0 4  (% p.a.)
2001 2002 2003 2004
Bank's borrowing cost 7.2 1.1 6.4 5.0
Bank spreads
Total 27 .0 30 .0 31.9 28.1
Firms 11.8 14.5 14.7 13.5
Individuals 48.9 51.4 55.6 46.5
Source: C e n t r a l  B a n k .
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generated funds to finance housing and commercial investments. Overall, 
more than two-thirds of firms' capital comes from retained profits.
A share of the savings that go into the financial system remain in the 
system in the form of bank spreads, fees and commissions paid to invest­
m ent banks, security brokers and dealers, etc., paying for services provided, 
taxes, delinquency losses and, in some cases, abnormal profits. In Brazil, 
this share is relatively high: McKinsey (1998) estimates that just the waste 
caused by low productivity in the financial system subtracts 2 percent of 
GDP from the resources made available to investors. This helps to explain 
why in 2 0 0 1 -0 4  the interest rate spreads on freely allocated bank loans 
ranged between 27 percent and 32 percent, with averages of 51 percent and 
16 percent on loans to individuals and firms, respectively (Table 7 .3).4 
Transaction costs in stock markets are also significant: commissions are not 
high compared to other Latin American countries, but the spread is, as are 
the costs of underwriting and com pliance with regulations applying to 
public companies (auditing, public notices, obligatory reports, etc.).
Bank spreads can be decomposed into net margin, administrative expenses, 
losses with default, and taxes/reserve requirements, with the actual break­
down being somewhat different for public and private banks: as expected, 
in the latter a lower proportion of the spreads is due to administrative costs 
and default losses, and proportionately more goes to profits. A cross­
country comparison by Demirgii^-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) shows that 
Brazilian banks had the fifth largest net interest margin among banks of 
76 countries, reflecting high ratios of overhead costs (the highest among 
the 76 countries), taxes (5th largest), loan loss provisions (13th largest) and 
net profits (24th highest) to total assets.
Insufficient bank com petition is deemed a possible explanation for both 
high profits and low productivity -  Demirguy-Kunt et al. (2003) show, for 
instance, that bank margins tend to be associated with concentration. 
Belaisch (2003) shows that although concentration is not high -  the largest 
10 banks answer for 70 percent of total assets -  rivalry among banks is not 
strong. Com petition was expected to rise with increased openness of the 
financial market to foreign institutions in the second half of the 1990s, but 
although the quality of credit-granting analysis has improved, and adm in­
istrative expenses fallen, net margins have stayed high by international 
standards (see Reis and Valadares, 2004).
Two tentative complementary explanations for the market power of 
financial institutions are a noncom petitive conduct (e.g., a tacit cartel), 
(tacitly) led public banks, whose costs are particularly high and lack a profit 
maximizing orientation (McKinsey, 1998); and the segmentation of credit
4Afanasieff et al. (2001) show that bank spreads in Brazil are am ong the highest in 
Latin America and are a multiple of those found in developed countries.
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markets, that creates monopolistic banking relationships between banks and 
part of the borrowers. The problem is further composed by the lack of a clear 
mandate to the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) and anti-trust agencies to foster 
competition in the sector. Competition is also weakened by financial regula­
tions that raise the cost of migration from one bank to another.
High reserve requirements on sight and time deposits and incom e and 
transaction taxes on loans are another m ajor com ponent of interest rate 
spreads. According to Troster (n.d.), if no costs or any coverage for default 
are imputed to a loan, for every $100 of interest paid by a debtor, the saver 
is paid (net of taxes) $25.3, the bank profits $24.4, $0.8 is paid as deposit 
insurance premium and the government collects $49.5! Transaction taxes 
were also at some stage levied on stock market transactions, with signific­
ant negative consequences. Narita and Novaes (2003) estimate that the 
CPMF (a tax on checks and other withdrawals) levied on stock market 
transactions reduced the volume of transactions in the Sao Paulo Stock 
Exchange (Bovespa) by 19 percent.
The problems caused by the high tax burden on financial operations are 
compounded by the frequent change in tax rules, which raises risk substan­
tially. This instability stems partly from a "cat and mouse" game between 
financial intermediaries and the tax authority: given the high tax burden, 
the former are especially motivated to find and explore loopholes, while 
the latter follows behind closing them. Constant changes in taxation con­
tribute to shorten maturities and increase the preference for liquid assets.
High taxes, not necessarily on financial intermediation, also compromise 
financial interm ediation by fostering informality and encouraging compa­
nies not to go public in order to keep murky accounts and in this way 
"lower" their tax burden -  public companies have to abide to more strin­
gent rules of disclosure. This happens in spite of the lower cost of capital 
faced by public companies. The impact of tax evasion on the quality of 
accounting information is particularly serious in the case of informal firms, 
whose access to financial markets is expensive and very limited. In particu­
lar non-transparent accounts make much of the relevant inform ation on 
borrowers private to the bank with which companies keep a relationship, 
making borrowers "inform ationally" captured and allowing banks to 
extract monopoly rents (Pinheiro and Moura, 2003). For small and medium 
companies the opportunity cost of more transparent accounts seems a crit­
ical obstacle in the way of using external funds to finance investment, and 
most do not pass basic due diligence processes.
High default rates are another reason for high bank spreads in Brazil. In 
2004 the average default rate on (freely allocated) loans to individuals was
13.2 percent, alm ost four times as much as that for firms (3.6 percent). 
These high delinquency rates are a result of high interest rates (a circular 
effect), the poor quality of inform ation available to select borrowers, and 
weak creditor rights. The main com plaint of creditors in Brazil is not the
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lack of legal protection, but its improper enforcem ent by the courts. 
The slowness of the judiciary is perceived to be the main problem not only 
for credit operations but also for the workings of justice in general (see 
Pinheiro, 2002). The World Bank's 2005 Doing Business survey also shows 
that collecting a debt in court or carrying out a bankruptcy process in Brazil 
take longer than on average in LA and in developing economies.
Furthermore, judicial decisions on credit disputes are perceived to be pro­
debtor. This attitude is often the reflex of a certain degree of judicial 
activism that causes jurisprudence and patterns of judicial behaviour to 
play a role as, or more important than the law itself in regulating credit dis­
putes. Therefore, creditors are usually unwilling to rely on legal instru­
ments until there is a well-established jurisprudence. This explains why 
chattel mortgage (fiduciary alienation) is so well accepted for car financing 
but not house financing, while also making it very difficult to repossess 
most types of assets given as collateral, which then have a low impact in 
reducing risk and spreads.
The legal and judicial protection of m inority shareholders is also per­
ceived to be weak, which helps to depreciate share values and raise the cost 
of equity capital. Nenova (1999) estimates that weak property rights in 
Brazil lower company values by at least 20 percent. Shareholder rights are 
also weakened by the m ism atch between cash flow and voting rights 
and the high ownership concentration of voting shares. Of a sample of 
723 companies analyzed by Rocca (2001), only 11 percent did not issue 
preferential (non-voting) shares, against 27 percent that issued the limit 
two-thirds of total equity capital in preferential shares. On average, prefer­
ential shares made up 46 percent of the equity capital of those firms. For 
large companies, this proportion is even higher. The high concentration of 
ownership and voting rights is another problem. In two-thirds (67 percent) 
of the companies, the proportion of ordinary shares owned by the control­
ling shareholders with at least 5 percent of these shares is above 90 percent; 
with 16 percent in the 80 -90  percent bracket. An indicator of weak m inor­
ity shareholder rights is the high premium on voting rights. In Brazil, this 
premium is 23 percent (correcting for differences in liquidity, dividend 
policy, and share preference), compared to 18 percent in Germany, 9 per­
cent in the UK, 3 percent in the US and 1 percent in Hong Kong. This high 
premium is associated with the high concentration of ownership in Brazil 
(Claessens et al., 2000).
Judicial activism is part of what Arida et al. (2005) dubbed jurisdictional 
uncertainty, defined as the "risk of acts of the Prince changing the value of 
contracts before or at the m om ent of their execution," which, as is the 
case with court rulings, "m anifests itself predominantly as an anti-saver 
and anti-creditor bias." Examples include the freezing of financial assets, 
the purging of price indices to lower m onetary correction and the non­
enforcement of dollar indexed leasing contracts by the Judiciary.
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The poor quality of the information available to creditors and minority 
shareholders also discourages financial intermediation. The more and the 
better the credit information made available to lenders, the greater tends to be 
the access to credit (Galindo and Miller, 2001). In particular, firms in coun­
tries with better CIRs (Credit Information Registries) tend to rely more on debt 
than in those in which credit information is scarce and of poor quality.
Brazil has a large and well-established credit bureau industry, with 
private and public CIRs. These keep mostly black inform ation on borrow­
ers, which is used when deciding about small loans, usually to individuals 
or small businesses. They also function as enforcem ent mechanisms, since 
borrowers included in black lists are usually denied credit. But their use in 
larger and longer-term operations is much more limited, in which case 
creditors suffer with the poor quality of accounting and disclosure rules, 
which also affect m inority shareholders. Only in the corporate segment, 
comprising large firms, several of which borrow or have their shares traded 
in foreign markets, is inform ation deemed of relatively good quality. For 
small and medium firms, informality, as discussed above, is a major factor 
worsening the quality of financial inform ation. According to Rocca (2001, 
p. 102), based on inform ation collected from managers of private equity 
funds, 70 percent of the companies selected for investment are discarded at 
the due diligence stage, given the inconsistency of accounting registries 
and effective revenues and due to tax contingencies stemming from this. 
The poor quality of inform ation disclosed to investors is also the result of 
the inadequate enforcement of disclosure norms, with a large proportion of 
listed companies failing to send the required information to CVM.
The above highlights as main barriers to financial deepening the distortions 
caused by the poor situation of the fiscal accounts and state interventions in 
mobilizing, draining, and allocating savings. A large part of the financial 
wealth in Brazil is held in short-term, highly liquid and well-remunerated 
public bonds, which crowd out private bonds and stocks. The difficulty faced 
by the government to elongate the maturities of its debt also limits the capac­
ity of firms to issue long-term securities, making them unwilling to seek exter­
nal finance. The high tax burden induces firms to become informal and mask 
their accounts and increases interest rate spreads, while at the same time 
making tax rules volatile and uncertain. Macroeconomic instability is also a 
hindrance to stretching maturities due to high market risk, as reflected in the 
high volatility of the stock market. Breaches of financial contracts involving 
the public sector are often motivated by the effort to prevent the public debt 
from entering into an explosive path.
Finance and equity: Too late, too little
Much of the criticism to first -  and second-generation reforms in LA is linked 
to their apparent lack of impact on inequality. Can financial development
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improve equity in LA and, in particular, In Brazil? Our view is that it should 
help, although the link between finance and social conditions is more likely 
bi-directional than one way. Financial deepening should accelerate GDP 
growth. But the impact of growth on inequality and poverty is not uniform 
across countries, as it depends on the factor-intensity of growth and on who 
owns those factors. The factor of production owned by the poor is (unskilled) 
labor, and normally they lack, or have no access to, human, fixed (including 
land), and financial capital. This explains why policies aimed directly at alle­
viating poverty and improving the distribution of income that are not 
directly based on income transfers, which have limitations, usually focus on 
either redistributing capital or tilting the factor intensity of growth towards 
labor.
Financial development should benefit the poor more than proportionately 
because they are the ones who pay most for financial services and have least 
access to the system. A lower cost of consumption and investment finance 
will mean a direct income gain to the poor, and the opportunity to enhance 
physical and human capital accumulation, increasing their productivity and 
becoming better positioned to gain from growth. Better access to financial ser­
vices should reduce their transaction costs, allow them to keep their savings at 
a safer and better-remunerated place, and even consume insurance and 
private social security services. Currently, outside the very expensive con­
sumer loans extended by traditional financial institutions, their only option is 
the relatively small micro-credit segment.
Brazil offers a fertile environm ent for m icro-finance -  a large and entre­
preneurial low-income population that lacks access to regular banking 
services and a favorable stance from public authorities -  but despite regis­
tering some activity in this area since 1973, only in the past decade has the 
system of micro-credit started to receive some attention from the authori­
ties. This occurred with the establishm ent of the "Com unidade Soliddria" 
program, which allocated public funds to that end and encouraged the 
creation of new types of m icro-finance institutions (1999) that gave the 
industry more flexibility regarding both funding and lending. Currently, 
different types of organizations provide micro-finance:5
1. Non profit-seeking institutions: Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
which are subject to the Usury Law; and public interest civil society
5The supply of m icro credit in Brazil is made through a diversity of institutions 
under different regimes Micro credit can be assessed by formal and informal entre­
preneurs. Typical loan values amount up to R$ 5,000 (approximately U S$2,000) and 
interest rates charged reach approximately 4 -4 .5%  per month (yearly consumer price 
inflation in Brazil is currently around 5.5%). Requirements include a dean record (at 
least one year) and a guarantor. Alternative mechanisms are joint guarantees and 
credit cooperatives (Expósito da Silva, 2003, pp. 100-2).
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organizations (Oscip), registered with the Ministry of Justice, and which 
are not subject to the Usury Law; and
2. Profit-seeking institutions: Credit society for micro-entrepreneurs (SCM), 
which needs to be authorized by the BCB and may be controlled by any 
individual or organization, including private financial institutions or 
Oscip; and any conventional financial institution.6
Despite expanding considerably over the past decade, m icro-finance in 
Brazil has flourished less than in other Latin American countries (World 
Bank, 2004b). Moreover, it remains highly dependent on the public sector, 
either directly, as with Banco do Nordeste's “Credi Amigo" program, or indi­
rectly, by way of financial support from BNDES to NGOs providing m icro­
finance. Autonomous micro-finance institutions (such as ABN-Amro's "Real 
Micro-Crédito") are few and small.
Brazil also has a large credit cooperative industry that operates in a loan 
range similar to that of the m icro-finance institutions. It is, though, more 
skewed towards individuals and less active in the inform al business 
segment, which is the prime target of m icro-finance. Credit cooperatives, 
which have existed in Brazil for over a century, account for a larger 
volume of credit, are less dependent on public support and have expanded 
more rapidly than the m icro-finance institutions. Their share in total 
lending by the banking system more than doubled between 1977 and 
2002. The num ber of SCM also expanded vigorously since they were 
allowed to operate in 1999, but these are still very few when compared to 
the cooperatives: their total lending at the end of 2002  amounted to just 
0 .0007  percent of GDP. Moreover, they account for a small share of the 
m icro-finance industry in Brazil, which is dominated by the Oscip and 
NGO. As noted by the World Bank (2004b, p. 52):
Many m icrofinance institutions are largely beyond the purview of 
formal financial system supervision, but estimates suggest that the total 
number of clients served increased from around 3,000 in 1995 to around 
160,000 by end-2001, while the active loan portfolio grew to some 
R$140 million. This is small compared to the credit cooperative system, 
and also small compared to other countries in the region, once adjusted 
for country size. Peru and Bolivia had estimated microfinance clienteles 
of around 185,000 and 380 ,000  at end 2001, respectively, while small 
countries such as Nicaragua and El Salvador also had over 80,000 
microfinance clients.
6For a detailed account of m icro-finance and credit cooperatives in Brazil see World 
Bank (2004b) and Banco Central do Brasil (2003a and 2003b). According to Darcy 
and Soares (n.d.), 47%  of the m icro-finance institutions are OSCIP, 31%  NGO, 12% 
SCM and 10% funds.
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The poor should also benefit from financial development if the access of 
SMEs to finance increases. Because SMEs are more labor intensive than 
large firms, a large expansion in SMEs output should make growth more 
labor intensive. Moreover, SME could possibly play a larger role in enhanc­
ing entrepreneurship and alleviating poverty, thereby potentially contri­
buting to reduce inequality. Small firms have a much more limited access 
to credit and finance than medium firms -  despite the fact that the size 
limits of medium firms are flexible, depending on the investigator (usually 
up to 50 employees is small; from 50 to 5000, medium-sized). But, however 
defined, SMEs represent a sizeable proportion of firms, employment, and 
output in both developing and, especially, in the developed countries. In 
LA they represent 50 percent of formal em ploym ent in Mexico, almost 
60 percent in Ecuador and Brazil, around 70 percent in Argentina, 
Colombia, Panama and Peru. In a sample of developed countries the figures 
are: 60 percent in Germany and the United Kingdom, 70 percent in France 
and 80 percent in Italy and Spain (BID, 2005, p. 195).
Lack of access to credit is an im portant obstacle to the development of 
SMEs.7 Only 28.8  percent of the small firms have access to bank credit, 
compared to 42.8 percent for medium and 54.5 percent for large firms. 
Financing restrictions to small and medium firms in LA have four main 
causes: (1) fixed costs of loans (related to evaluation, supervision, and 
repayment of loans, which increase the cost of loans to small borrowers; 
micro credit is not a solution here because the amounts are likely to 
be large); (2) difficulty to repossess collateral; (3) bankruptcy costs; and 
(4) asymmetric inform ation, which causes moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems.
An empirical analysis of financing constraints found that the main 
restrictions faced by firms are due to: (1) difficulties in the enforcem ent of 
credit contracts (effective com pliance reduces financing restrictions per­
ceived by firms); (2) lack of proper credit inform ation registry (private reg­
istry has a positive impact; public registry has no impact); (3) the existence 
of dislocation, or crowding out effect (high public domestic debt increases 
financing restrictions and reduces access to bank credit); (4) high bank con­
centration and bank ownership (high concentration increases financing 
restrictions to SMEs; there is some evidence that state property reduces 
restrictions to SMEs; the presence of foreign banks reduces restrictions 
overall, and not just to SMEs); and (5) GDP volatility (BID, 2005).
Financial development also lowers the cost of financial capital and phys­
ical investm ent in the econom y as a whole. This will raise investm ent and
7The data m entioned in the text com e from the World Bank's W orld Business 
Environment Survey (WBES), which covers approximately 10,000 firms in 81 countries 
(20 in LA and 2,000 firms) in 1999-2000 . See BID (2005).
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labor productivity, lifting wages of employed workers. On the other hand, 
higher labor productivity would have a negative impact on employment, 
unless output is to expand sufficiently. In particular, there is a risk that the 
less skilled workers suffer most, if they are the ones capital can most easily 
substitute for. This stresses the importance of financial reform accelerating 
growth for its social impacts to be positive. To the extent that growth is 
indeed constrained by the lack of investm ent finance, the benefits to the 
poor are uncontroversial. But this could not be the case in countries in 
which other factors constrain growth.
Inasmuch as different market segments and/or participants are unequally 
affected by the disincentives provided by weak creditor protection, reforms 
in this area could have particularly im portant im plications regarding the 
access of certain econom ic agents to credit. That is, the rationing of credit 
resulting from debtor-oriented laws can disproportionately affect certain 
types of borrowers, restricting their access to credit or penalizing them with 
especially large spreads. This point is illustrated by the results of Gropp 
e t  a l.  (1997), who find that in American states with debtor-oriented bank­
ruptcy laws, credit tends to be channeled to high-asset households, with a 
reduction in the availability and amount of credit extended to low-asset 
households. Moreover, they find evidence that low-asset households are 
charged higher interest rates on automobile loans in high bankruptcy 
exemption states. Pinheiro (2002) shows that in Brazil small borrowers are 
especially harmed by the difficulty of creditors to enforce loan contracts 
through collateral repossession or other types of judicial collection.
Thus, financial reform will also contribute to reduce inequality for it will 
require solving problems that affect the poor and small businesses dis­
proportionately: for instance, better defined property rights, less inform al­
ity, more m acroeconom ic stability and com petition. Inform ality is one of 
the main areas in which the needs of financial reform and social policies 
coincide. Alongside the relative scarcity of jobs in the corporate sector, par­
ticularly "form al" jobs, since the early 1990s new employment opportuni­
ties in LA countries have been concentrated in largely informal small 
business, cooperatives and self-employment, posing powerful barriers to 
econom ic growth and productivity change. A recent study argues forcefully 
that informality explains the large inter-firm productivity gaps observed in 
Brazil and is also a powerful obstacle to productivity growth (McKinsey & 
Company, 2004).8 Informal firms invest little in physical and in human
8The productivity gap between informal and formal firms in Brazil is estimated at 
about 50% . This is due to the difficulty to access financial market mechanisms, 
reduced access to judiciary in order to enforce contracts, disincentive to grow due to 
fears of being caught by governm ent agencies in charge of enforcing tax and other 
legal norms and procedures, and insertion in productive chains formed by informal 
firms as well.
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capital, have a more difficult access to credit, and have no incentive to grow, 
for they would become more visible to the authorities. Their commercial rela­
tionships tend to be with other informal firms (World Bank, 2004a).
Finally, financial reform  can im prove incom e d istribu tion  if it entails 
m aking the  d istribu tion  of financial incentives less skewed towards large 
farms and  firms and more pro-poor. The Brazilian financial system is also a 
m eans to  transfer subsidies to  specific sectors, firms, and social groups. 
Agriculture is the  m ost conspicuous case, bu t o ther sectors also benefit. 
Farmers benefit from targeted credit, w hich is channeled  m ainly th rough  
th ree federal banks (notably Banco do Brasil). Funding for rural credit 
comes m ainly from  m andated  credit and com pulsory savings funds.9 
A relatively h igh proportion  of its population  still lives in  rural areas. 
Therefore, the poten tia l clientele for rural credit m ounts to approxim ately 
35 m illion people and an  estim ated 4.8 m illion rural establishm ents, 
or farm units. But land d istribu tion  is highly skewed, w ith  the  w ealthiest 
1 percent of farmers accounting for 45 percent of landholdings and  the 
poorest 50 percent of farmers ho ld ing  just 2 percent of agricultural land. 
And it is the  w ealthiest farmers w ho benefit the  m ost from  governm ent 
subsidies, in  th is way em ptying any distributive goals of such programs, 
while at the same tim e bringing in to  question the  need of subsidies due to 
m arket failures -  large farmers have various m eans to  deal w ith risk and 
other problems inheren t to  rural production. Thus, as noted  in W orld Bank 
(2004b, p. 192):
[A] large part of th is directed credit fails to  m eet in tended  targets, 
however, w ith  better-off farmers, for exam ple, capturing m uch of the  
subsidies, ra ther th an  th e  poorer groups for w hom  the  subsidies are 
in tended . In agriculture the  largest 2% of the  borrowers receive 57% 
of the  loans, while the  sm allest 75% of borrowers receive only 6% of 
credit."
As in  agriculture, it is the  large firms in  industry  and o ther sectors th a t 
receive m ost of the  subsidies interm ediated  by public banks and regional 
developm ent funds. Historically, the better-off segments of the  population 
also benefited the m ost from housing finance subsidies.
9First, there is a 25%  reserve requirem ent on sight deposits in the banking system, 
which can either be deposited with the Central Bank without remuneration or used 
for lending to agriculture at controlled interest rates. This answers for over half of 
the rural credit funds. Second, there is an array of off-budget taxes, compulsory 
savings, and constitutional funds, managed by public banks. These also have exclu­
sive access to the "equalization of interest rates" instrum ent, which supports the 
"Programa Nacional de Agricultura Familiar" (Pronaf, a credit program aimed at rural 
households).
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Market reforms in  Brazil came later and were im plem ented more gradually 
and flexibly th an  in other LA countries, but eventually they caught up w ith 
the  regional average and even surpassed it: in 1999 Brazil's overall index of 
structural reform m atched Chile's. And, after a difficult start, w ith  a con­
traction  of GDP in 1990-92, reforms seemed to have enhanced growth, 
w ith  the  econom y expanding vigorously in  1993-95, w ith  further rapid 
growth expected for the  rest of the decade. Actually, Brazil grew on average 
only 2.4 percent per year in  1995-2004. M oreover, after a substantial 
decline in poverty w ith  the end of high inflation, in  1994, little progress 
was accom plished in reducing the country 's severe social inequalities.
The reforms of the  1990s succeeded in  raising productiv ity  grow th, bu t 
no t investm ent rates: capital accum ulation proceeded even m ore slowly in 
1994-2004 than  in the  so-called "lost decade." The high cost of investing is 
one of the underly ing causes, and lack of proper finance is one of the 
factors th a t pushes investm ent cost up. Long-term finance to  private 
investors on adequate term s is scarce, o ther th an  th a t provided by public 
banks. Given Brazil's high m arginal productivity of capital, facilitating the 
access to  finance and lowering its costs is a sure way to accelerate growth.
The financial sector is one of th e  areas in  w hich reform  was m ost in ten ­
sive in  LA, but also the one in w hich Brazil lagged m ost behind. Recent ini­
tiatives aimed at im proving the sector's institu tional fram ework include 
the  creation of a new public CIR at the  BCB, the  enactm ent of legislation 
allowing for salary-backed loans, and the reforms in  the  bankruptcy  and 
corporate laws. The results so far have no t been noticeable: the  cost of 
capital rem ains extrem ely high, there is little  financial in term ediation  
taking place, and external finance reaches only a lim ited num ber of large 
firms.
In this context, our analysis has stressed the  im portance of reforms 
geared to  im proving the quality  of in form ation  and streng then ing  the 
rights of creditors and m inority  shareholders. It also exam ined explana­
tions for the relatively small contribution the Brazilian financial system has 
had towards prom oting growth and equity. Four are w orth summarizing.
First and forem ost is the  incom plete m acroeconom ic ad justm ent of the  
econom y -  and, in particular the  existence of a large public debt -  w hich 
leads to high interest rates, m arket volatility, and a preference of savers for 
liquid, short-term  financial investm ents. By giving savers the alternative to 
invest in highly paid, low risk, highly liquid public bonds, the public sector 
sets a hard-to-m eet benchm ark  for private investors, while dow nplaying 
the role of the financial sector in  selecting and m onitoring investm ent pro­
jects. This is the case of institu tional investors, w hich control large sums of 
financial saving, largely invested in  Treasury bonds. Fiscal im balances also 
explain the relatively high reserve requirem ents on sight and term  deposits,
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reducing the  pool of savings th a t banks can draw on  to  finance firms and 
households.
Second, the high tax burden (35.9 percent of GDP in 2004) and the associ­
ated high degree of informality and fiddling w ith com pany accounts, which 
lower the quality of the inform ation disclosed to financial institutions and 
minority shareholders. This lowers the supply of external finance and makes it 
more expensive. But most companies prefer to pay this price to give up the op­
portunity  to partly evade taxes. Financial interm ediation per se is also subject 
to high taxes, enlarging the wedge between the cost of capital to investors and 
the return obtained by savers. These enhance the importance of retained pro­
fits as a source of investment finance, notably in the case of small and medium 
companies, being another factor contributing to financial disintermediation.
Third, the central role of the  state in mobilizing and allocating savings, 
largely an inheritance of the pre-1990s developm ent model, which dam pens 
the im pact of financial interm ediation on capital productivity. Virtually all 
long-term credit in Brazil is funded through compulsory savings and the 
m andatory use of a part of sight and term deposits to finance selected activi­
ties. These resources am ount to 40 percent of all credit available to the private 
sector and are mostly intermediated by public banks. Both the loss of flexibil­
ity and political interference in the allocation of credit by public banks reduce 
the impact of financial interm ediation on capital productivity.
Fourth, the low protection of minority shareholders and especially creditors 
against expropriation  by the  state and private parties creates a highly 
uncertain and risky environm ent tha t raises the cost of capital, discourages 
financial interm ediation and raises the preference for short-term  and liquid 
financial assets. This low protection of rights reflects a num ber of factors -  
judicial activism, high volatility of tax rules, contract breaches by the  gov­
ernm ent, and the slow enforcem ent of laws and regulations -  including an 
overall bias against financial investors in the  executive, legislative and judi­
cial branches of governm ent.
Some of these problems are even more acute in the so-called retail segment, 
which covers individuals and small businesses. Financial institutions operat­
ing in this segment tend to  direct loans to  consumers, rather than  producers; 
prefer to operate w ith the rich, rather than  the poor; and essentially supply 
only short-term  loans. Default rates are higher than  the average, and so are 
interest rate spreads. This is the targeted clientele of micro-credit institutions, 
which have expanded their activities in recent years, but from a very low base. 
Their activities are ham pered by the same kind of legal and inform ational 
problems that complicate traditional institutions: lack of valuable, well titled, 
executable collateral; severe problems of asymmetric information; and, in the 
case of small businesses, a high mortality rate.
Emerging econom ies w ith relevant capital m arkets have low inflation  
and a relatively low public debt. Thus, considering the  issue of sequencing, 
Novaes (2005) shows that the transition to such a m acroeconom ic environ­
ment, allowing for a decline in interest rates, has preceded a discrete improve­
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m ent in  financial market developm ent, confirm ing our assessment that fur­
thering the fiscal adjustm ent process and lowering the public debt to GDP 
ratio are pre-requisites not only for lowering the tax burden and jurisdictional 
uncertainty, but ultimately to allowing for financial development in Brazil.
Pronounced market instability, high real interest rates, large public deficits, 
high taxes, high reserve requirem ents on sight deposits, poor borrower 
screening, and insufficient creditor p ro tection  are factors th a t add up to  
make finance scarce and expensive to  firms and individuals. The com bined 
effects of these problem s are financial d isin term ediation  and a preference 
for liquid, short-term  financial assets. Savers also tend  to  either reinvest 
the ir savings or keep them  abroad in  safer jurisdictions. The end result is a 
financial system that, although counting  on a sophisticated infrastructure, 
plays a very limited role in fostering growth and equity.
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O pening of the capital account has been one of the strongest policy recipes 
of m ainstream  econom ics since the  1980s. The recipe has been im ple­
m ented vigorously in  Latin America, encom passing a wide variety of flows 
including acquisitions of public and private firms, bonds, equity stock and 
derivatives.2 After significant innovations in  in ternational capital markets 
in the  1990s, private flows flowed abundan tly  in to  Latin America, particu­
larly, in 1990-97. Liberalization has also included flows of domestic capital, 
seeking the full in tegration  of local financial m arkets to  in ternational 
markets.
The incidence of private capital flows on dom estic econom ic activity has 
been an ou tstand ing  feature of Latin American econom ies (LACs) during 
the past quarter of a century. Actually, on frequent occasions, capital surges 
have been associated to financial crises ra ther th an  to  vigorous capital 
form ation and sustainable GDP grow th. This fact h igh ligh ts the  central 
role played by the transm ission of boom -bust cycles in  in ternational 
capital markets into the host markets, and the vulnerabilities and hysteresis 
effects tha t pro-cyclicality tends to generate on  diverse emerging economies
’This chapter is partly based on Ffrench-Davis (2005, Chapter VI) and on output of a 
research project of ECLAC, with support of the Ford Foundation (see Ffrench-Davis, 
2006, Chapter I). I appreciate the com m ents of Augusto de la Torre, Claudio Loser, 
José Luis M achinea, Roberto Zahler, and colleagues at ECLAC. I appreciate the 
research assistance of Heriberto Tapia and Rodrigo Heresi.
2See ECLAC (2002a, Chapters 2 and 5); Morley et al. (1999); Stallings and Studart 
(2006); W illiamson (2003).
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(EEs).3 Financial volatility has been one significant variable underlying the 
poor grow th perform ance; (1) in  1990-2005, annual GDP per capita grew 
merely 1 percent, vis-à-vis the world and the USA averaging 1.2 percent and 
1.8 percent, respectively; (2) ou tp u t per m em ber of the  labor force stag­
nated  betw een 1990 and 2005; and (3) the  investm ent ratio rem ained 
notably depressed notw ithstand ing  intense "m arket reforms" and a recov­
ery of capital inflows.
Significant shifts in expectations, usually reinforced by subsequent risk- 
rating changes, lead to sharp pro-cyclical adjustm ents in the  availability of 
financing, m aturities, and spreads. The m ost dam aging, as argued below, 
ra ther th an  very short-term  volatility, are the  m edium -term  fluctuations: 
several years of over-optim ism  and abundan t financing (i.e. 1991-94 and 
m id-1995-97), followed by several years of over-pessimism and dryness 
(1998-2003). The outcom e of th a t pro-cyclical env ironm ent includes 
several years w ith recessive output-gaps, depressed actual productivity  
(TFP), and lowered investm ent ratios. Given a natural asym m etry in macro- 
econom ic perform ance (econom ic activity canno t exceed persistently full 
em ploym ent b u t can stay for long significantly below), average actual TFP, 
investm ent ratios, em ploym ent and social equity, and  GDP grow th are 
severely affected by instability.
In th is chap ter I analyze how  and w hy th e  transm ission of financial 
volatility  in to  LACs has been one d e te rm inan t variable beh ind  th e  poor 
econom ic and  social perform ance of th e  region since th e  early 1990s. In 
th e  first section, after sum m arizing th e  two m ore trad itional argum ents 
in favor of capital account open ing  by developing econom ies, tw o newer 
argum ents are analyzed. In the  second section it  is argued why recessions 
leave significant long-lasting econom ic and social costs. Even th e  better- 
behaved recoveries usually end in a GDP plateau notoriously  below the  
pre-crisis plateau. In the  th ird  section, it is analyzed how and why, repeat­
edly, crises are bu ilt in boom  periods. The role of short-termist agents and 
processes of persistent positive shifts of th e  supply of funding  during  the  
boom  stage are stressed. The final section, concludes w ith some lessons for 
providing a m arket env ironm en t actually  "friendly” to labor and capital 
th a t are th e  producers of econom ic growth.
3Marfan (2005) shows that pro-cyclicality has been located in private flows. Actually, 
public funding has tended to behave counter-cyclically (see ECLAC, 2002b). Ffrench- 
Davis (2006) presents a comparative analysis of m acroeconom ic policies of selected 
Asian, African and Latin American economies. Ffrench-Davis (2005) analyzes trade, 
financial and m acroeconom ic reforms in Latin America under the aegis of the 
W ashington Consensus, and offers ingredients for an alternative analytical frame­
work. Several assertions in this chapter have their statistical or econom etric support 
in the latter book. See com plementary analyses in Agosin (2006); Frenkel (2004); 
Griffith-Jones (1998) and Ocampo (2006).
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Newer arguments for liberalizing capital flows
Flows from capital-rich to  capital-scarce econom ies and flows com pensat­
ing external shocks are the  tw o m ost classic argum ents in  favor of capital 
flows to  LDCs. Real returns on m arginal investm ent in capital-rich coun­
tries are expected to  be system atically lower th an  those in  "soundly" 
m anaged capital-scarce countries like the  EEs. Indeed, net inflows of exter­
nal savings can supplem ent na tional savings, raise productive investm ent 
and, thus, boost grow th. In tu rn , expansion of aggregate incom e can 
further increase dom estic savings and investm ent, thereby creating a v irtu­
ous circle th a t contributes to  the  convergence of levels of econom ic devel­
opm ent.
Given the  large gap betw een the  stock of capital per worker in  Latin 
America and in  developed nations such as the  US (a relation 1 to  5 in
2003), there is broad space during a long span of tim e, for equilibrating 
flows from capital-abundant to  capital-scarce economies.
This trad itional fram ework has powerful policy im plications: (1) capital 
inflows should consistently finance productive investm ent; th a t is, crowd­
ing-out of national savings should be avoided; (2) investm ent m ust be allo­
cated efficiently (requiring the  supply of the  o ther ingredients of the  
production  function , and a real m acroeconom ic env ironm en t suitable for 
productive investment); (3) the country m ust invest intensively in tradables in 
order to generate a trade surplus large enough to transform  domestic savings 
into foreign currency, to service external liabilities; and (4) creditors m ust be 
w illing to  provide stable and  predictable flows of finance on  reasonable 
terms. Particularly, it should perform  a counter-cyclical role by balancing
Table 8.1 Latin America (19): Composition of capital flows, 1977-2004 
(percen tage  of tre n d  GDP, %)
1977-81 1982-90 1991 1992-94 1995 1996-97 1998-2003 2004
1 Current Account (2+3+4) -3.9 -1.3 -1.4 -3.1 -2.4 -3.0 -2.3 1.0
2 Trade Balance -1.5 2.4 0.4 -1.5 -0.8 -1.2 -0.7 2.3
3 Rents -2.6 -4,2 -2.6 -2.4 -2.6 -2.7 -2.9 -3.5
4 Unrequited transfers 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.3 2.2
5 Net Capital Inflows (6+10+11+12) 4.6 1.3 2.9 4.3 3.2 4.2 2.4 0.2
6 Net FDI (7+8-9) 0.8 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.6 2.9 3.2 2.4
7 M & A  inflow's 0.2 0.4 0.5 1.5 1.8 1.1
8 Greenfield FDI inflows 0.8 0.9 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
9 Outflows 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.7
10 Portfolio 0.2 0.0 1.4 4.0 0.1 1.9 0.1 -0.6
11 Other Capital 3.5 -2.2 -0.3 -1.1 -0.5 -0.4 -1.6 -2.2
12 Special flows 0.1 2.8 1.0 0.3 2.0 -0.2 0.6 0.5
13 Reserves Accumulation (5+1) 0.7 0.0 1.5 1.2 0.8 1.2 0.1 1.1
14 Net Transfer of Funds (5+3) 2.0 -2.9 0.3 1.9 0.7 1.5 -0.5 -3.4
Source: Ffrench-Davis (2006, Table V I.1). T rend GDP was calcu lated  by  filtering  n o m in a l GDP in  
US dollars (H odrick-Prescott filter, lam bda  = 100). Portfolio  flow s inc lude  b o n d s  a n d  stock 
purchases (ADRs am o n g  them ). O th e r cap ital includes, a m o n g  o thers, b ank  loans and  errors and  
om issions. Special flows inc lude  use o f IMF credits a n d  excep tiona l financ ing .
178 Economie Growth with Equity
transitory differences between ou tpu t and expenditure, or betw een im port 
and export prices, or spreading out over tim e the adjustm ent to perm anent 
changes in relative prices; thus, it would allow a stabilizing intertem poral 
ad justm en t of consum ption  and investm ent. Given the  sm allness of EEs 
m arkets, vis-à-vis in ternational financial markets, a stabilizing behavior 
of the  supply is potentially  feasible. In average, capital has tended to  flow 
in the  expected direction, bu t frequently  several or all those requirem ents 
have no t been fulfilled.
In boom  periods, positive ne t inflows and positive net transfers have 
elim inated any b ind ing  external constrain t; however, in  recessive periods 
negative net transfers have prevailed, actually im posing a b inding external 
constrain t in  tw o long periods (see 1982-89 and 1998-2003 periods in 
Table 8.1).4
Crowding-out of national savings and a variant of the "Dutch" disease 
have been frequent during booms. Flows have com pensated terms of trade 
shocks systematically only during periods of generalized abundant supply. 
For instance, in 1991-97, agents th a t were affected by a falling export price 
usually could borrow abroad rather easily. On the contrary, in cases of weak 
finance supply, a worsening of the terms of trade has led to  sharper dryness 
or to  a consolidation of a b inding external restriction; the  outcom e tends to 
be a private capital account contributing to  a destabilizing intertem poral 
adjustm ent.5 Indeed, financial markets, systematically, have pressed EEs 
authorities to  face the negative external shocks w ith a pro-cyclical recessive 
policy. The sexennium 1998-2003 offers an outstanding case of recessive pro­
cyclicality in South America, as discussed in the next sections.
But newer argum ents have been b rought on by prom oters of capital 
account liberalization. We now  discuss two of them .
Flows diversifying risk
The argum ent is th a t capital m obility  would allow individuals to  satisfy 
the ir risk preferences m ore fully th rough  greater asset diversification. This 
m icroeconom ic argum ent has been used widely for justifying a full o pen ­
ing of the  capital account, particularly including the opening to outflows of 
dom estic funds.
There are several ways to  diversify risk or insure against diverse types of 
risk. For instance, by trade diversification and stabilization funds (including 
in ternational reserves policy) to  face exports and  im ports instability  as a
4Capital flows minus interest and profit payments became negative in both periods,
in amounts equivalent to 2.9 percent and 0.5 percent of GDP, respectively. 
sPrasad et ai. (2003, Section I.c and Table 4), conclude that "procyclical access to 
international capital markets appears to have had a perverse effect on the relative 
volatility of consumption for financially integrated developing economies."
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prudentia l m acroeconom ic policy; at the  micro-level, w ith sectoral and 
geographical diversification by the  firm, and by producers of goods and ser­
vices6 and of creditors/debtors by operating w ith derivatives m arkets.7 
These forms of diversification or direct insurance should foster develop­
m ent of new techniques and products w ith probably higher though uncer­
tain  returns for the suppliers of funding.
But, a quite different m atter is a capital account opening to  diversify the 
financial assets and equity  stock portfolio  of residents. There are some 
interesting analytical pieces in the literature supporting this risk diversifica­
tion  argum ent. For instance, Obstfeld (1998) develops a m odel based 
on the  hypothesis th a t global financial in tegration  im plies a portfolio  
shift from low-risk-low-returns capital to  high-risk-high-returns capital, 
w ith  an increase in global productivity . From an EE view, there are three 
qualifications I would like to pose:
1. There is an overlapping of the  risk diversification argum ent w ith tha t of 
flows from capital-rich to  capital-scarce markets in response to differen­
tial returns; there is need of d istinguishing betw een h igher world p ro ­
ductivity due to  resources being reallocated from capital-abundant to 
capital-scarce econom ies, and  a reallocation from low risk to h igh risk 
projects encouraged by outpu t and geographical diversification.8
2. Actually, w hat we do observe are cross-border flows tend ing  to  move 
into better-known and non-high risk assets in the recipient economies; a 
look at stocks (for instance, ADRs) and  bonds of EEs transacted in te r­
nationally , docum ents it sharply: they  usually correspond to  large, 
m ature, and better graded dom estic firms. In particular, the  same 
happens w ith financial investm ent abroad of EEs residents. An im por­
tan t exception is in the case of the bubbles, in  w hich investors likely do 
no t reveal an appetite-for-risk, bu t ra ther an  assum ption away of risk 
during the contagion of over-optimism.
3. It is assumed th a t financial investm ent rapidly transfers in to  productive 
investm ent (capital form ation), w hat has frequently  n o t occurred, as 
exposed in  the second section.
6lt is assumed that the trade cycles of the new products or destinations are not syn­
chronized, and that they do reduce average fluctuations.
7The accelerated growth of derivatives markets contributed to soften "micro-instability," 
but has tended to increase "macro-instability" and to reduce transparency. See Dodd 
(2003) for an analysis of the channels by which stability and instability are transmitted.
8There is a natural association between financial returns and the value of marginal 
productivity of capital, within each economy, but during the cycle large divergences 
use to appear between the two. These divergences are at the core of financial crises, 
with a corresponding collapse of asset prices, exchange rate depreciation and interest 
rate hike.
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It is quite  relevant th a t, for a given EE, financial open ing  for the  im ple­
m en ta tio n  of financial risk diversification im plies liberalizing outflows by 
residents. Usually, closeness has been tougher on outflows by residents 
than  on inflows from foreigners. Consequently, m ost probably, full liberal­
ization w ould tend to im ply net outflows from - th e  m ore incom plete, 
smaller, less liquid and less deep- emerging markets, rather than  the oppo­
site.9 Evidently, these net outflows may diversify risk for dom estic financial 
investors and agents. However, m ost likely, it does n o t contribute to diver­
sify risk on returns to  dom estic producers, w hat actually does tend to  be 
achieved w ith  o u tpu t and geographical diversification of sales. A ddition­
ally, while those outflows m ay reduce savings available dom estically and 
the  financing for productive investm ent and, I suspect, tend  to foster a 
short-term  bias in domestic financial m arkets.10
The fact is th a t in ternational financial diversification is presently  being 
given evident priority  in policy-m aking; for instance, w hen elim inating 
capital gains taxes on cross-border operations and in  the encouragem ent 
tha t a liberalization process grants to  interm ediaries of financial investm ent 
in offshore m arkets. But, the  fact is th a t bo th  activities are quite isolated 
from the sources of systemic com petitivity and productive developm ent. In 
brief, there appears to  be no  w ell-docum ented connection  of this form  of 
risk diversification w ith the sources of dom estic productivity  increases and 
growth convergence. On the contrary, tha t sort of priority tends to concen­
trate energy of econom ic agents in purely financial activities; this implies a 
neo-rent-seeking attitude: to make short-term  profits at the expense of o ther 
agents, instead of profits derived from  increased productivity . The policy 
challenge is one of a rebalance in favor of "productivism " and longer-term  
horizons.
Capital account opening and macroeconomic discipline
This is the  newest argum ent in  favor of capital account liberalization. It 
states tha t the dependency from capital inflows can make a significant con­
tribution to  deter political authorities from adopting irresponsible and pop­
ulist m acroeconom ic policies. It is argued that, consequently, fully opening 
the  capital account w ould encourage "sound m acroeconom ic fundam en­
9In M ahani et al. (2006) it is documented that Korea and Malaysia -  the two fastest 
recovering EEs after the Asian crisis -  kept restrictions on outflows by residents as a 
countercyclical macroeconomic device. See Zahler (2006) for an analysis on outflows 
by private pension funds in Chile.
,0Bhagwati (2004) argues convincingly that financial volatility has been detrimental 
for trade, discouraging its liberalization.
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tals."11 In the case of irresponsible, weak, or divided governm ents, it may be 
true for domestic sources of instability, i.e., large fiscal deficits, permissive m on­
etary policy, and populist exchange-rate overvaluation. Indeed, the menace of 
sudden private capital outflows can become a powerful deterrent for those 
forms of populism. However, in  the case of responsible authorities, it is a 
redundant tool on tha t side of the coin. On the other hand, during capital 
surges, it has been observed tha t lax dem and policies or exchange-rate over­
valuation have tended to be fostered, rather th an  discouraged, by financial 
markets (in periods of over-optimism of financial agents); praises from 
financial markets for inflation drops -  th a t were led by a m ix of large capital 
inflows, exchange rate appreciation, and rising external deficits -  have been 
quite com m on during boom periods in the last quarter of a century. That is, it 
is the financial market itself which, during the booms, has generated incen­
tives for EEs to enter vulnerability zones (see the third section). The perverse 
outcome during booms is duplicated during the contractive stage that usually 
follows the boom, w hen excessive punishm ent by those same markets has 
tended to  force national authorities to adopt overly contractionary policies. 
The consequence is a straightforward pro-cyclicality.
In fact, the  im plications for m acroeconom ic policies appear to  be par­
ticularly significant during the recessive stages. The recent six year recessive 
gap in  Latin America -  in  1998-2003 -  had an evident m acroeconom ic 
origin. In all those years there was a significant ou tpu t gap (an actual GDP 
below po ten tia l output). The 5.1 percent average grow th recorded in 
2004-05 as com pared to  1.2 percent in 1998-2003 (see Table 8.2), w ithout 
any significant change in capital form ation, reveals tha t the output gap was 
in fact significant. It is in teresting  th a t th e  ou tp u t gap and its changes are 
mostly located in the non-exportable com ponent of GDP; this is the part of 
GDP m ore dependen t on dom estic m acroeconom ic m anagem ent.12 As
11A recent working paper of the IMF (Tytell and Wei, 2004) examines the "discipline 
effect" of financial globalization on m acroeconom ic balances, focusing on the two 
pillars in fashion -  low inflation and fiscal balances -  disregarding the other com po­
nents of a comprehensive set of real macroeconomic balances. Particularly, they find 
that the "discipline effect" was effective in reducing inflation. However, we should 
consider the control of inflation not an end, but an input for improving market 
inform ation and the allocation of human and physical resources. Research exam in­
ing why success by LACs in reducing inflation has come together with failure in both 
growth and equity is quite scarce.
12The bulk of the changes in GDP growth between expansive periods (19 9 0 -9 7  and 
2 0 0 4 -0 5 ) and recessive periods (1 9 8 2 -8 9  and 1 998-2003) are located in the non­
exported com ponent of GDP. That is, GDP has fluctuated more due to instability in 
non-exports than in exports. The former instability is associated to  the pro-cyclical 
nature, from the perspective of the real economy, of m acroeconom ic policies imple­
mented under the W ashington Consensus. See Ffrench-Davis (2005, Chapter 2 and 
Table 5.2).
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Table 8 .2  Latin America (19): Growth of exports and non-exported GDP, 1990-2005 
(an n u a l average g row th  rates, %)
GDP Exports Non-exports
1990-97 3.2 8.3 2.5
(1-0) (2.2)
1998-2003 1.2 5.4 0.5
(0.8) (0.4)
2004-05 5.1 9.2 4.2
(1.7) (3.4)
1990-2005 2.7 7.3 1.9
(1-0) (1.7)
Source: Based on  official figures from  ECLAC for 19 coun tries. Figures in to  brackets are estim ates 
o f p o in ts  o f GDP g row th  c o n trib u ted  by  exports  and  n o n -ex p o rts  (rest o f GDP), respectively. T he 
d irec t co n tr ib u tio n  o f expo rts  to  GDP is th e  d om estic  value-added  c o m p o n e n t o f gross expo rts  of 
goods and  services. Export va lue-added  w as estim ated  by  d isco u n tin g  from  gross exports  th e ir  
im p o rted  c o n ten t. T he im ported  c o n te n t was assum ed to  be equal to  th e  share  o f n o n -co n su m er 
im p o rts  in  to ta l GDP; for M exican m aquila , actual figures o f value-added  w ere used.
Table 8.2 shows, in 1998-2003 the by-far-larger drop in GDP corresponded to 
non-exports, and in 2004-05 the by-far-larger share of the recovery of GDP 
growth also corresponded to non-exports resulting from a sharp fall in the 
respective output gap. A binding external constraint was determ inant of that 
gap. The restriction was dom inated by private capital flows during m ost part 
of the period. The proper technical response -  for a growth-friendly outcom e- 
would have been a sharp reactivating policy with effective switching policies. 
However, most countries pursued recessive policies that determined the actual 
poor GDP perform ance.13 Even Chile followed a rather similar behavior, 
recording a 2.7 percent growth in 1998-2003 vis-à-vis 7.1 percent in 1990-97 
and 6.1 percent in 2004-05.14 The fact is tha t LACs gained "credibility," in 
financial markets and with international financial institutions, at the expense 
of recording a poor growth performance.
Beyond the m acroeconom ic im plications, as well there are im plications 
for dem ocracy in  EEs. One, m ost worrisom e, im plication  is th a t na tional
13Two notable exceptions are the reactivating m acroeconom ic shock therapy 
adopted, with variants, by Korea and Malaysia in 1998 (see M ahani et al. (2006). 
Their actions show that there was an alternative to the passive approach adopted by 
LACs that waited until 2004 for recovery to be led by external positive shocks. Also 
show that there are diverse alternatives for a recovery based on domestic policy-led 
shocks, as the different sets of com m on and diverse features in Korea and Malaysia 
depict.
14The rather better performance of Chile (2.7 percent versus the 1.3 percent average 
of the region) is partly associated with the innovative structural fiscal balance 
approach adopted by the government in 2001, which allowed avoiding a pro-cyciical 
fiscal policy during the recessive years 2001-03 .
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political authorities m ay lose the  capacity to  pursue th e  legitim ate policy 
proposals for w hich they  were elected by the  dem ocratic electorate. There 
are m esoeconom ic im plications, such as on  tax policy, giving way to  a 
relaxation of the  tax  burden  on  capital and on  h igher incom e sectors, at 
the expense of labor and m id/low  incom e brackets.
Actually, there is a grow ing duality, reflecting a counter-dem ocratic 
trend, in  the constituencies taken in to  account by authorities in EEs. 
A dilem m a for decision makers arises betw een pleasing financial agents or 
the dom estic agents in  the  "real" econom y (workers and firms) bearing the 
consequences. An outcom e of the  specific road taken by globalization has 
been th a t experts in financial in term ediation  -  a m icroeconom ic tra in ing - 
have becom e determ inant, in  too m any cases, for the  evolution  of the  
dom estic m acroeconom ic balances and the ir volatility. C entral banks and 
ministries of finance frequently, in their own wording, have been following 
the "advise of m arkets,” by w hich it is im plied a group of influential agents 
in financial markets, w hich are m erely a small fraction of private markets 
and of the generation of GDP.
It is "irrational," and evidently inefficient from the perspective of resource 
allocation and to tal factor productivity , if th e  decisions of authorities, 
w hich should obviously be taken w ith a long-term  horizon, seeking sus­
tainable grow th w ith  equity, becom e entrapped  w ith  the  lobbying and 
policy recipes of experts in short-term  and liquid flows.
Elusive growth and equity: the role of financial inflows
A dom inan t feature of the "new generation" of business cycles in EEs are 
the  sharp fluctuations in dom estic private spending and balance sheets, 
associated to  boom -bust cycles in  external financing. As stated earlier, 
these swings in econom ic activity have m id-term  persistence. The corre­
sponding deviations from a stable trend tend to  be biased against SMEs and 
less-trained labor. Incom pleteness in  labor and financial m arkets (see 
Bourguignon and W alton, this volume), and the  quite diverse m obility and 
tim e horizons of "producers" and "financiers" are at the  core of the  
inequitability biases of instability.
The rise of external financing in the 1990s contained  a significant exo­
genous or push origin (Broner and Rigobon, 2006; Calvo, 1998); but actual 
inflows tend  to  produce policy changes, w hich th en  in troduce pull or 
endogenous factors. It can be in terpreted  th a t the form er effect is the 
prim ary dom inan t one w hen a growing deficit on  curren t account and 
appreciating exchange rates coexist w ith the  accum ulation of in ternational 
reserves. That happened in  m ost LACs in  1990-97.
External shocks, bo th  positive and negative, are m ultiplied dom estically 
if exchange rate and m onetary  policies are pro-cyclical, as it actually has 
been encouraged by financial m arket agents and m ultilateral financial
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Figure 8.1 Latin America: Net capital inflows and RER, 1987 -2 0 0 5  (% of GDP, 
indice 1997=100)
Source-. F french-D avis (2005, Figure 6.2), based  o n  ECLAC figures. Real e x ch an g e  ra te  defin ed  in 
te rm s o f dollars per u n it  o f local cu rrency . P relim inary  figures for 2005.
agencies.15 As a consequence of a pro-cyclical behavior, during the capital 
surges we have observed th a t EEs have, frequently, penetrated in vulnerabil­
ity zones, during expansive adjustment processes including some com bina­
tion  of: (1) rising external liabilities, w ith a large liquid or short-term  share 
(IMF, 1998; Rodrik and  Velasco, 2000); (2) large current account external 
deficits; (3) appreciated exchange rates; (4) currency and m aturity  m is­
m atches; (5) high price/earnings ratios of dom estic financial assets; and 
(6) h igh prices of real estate. Bust in  EEs, usually has come after a boom  in 
capital inflows, w hich have been generating all these destabilizing m arket 
signals (Ffrench-Davis, 2005, chapters VI-VII).
Figure 8.1 illustrates the  incidence of capital flows on the  foreign 
exchange rate. The im pact is so strong th a t a w eighted average of LACs
I5The mainstream fiscal recipe differs during the boom and recession; particularly 
under advice by the IMF, tends to behave counter-cyclically during the boom and 
pro-cyclically during recession. However, data show that the effects of capital inflows 
during booms are overwhelmingly larger than counter-cyclical fiscal restraint during 
financial surges. Even in the case of Chile, in 1996-97 , fiscal policy moderation gen­
erated the largest public surplus of the 1990s (over 2 percent of GDP), but expansive 
exchange rate and monetary policies, led by capital inflows, implied a duplication of 
the deficit on current account in com parison to 1990-95  (see Ffrench-Davis, 2002,
p. 21).
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shows a high correlation betw een net capital inflows and  th e  average real 
exchange rate of the  region in the  nearly tw o decades period covered. 
These flows have show n to  be a dom inan t force o n  th e  exchange rate 
behavior over th a t of trade in  goods and services in  the  short to  m id-term . 
Afterward, w hen real external disequilibria becom e unsustainable, an 
abrupt correction frequently  takes place w ith  a recessive ad justm en t;16 
usually this reversion has been led by financial outflows.
The longer and deeper the  econom y's penetration in to  those vulnerability 
zones, the  more severe the financieristic trap in w hich authorities tend to  get 
caught, and the  lower the probability of leaving it w ithou t undergoing a 
crisis and long-lasting econom ic and social costs. The absence or weakness 
of policies m oderating  the  boom  -  lack of adequate breaks during the 
process toward overheating  -  inh ib its the feasibility of adopting  a strong 
reactivating (counter-cyclical) policy under a recessive env ironm ent after 
the  bust.
In fact, in th is sort of crises, a dow nw ard ad justm ent of aggregate 
dem and takes place after th e  drying-up of supply. The negative financial 
shock underlying the Asian crisis was compounded by a concom itant terms of 
trade worsening; it is evident tha t there were no spontaneous capital flows 
com pensating the terms of trade negative shocks. Usually, there has been an 
"autom atic" com ponent in the domestic adjustm ent, associated to  a 
significant loss of international reserves, com plem ented w ith diverse doses of 
either autom atic or policy-increased interest rates, currency depreciation, and 
fiscal contraction. Naturally, the drop in domestic dem and (or of its rate of 
growth) tends to  correct the external deficit, and consequently tha t source 
of the dem and for foreign currency. In these sharp processes of adjustm ent, 
frequently a drop in GDP (or rate of GDP growth) follows,17 which tends to 
make necessary a subsequent additional fall in  aggregate demand. Obviously, 
the  larger the cumulative drop in GDP, the heavier the economic and social 
costs of adjustm ent and the foregone welfare. Most of the drop in GDP does
16Rodrik, in this volume, stresses the crucial role that the exchange rate has come to 
play, after trade liberalization and restrictions from the WTO, on the use of produc­
tive development policies by EEs.
17Large deficits on current account (duly controlled by the terms of trade fluc­
tuations) make unavoidable a reduction in aggregate demand; but a drop in GDP 
is neither necessary nor convenient. W ith an efficient com bination of demand- 
reducing and switching policies there should be no large output loss associated to 
the downward adjustm ent of aggregate demand. The actual huge GDP losses with 
respect to the previous growth trend, clearly signal that the econom ies we are 
dealing with are too inflexible vis-à-vis sharp negative shocks, and that switching 
policies are not efficient or have becom e less efficient given the loss of tools, or that 
the recipes in fashion impose a pro-cyclical or, at best, neutral policy. Particularly, an 
over-killing demand-reduction tends to predominate.
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Figure 8.2 Chile and Korea: GDP and aggregate dem and, 1987-2005
Source: A u th o r 's  c a lcu la tio n s  based o n  d a ta  fro m  th e  C en tra l Bank o f C h ile  a n d  th e  A sian  
D e v e lo p m en t Bank. T rend  GDP w as ca lcu la te d  for p e rio d s  in  w h ich  p o te n tia l a n d  ac tu a l GDP 
w ere ra th e r close: 198 9 -9 8  in  C hile, an d  1987-97  in  Korea. P relim inary  figures fo r 2005.
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not imply, necessarily, destroyed capacity but a transitory underutilization, an 
output gap (potential GDP larger than  actual GDP). That is a recessive gap. 
A positive implication, nonetheless, is tha t the resulting output gap provides 
room for a subsequent recovery. Indeed in  all moderately or well-managed 
economies, a recovery usually follows the fall in activity.18
However, even in  the  ou tstand ing  cases of fast recovery -  the so-called 
v-shaped recoveries -  significant costs have been observed.19 Generally, 
countries are pushed into a lower GDP path . Figure 8.2 depicts the  cases of 
Korea and Chile. Before the crisis, both  were in  a growth trend in  the order 
of 7 percent per year, considered sustainable by most observers; actually, both 
economies had been growing somewhat faster than 7 percent. Even these two 
outstanding economies, after 1998, rem ain notoriously below the previous 
trend.
These econom ic and social costs are associated w ith three particularly 
relevant dynam ic m edium -term  effects on GDP. One is a usual sharp reduc­
tion  of productive investm ent during th e  crisis, w hich naturally  deterior­
ates the  future path  of p o ten tia l GDP; for instance, the already m ediocre 
investm ent ratios in LACs fell 1.5 points of GDP betw een the  averages of 
1992-99 and 2000-2003. The drop in capital form ation is associated to  a 
persistent ou tp u t gap, unem ploym ent, and generalized uncerta in ty  and 
pessimism w ith  the  bust. The rising ou tp u t gap implies a depressed actual 
to tal factor productivity .20 Second, due to  the w orsening of balance sheets 
(Krugman, 2000), financial system loans becom e tighter, usually w ith  sig­
nificant liquidity  restraints for SMEs; frequently, also the  public budget 
worsens and investm ent is postponed (Easterly and Serven, 2003). Third, a
18In more naive econom etrics it is interpreted that total factor productivity (TFP) 
rises with recovery. W hat actually happens, to a large degree, is that underutilized 
factors becom e employed. We have shown that control by the output gap corrects 
downward standard estimates for the contribution of TFP to Latin American GDP 
growth, and corrects upward that of capital form ation. See Ffrench-Davis (2005, 
Chapter Hi).
I9As said, there is a significant asymmetry in the behavior of the output gap. Actual 
GDP can drop significantly below potential GDP, while it cannot exceed it by much. 
In Ffrench-Davis (2002, Chapter 1.2 and Appendix) we estimated the non-sustainable 
share of actual GDP in the diverse boom periods experienced by Chile. This asymme­
try contributes to explain the regressive bias of instability. During recession, the drop 
usually is deeper for SMEs; even if in the expansive stage the recovery in SMEs were 
stronger than in large and modern firms, the average output gap would remain larger 
for SMEs, given the asymmetry.
20Here we are referring only to a drop in TFP due to underutilization of installed pro­
ductive capacity. In recessive gaps it is likely that some few firms might increase 
innovation to survive, and some absorb and renovate failing firms that they acquire, 
but it is also likely that uncertainty and capital markets incom pleteness discourage 
most firms to innovate, especially innovation associated with capital formation.
growing body of evidence docum ents th a t boom -bust cycles has ra tchet 
effects on social variables (Rodrik, 2001; Tokman, 2004; World Bank, 2003). 
The deterioration  of th e  labor m arket (open unem ploym ent, a w orsening 
in  the  quality of jobs or in real wages, and rising inform ality) is generally 
very rapid, whereas the  recovery is slow and incom plete. This is reflected, 
for instance, in the  long-lasting w orsening of real wages in Mexico after 
th e  Tequila crisis (Frenkel and Ros, 2004); tw o crucial variables behind  
th is outcom e are that: (1) labor supply keeps rising, while capital form a­
tion  experiences a sharp drop and  the  average rate of use of the stock of 
capital is reduced; and (2) SMEs and inform al sectors, bo th  labor-intensive, 
tend to  be more affected by instability. It is relevant, for equity and average 
grow th perform ance, th a t th e  upw ard process usually tends to be m ore 
gradual or slower th a n  th e  dow nw ard adjustm ent, w hich tends to  be 
abrupt.
These three problems signal policy priorities during the crises: sustaining 
public investm ent, encouraging private investm ent; con tribu ting  to 
reschedule liabilities, and assisting in  solving currency and m aturity  m is­
matches; reinforcing a social netw ork tha t uses the opportun ity  to improve 
the productiv ity  of tem porarily underutilized factors, and the  need to  
enforce an active counter-cyclical m acroeconom ic approach.
Pro-cyclical financial flows that destabilize macroeconomic 
balances
An ou tstand ing  feature of "m odern" currency and financial crises is th a t 
they  have been suffered by EEs th a t usually were considered to  be highly 
"successful" by IFIs and financial agents; actually, EEs were awarded w ith 
growingly im proving grades from  in ternational risk rating  agencies and 
falling spreads, in  parallel w ith rising stocks of external liabilities (Frenkel, 
2004; Reisen, 2003; W illiamson, 2003).
It is analytically interesting to explain w hy private funds do continue to  
flow, no tw ithstanding th a t disequilibria is being built.
Diversification toward vo latility
In ternational financial flows since the  early 1990s becam e notably  m ore 
diversified th an  in the 1970s. One com paratively stable flow is th a t of 
FDI,21 w hich after the  Tequila crisis rose sharply: from about 1 percent 
of GDP in the early 1990s to  about 3 percent since the  mid-1990s. 
However, in tha t last period only one-half of those inflows corresponded to
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21 Prasad et al. (2003, Table 1 and Figure 3) report data on volatility of total 
(greenfield plus M&A) inward FDI, bank loans and portofolio investm ent. They 
confirm the conclusion from other abundant research that FDI is less volatile.
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greenfield FDI, while acquisitions did m ultiply by n ine betw een both  
periods (see Ffrench-Davis, 2005, Table VI.1; UNCTAD, 2005). During expan­
sive periods, th e  financial counterpart of acquisitions tends to  stay in  the 
host country, while during depressive situations tends to  outflow in stan ta­
neously. Its behavior is straightforw ardly pro-cyclical. The outcom e w ith 
the  new diversified set of financial flows is potentially  unstable, since:
(1) the trend has been a shift toward a set of short-term  and liquid reversible 
sources o f  funding22 (equity portfolio flows, liquid bonds, m edium -and short­
term  bank financing; short-term  tim e deposits; acquisitions of dom estic 
firms by foreign investors); and (2) m ost share synchronized contagions 
of over-optim ism  and  of over-pessimism. The m acroeconom ic im plica­
tions of the  reversibility of flows are no t observed during the  expansive- 
boom  stage of the  cycles, bu t its pervasiveness, for real m acroeconom ic 
stability, explodes abruptly  w ith the  negative change of m ood of markets. 
Additionally, it is no tew orthy  th a t a significant p roportion  of short-term  
and liquid inflows as well as the  m o un ting  mergers and acquisitions are 
delinked w ith the direct generation of productive capacity.
The fact is th a t change in  the  volum e and  com position of in ternational 
supply in  com bination  w ith  capital accounts opening  by LACs, implied 
tha t several economies moved into vulnerability zones (we repeat the signals: 
some com bination  of large external liabilities, w ith a h igh short-term  or 
liquid share; currency and m atu rity  m ism atches; a significant external 
deficit; an  appreciated exchange-rate; h igh price/earnings ratios in the  
stock market, plus low dom estic investm ent ratios). In parallel, as said, 
agents specialized in microeconom ic aspects of finance, placed in the  short­
term  or liquid segm ents of capital markets, acquired a dom inan t voice in 
the generation of m acroeconom ic expectations.
Pro-cyclical risk-rating and spreads
There is an extrem ely relevant literature on th e  causes of financial m arket 
failures: the asym m etries of inform ation  betw een creditors and debtors, 
and the  lack of adequate in ternalization  of the  negative externalities 
th a t each agent generates (through growing vulnerability), th a t underlie 
the  cycles of abundance and shortage of external financing (Krugman, 
2000; Stiglitz, 2000). Beyond those issues, as stressed by H eym ann (2000) 
and Ocam po (2003), finance deals w ith the  future, and evidently concrete 
"inform ation" about the future is unavailable. Consequently, the tendency
22Persaud (2003), argues that modern risk-management by investm ent funds and 
banks, based on value-at-risk measured daily, works pro-cyclically in the boom and 
bust. A complementary argument by Calvo and Mendoza (2000) examines how glob­
alization may promote contagion by discouraging the gathering of information and 
by strengthening incentives for imitating market portfolio.
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to equate opinions and expectations w ith "inform ation" contribute to  herd 
behavior and m ultiple equilibria.
Actually, we have observed a notorious contagion, first of over-optimism, 
and th en  of over-pessimism in m any of the  financial crises experienced by 
EEs in the  past three decades. In all three significant surges of the past 
quarter century, loan spreads underw ent, in a process, a continued decline, 
no tw ith stand ing  th a t the  stock of liabilities was rising sharply: spreads 
fell for 5-6 years in  the  1970s; over 4 years before the  Tequila crisis, and 
nearly 3 years before the  arrival of the Asian crises (see Ffrench-Davis, 2006, 
Figure 1.2).
This behavior of spreads has im plied, during the  expansive side of the 
cycle, a sort of dow nw ard sloping m edium -run supply curve; w hich is a 
highly destabilizing feature. During all three expansive processes there has 
been an evident contagion of over-optim ism  am ong creditors but, ra ther 
th an  appetite for risk, there prevails an underestim ation or assum ing away 
of risk on the part of creditors.
The literature em phasizes the  role of m oral hazard, resulting from  
im plicit or explicit public insurance and the like. However, in the frequent 
boom s we have observed, m any creditors behave pro-cyclically, in  an 
honest and transparen t over-optim istic a ttitude. That signals the  need for 
a prudential regulation and supervision th a t incorporates also effect­
ive counter-cyclical m icroeconom ic m echanism s. But, beyond tha t, it is 
counter-cyclical m acroeconom ic policies th a t ough t to  hold  the m ajor 
responsibility.
W ith respect to  debtors, the  evidence for periods of over-optimism is th a t 
m ost of them  do n o t borrow  th ink ing  of default and  expecting to  be 
rescued or to benefit from  a m oratoria. Contrariw ise, expectations of high 
yields tend  to  prevail: borrowers are also victim s of the  syndrom e of 
financial euphoria during the  boom  periods.
The dom inant role o f short-termist agents
Over and above these variables, there are tw o additional features of the  
creditor side th a t are crucially im portan t. One feature is the  particular 
nature o f the leading agents acting on the  supply side. There are natural 
asym m etries in  the  behavior and objectives of different econom ic agents. 
The agents p redom inan t in the  financial m arkets are specialized in  sh o rt­
term  liquid investm ent, operate w ith in  short-term  horizons, and naturally 
are highly sensitive to  changes in variables th a t affect returns in the short- 
run. The second feature is the  gradual spread of inform ation, am ong 
prospective agents, on investm ent opportun ities in  EEs. This feature is 
presen t no t only in the  "initial" capital account opening, bu t also in  the  
subsequent renewal of inflows following each associated crisis.
In fact, agents from  different segm ents of the  financial m arkets becom e 
gradually drawn in to  new in ternational destinations as they take notice of
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the  profitable opportun ities offered by em erging econom ies previously 
unknow n to  th em  or abandoned  during a crisis. This explains, from the 
supply-side, why the  surges of flows to  em erging econom ies -  in the  1970s 
and 1990s -  have been processes th a t w ent on for several years ra ther th an  
one-shot changes in supply.
In th is sense, it is relevant for policy design to  stress the d istinction 
betw een two different types of volatility  of capital flows, short term  ups- 
and-dow ns, and the  m edium  term  instability  th a t leads several variables -  
such as the  stock market, real estate prices, and the  exchange rate -  to 
m ove persistently in a given direction for several years. The expectation of 
persistent changes provides "wrong certainties" to the  financial markets, 
encouraging capital inflows seeking economic rents rather th an  differences in 
real productivity.
For instance, increased supply in all th ree recent financial boom s has 
generated a process of exchange-rate appreciation  in m ost LACs; the  ex­
pectations of continued, persistent, appreciation  encouraged additional 
inflows from  dealers operating w ith  m aturity  horizons located w ith in  the 
expected appreciation of th e  dom estic currency.23 For allocative efficiency 
and for export-oriented developm ent strategies, a m acroprice -  as sig­
nificant as the exchange rate, particularly after trade liberalization-led  by 
capital flows conducted by short-term ist agents reveals a severe policy 
inconsistency.24 The increase in aggregate dem and, pushed up by financial 
and term s-of-trade inflows and  appreciation, expands "artificially" the 
absorptive capacity and the  dem and for foreign savings, and leads to a 
rising share of the  dom estic dem and for tradables. Thus, exogenous 
changes abroad in in ternational capital markets, as said, are then  converted 
in to  an endogenous process, leading to  dom estic vulnerability  given the 
potential reversibility of flows.
In brief, the  in teraction  between the two sets of factors -  the nature o f 
agents and a process o f adjustment -  explains th e  dynam ics of capital flows 
over time: w hy suppliers keep pouring-in funds while real m acroeconom ic
23For short-termist agents the actual and expected profitability increased with the 
appreciation process. That same process, if perceived as persistent, would tend to dis­
courage investm ent in the production of tradables intensive in domestic inputs. 
Therefore, it is most relevant, because of its policy im plications, what happens with 
the behavior of exchange rates during the expansive or boom stage. It is mainly then 
when external imbalances and currency and maturity mismatches are, inadvertently, 
being generated.
24During the 2 0 0 4 -0 6  economic recovery, LACs have again been experiencing appre­
ciation, on this occasion associated with improved terms of trade rather than with 
capital inflows.
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fundam entals worsen. W hen creditors discover an em erging m arket, their 
initial exposure is low or non-existent. Then they  generate a series of con­
secutive flows, w hich result in increasing stocks of financial assets in  the  
EE; actually, too  rapid an d /o r large for an efficient dom estic absorption. 
Frequently, the  absorption is artificially increased by exchange rate appreci­
ation, and a rising real aggregate dem and, resulting in an enlarged external 
deficit and a crowding-out of dom estic savings.
"Rational" short-termist agents, "irrational" macroeconomics
The creditor's sensitivity to  negative news, at some point, is likely to, sud­
denly, increase rem arkably w hen the  country  has reached diverse vulnera­
bility zones; then, the creditors take notice of: (1) the rising level of the stock 
of their assets held in a country (or region); (2) the degree of dependence of 
the debtor m arket on additional flows, w hich is associated w ith the m agni­
tude of the  current-account deficit; (3) the ex ten t of appreciation; (4) the  
need of refinancing of m aturing  liabilities; and  (5) the  am ount of liquid 
liabilities likely to  flow out in face of a crisis. Therefore, it should no t be 
surprising tha t, after penetra ting  deeply in those vulnerability  zones, the 
sensitivity to adverse political or econom ic news and the  probability  
of reversal of expectations grows steeply (Rodrik, 1998). The in tensity  of 
the  change in  the  availability of financing tends to  be enhanced  w ith the  
liberalization of outflows of dom estic savings.
The accum ulation overseas of stocks of assets by financial suppliers un til 
the  boom  stage of the  cycle is well advanced, and, then , a subsequent 
sudden reversal of flows, can both be considered to be rational responses on 
the  part of individual agents w ith short-term  horizons. This is because it is 
of little concern to  th is sort of investor w hether (long-term) fundam entals 
are being im proved or w orsened while they con tinue  to  bring inflows. 
Indeed, for the m ost influential financial operators (that particular segment 
of " the  m arket"), the  m ore relevant variables are n o t related to  the long­
term  fundam entals but to short-term  profitability. W hat is relevant to these 
financial investors is th a t the  crucial indicators from their p o in t of view -  
prices of real estate, bonds and stock, and exchange rates -  can continue 
providing them  w ith profits in the  near term  and, obviously, th a t liquid 
m arkets allow them , if needed, to  reverse decisions timely; thus, they  will 
con tinue to  supply net inflows un til expectations of an im m inen t near 
reversal build up. This explains w hy they m ay suddenly display a radical 
change of opinion about the econom ic situation of a country whose funda­
mentals, other th an  liquidity in foreign currency, remain rather unchanged 
during a shift from over-optimism to  over-pessimism.
N aturally, the  opposite process tends to  take place w hen the  debtor 
m arkets have adjusted dow nw ard "sufficiently." Then, the  inverse process 
makes its appearance and can be sustained for some years, like in 1991-94 
or 1995-97, or short-lived like in  late 1999 and 2000.
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Concluding remarks
Given the  volatility of in ternational financial markets, the  opening  of the 
capital account has frequently led EEs to im port external financial instabil­
ity, w ith capital inflows engendering a w orsening in m acroeconom ic fun ­
dam entals. Indeed, those flows have induced deviations of macro variables 
and ratios from sustainable levels: during booms, the financial market itself 
has generated incentives for EEs to  enter vulnerability zones.
Econom ic agents specialized in  the  allocation of financial funding, who 
may be highly  efficient in the ir field bu t operate w ith short-horizons “by 
tra in ing  and by reward," have come to play a leading role in determ ining  
m acroeconom ic conditions and  policy design in EEs. It implies th a t a 
"financieristic" approach becom es predom inan t ra ther th an  a "product- 
ivistic" approach. In contrast, grow th w ith  equity  requires im proving the 
rewards for productiv ity  enhancem en t rather th an  financial rent-seeking 
searching for capital gains. There is a need to  rebalance priorities and 
voices.
Toward developm ent-friendly macroeconomics
The approach th a t has been in fashion in the  m ainstream  academic world 
and IFIs in recent years (or neo-liberal or W ashington Consensus approaches), 
em phasizes m acroeconom ic balances of two pillars: low  inflation and 
fiscal balances, w ith a clear disregard for the  overall m acroeconom ic 
env ironm ent for producers. This env ironm ent includes, besides the  two 
pillars, o ther m ost influential variables: aggregate dem and and m acro­
prices such as in terest and exchange rates. Additionally, a frequent asser­
tion  in the  m ore recent conventional literature is th a t an open capital 
account im poses m acroeconom ic discipline on  EEs. Indeed, th is  approach 
assumes th a t full opening  of the  capital account would contribute to 
balance the external sector and autom atically  generate an aggregate 
dem and consistent w ith productive capacity: It is well docum ented th a t 
th a t is n o t the  usual experience in  the frequent cases of external, positive 
and  negative, financial shocks experienced by EEs (Ffrench-Davis and 
Ocampo, 2001).
In fact, several LACs fulfilled the m ain requirem ents of neo-liberal macro- 
econom ic balances. However, econom ic activity was notably  unstable, in 
the  period covered in  this chapter. Overall changes in GDP were led by 
ups-and-dow ns in aggregate dem and, w ith  an  effective dem and th a t has 
deviated sharply from the production frontier and w ith "wrong" or outlier 
macroprices and  ratios. Frequently, these prices and  aggregate dem and 
have been out of equilibria, as reflected in economies working either below 
potential GDP or at full capacity but w ith a large external deficit. They tend 
to  miss the interm ediate area where, precisely, m id-term  equilibrium  values 
are usually found. These features have responded m ostly to shifts in
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net capital flows, and dom estic m onetary  adjustm ents have been asso­
ciated w ith changes in in ternational reserves ra ther th an  w ith changes in 
dom estic credit by the Central Bank (Ffrench-Davis, 2005, C hapter VII and 
Figure 1.2).
The behavior of aggregate dem and, at levels consistent w ith potential 
GDP and well-aligned macroprices (such as interest and exchange rates) are 
a crucial part of a th ird  pillar of real m acroeconom ic balances. Empirical 
work shows tha t strong increases in investm ent are associated with a macro- 
econom ic environm ent tha t is able to  place effective dem and at a level con­
sistent w ith potential output, w ith "right" exchange and interest rates, and 
th a t situation is expected by private investors to be sustainable (see Ffrench- 
Davis, 2005, Chapter III).
In boom  periods, w hen the  degrees of freedom  to choose policies are 
broader, authorities should accum ulate resources in  stabilization funds, 
im prove fiscal balances, increase in te rna tiona l reserves, prepay external 
debt, avoid exchange rate appreciation, and regulate capital inflows. 
In recessive periods, it should imply, for instance, (1) continued  im ple­
m en ta tion  of a structural fiscal balance (recognizing th a t during recession 
tax proceeds are abnorm ally low and tha t, in  those circum stances, public 
expenditure should no t follow taxes in the ir descending runaway, and 
viceversa during the  boom!!), and (2) a strong encouragem ent to  effect­
ive dem and, w ith effective sw itching policies w henever dom estic activity 
is clearly below productive capacity. A severe obstacle to  a coun te r­
cyclical policy has been the  policy in  fashion of full, across-the-board, 
opening  of the  capital account during boom s. There is need to reform 
dom estic capital account and  financial reforms, and to reform  the  actual 
in ternational financial architecture (Bhattacharya and Griffith-Jones,
2004).
Financial globalization and governance
Certainly, th e  degrees of freedom  for efficient dom estic policies in an 
increasingly (but also incom pletely and inequitably) globalized econom y 
are m ore lim ited th a n  before, bu t there is still space to choose am ong 
a wide variety of alternative paths to make globalization, and effectively 
capturing net benefit w ith it.
Prudential dom estic policies, such as the selective capital controls estab­
lished in  Chile in  the  1990s, can reduce the  external vulnerability  and 
allow for counter-cyclical exchange rate and m onetary  policies during the 
bust. Furthermore, even once a crisis has taken place, dom estic policies are 
also crucial to m inim ize its negative effects and accelerate econom ic recov­
ery. Korea and Malaysia, two countries th a t perform ed comparatively quite 
well after their severe crises, followed different policy approaches but both  
developed active and consistent counter-cyclical m acroeconom ic policies, 
in contrast w ith m ost EEs, particularly LACs.
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The integration of capital markets has remarkable im plications on gover­
nance, room  for dom estic policies, and on the  constituencies to  w hich 
national governm ents respond. In fact, m any leaders in EEs are living a 
deep duality: on the one hand, political au thorities are elected by their 
countries' voters, and prom ise to im plem ent a platform  designed before 
their election, bu t on  the o ther hand  they also seek, after being dem ocrati­
cally elected, the  support of those w ho "vote" for the ir financial invest­
m ents (not necessarily productive investm ents or even at the  expense of 
productive investm ent). Recent cycles in financial markets have revealed a 
significant contrad iction  betw een the two, in  a negative-sum  game, w ith 
large ou tput gaps and discouraged capital form ation.
Thus, econom ic authorities should undertake the  responsibility of 
m aking real m acro-fundam entals prevail (sustainable external deficit; 
m oderate stock of external liabilities, w ith a low liquid share; reasonable 
m atching of terms and currencies; crowding-in of domestic savings; limited 
real exchange rate appreciation; effective dem and consistent w ith the pro­
duction  frontier), in order to  achieve m acroeconom ic balances th a t are 
bo th  sustainable and functional for long-term  grow th. That requires them  
to avoid entering  vulnerability zones during econom ic boom s-cum -capital 
surges; during recessive periods they  m ust be able to make intensive use of 
counter-cyclical devices, resting on the  strengths developed in the  expan­
sive years. If those strengths are insufficient, support from IFIs and private 
financial markets under reform ed counter-cyclical conditionality  would be 
welcome.
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Trade and Growth: Why Asia Grows 
Faster than Latin America
M anuel R. A g o sin 1
Introduction
It is already an accepted stylized fact of in ternational developm ent th a t 
Latin American countries (LACs) grow at m ore m odest rates than  the  Asian 
exporters of m anufactures. It is also true th a t the  latter countries m ade a 
transition to export-oriented growth well before LACs; moreover, they have 
been considerably m ore successful in encouraging export grow th and in 
diversifying their ou tpu t and export mix.
This chapter explores the  connection  betw een export expansion and 
GDP growth, w ith  special reference to  th e  differences observed betw een 
both  regions. It will n o t a ttem pt ano ther go at the  controversy of w hether 
openness is positively associated w ith econom ic grow th, a topic th a t has 
been dealt w ith exhaustively in the literature (see Rodriguez and  Rodrik, 
2000). By now, the issue seems to have been settled: m any countries (Korea 
and Taiwan being th e  paradigms) were able to  grow rapidly w hile m a in ­
taining high im port barriers and relaxing them  once export-oriented devel­
opm ent had been consolidated; at the  other extreme, others, am ong w hich 
there are several LACs, opened up their economies w ith m uch more modest 
effects either on exports or econom ic growth.
We are interested in the issue of w hether export growth is associated with 
overall economic growth. In a statistical sense, the relation m ust hold, since 
exports are a part of GDP. Here the  focus will be on w hether there is a par­
ticular kind of export growth tha t can result in sustained growth both  in 
exports and GDP. We posit th a t countries w ith diversified export structures 
are able to record consistently higher export growth than  countries where
‘I am grateful for the able research assistance of Alfie UUoa and Alejandro Tamola. I 
acknowledge the useful com m ents made by Robert Devlin and Roberto Bouzas. 
Ricardo Ffrench-Davis read the manuscript thoroughly and made suggestions that 
lead to significant improvements.
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exports are concentrated in a few products. Moreover, in economies w ith 
diversified export structures, export growth has more positive effects on the 
econom y as a whole and, therefore, translates in to  higher rates of economic 
growth than  in economies where exports are concentrated in a few products.
The first section presents som e analytical considerations of why o u t­
pu t and export diversification (OED) should  be positive for grow th. After 
looking at the export and grow th experience for Latin America and Asia, 
we show  that, indeed, there seems to  be a negative association betw een 
export concen tration  and grow th through the  effect of concen tration  
on export and ou tpu t volatility. Then we show tha t OED, as proxied by an 
export diversification index, is a strong explanatory variable in  a sim ple 
em pirical grow th m odel estim ated w ith cross section data for 1980-2003, 
th e  period for w hich the data on export com position is available. The 
coefficients yielded by the empirical m odel are used to estim ate the contri­
bu tion  of different factors to  grow th in  a sample of Asian and Latin 
American countries. The final section recapitulates.
Some analytical considerations
W hy would export diversification be beneficial for growth? There are po ten­
tially two different types of effects:
1. The portfolio effect: The greater the  degree of diversification the  less 
volatile will be export earnings. Less volatile export growth is likely to be 
associated w ith lower variance of GDP grow th. This is, in itself, a posi­
tive aspect of diversification, since countries w ith im perfect (or no) 
access to world financial m arkets will no t be able to  sm ooth  consum p­
tion  in the face of large fluctuations in exports and output. In addition, 
the  variance and th e  m ean of the  grow th rate may be negatively cor­
related. This adverse effect of volatility  on average grow th could result 
from  hysteresis. Periods of con traction  lead to  the  destruction of 
installed capacity and to  deskilling of the  labor force, b o th  of w hich 
canno t be easily undone during the next boom . Also, countries whose 
exports are highly dependent on one or a few products tend  to  have 
m ore volatile real exchange rates th an  countries w ith diversified export 
structures, and  real exchange rate volatility  discourages investm ent in  
tradable goods or services.
2. Dynamic benefits o f diversification: One of the single m ost im portant char­
acteristics of countries w ith  low per capita incom e is the  fact th a t they 
have a com parative advantage in  a very lim ited range of goods. In o ther 
words, because of the  paucity  of skills or lack of com plem entary inputs 
(some non-traded), these countries are unable to  apply knowledge about 
production  th a t exists elsewhere in  the  world. As a country  develops, it 
becomes increasingly able to  produce an ever wider range of goods and
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can begin to  com pete in in ternational m arkets in  them . W hile no t the 
only one, the ability to export certainly can be judged to  be an appropri­
ate indicator of in ternational competitiveness. Countries th a t are able to 
diversify their exports are also those th a t have been able to  expand their 
range of com parative advantage. And a broad range of com parative 
advantages is synonym ous w ith developm ent.
In a sense, OED is only a proxim ate cause of grow th and is itself a result of 
several phenom ena associated w ith developm ent and  w hich have been 
highligh ted  in  the endogenous grow th literature. These include the  accu­
m ulation of skills, learning by doing, positive pecuniary externalities th a t 
stem from the production of key non-traded inputs (e.g., infrastructure ser­
vices), positive technological externalities associated w ith skill creation, 
and technological innovation . Here we will take OED to represent one of 
the visible sym ptom s th a t those phenom ena have been at work in  the 
economy.
The accum ulation of skills is n o t a totally  exogenous phenom enon . 
Sometimes it may be the  result of deliberate policies; in  o ther cases it may 
be in terdependen t w ith the  establishm ent of plants producing new export 
goods. For exam ple, the  establishm ent of In tel in Costa Rica to  produce 
micro chips for foreign m arkets led to  an increase in  com puter program ­
m ing education (in part subsidized by Intel itself). That education benefits 
n o t only  Intel bu t has positive spillovers on related sectors (software, for 
exam ple) and even on o ther unrelated sectors th a t can raise their produc­
tivity through investm ents in  inform ation technology.
Learning by doing lowers the  costs of p roduction  to  the  firm where it is 
taking place. But it could also have externalities for o ther firms in  the  sec­
tor or even for producers in o ther sectors. In a low-skill econom y, the very 
fact th a t a new good is being produced may have positive technological 
externalities for o ther firms in the  sector (through the building up of indus­
try-specific skills) or even for firms in  totally unrelated sectors (through the 
creation of non-specific skills th a t are essential for m odern  p roduction  in 
general).
Learning by doing can also have pecuniary externalities by lowering the 
costs of production  of firms using inputs newly produced in the econom y. 
Perhaps transport costs are too  high for im porting  the  input. As dom estic 
p roduction  increases and costs are lowered, th is may render com petitive 
sectors th a t use the product as an input.
One m ight object th a t the  hypothesis th a t export diversification leads to 
faster grow th on the  grounds th a t it flies in  the  face of in ternational trade 
theory, be it Ricardian, H ecksher-O hlin, or K rugm an-H elpm ann. Tradi­
tional trade theory  stresses the  com parative-advantage benefits of special­
ization, w hich presum ably increases welfare and real incom es. The new 
trade theories, by em phasizing econom ies of scale, would also appear to
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favor specialization, at least on an in tra-industry basis. It should be noted, 
though, th a t all highly specialized economies are poor. On the other hand, 
all developed econom ies are h ighly  diversified, bo th  in the ir production  
and export structures.
Is OED ano ther aspect of long-term  growth th a t occurs spontaneously as 
a result of m arket forces? Can it be induced as a deliberate objective of 
developm ent policy? All developed econom ies exhibit OED, and in  this 
sense OED m ay be the  result of a long process of m arket-driven develop­
m ent. This was the case w ith the transform ation of the  Scandinavian coun­
tries from natu ral resource exporters to  producers and  exporters of a wide 
array of m anufactures goods (see Meller and Blomstrom, 1991). For devel­
oping countries th a t have succeeded in  growing rapidly in  the post-war 
period, OED was the explicit policy of governm ents in ten t on rapid indus­
trialization. The best-know n examples are Korea and  Taiw an.2 There are 
o ther less spectacular examples. In spite of its repu tation  for market- 
oriented reforms, Chile's success in diversifying its exports away from 
copper were partly the result of deliberate policies of prom oting production 
of new goods for in ternational markets (Agosin, 1999).
Is im port substitu tion  industrialization (ISI) a necessary first stage of 
OED? Many countries began diversifying their production structures through 
ISI. This is true both  of countries th a t were very successful and of those tha t 
did less well (like some LACs). The Asian exporters of m anufactures began 
their industrialization drive w ith protectionism ; later, w hen new m anufac­
turing sectors had emerged under the shelter of ISI, they switched to  export 
prom otion (EP). The skills acquired during ISI were essential for the  success 
of EP. In a sense, th is was also true of the  larger LACs (especially Brazil), 
although the path  they followed was considerably rockier.
Several studies address the question of w hether firms become more com ­
petitive by exporting or those who export do so because they have lower 
costs or higher productivity in the  first place. The question appears to have 
been settled in  favor of a self-selection view in w hich firms th a t succeed in 
export m arkets have superior technologies, are able to  produce quality  
products profitably, or em ploy higher-skilled workers.3 M any studies con­
clude th a t learning by exporting is no t an im portan t factor explaining
2The classic chronicles are Amsden's (1989) account of Korean industrialization and 
the description of Taiwan's experience by Wade (1990). See also Rodrik (1995). 
Interestingly, a recent paper by Jan tti et al. (2005) shows that, during the postwar 
period, Finland followed a model that had much in com m on with that of Korea.
3There is an extensive literature on this subject. For an analysis of Chilean industry, 
see Alvarez and Lopez (2004). Evidence from Morocco, Mexico, and Colombia can be 
found in Clerides e ta l .  (1998). Roberts and Tybout (1997) present further evidence 
for Colombia.
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perm anence in in ternational markets. This would seem to favor the  hypo­
thesis th a t firms learn by producing for th e  dom estic m arket and then  
attem pt to  break in to  in ternational markets.
However, studies using a different m ethodology and a production-func- 
tion  approach yield exactly the  opposite result. In a recent paper, Herzer 
and Nowak-Lehm ann (2004) estim ate a production  function  w ith a VAR 
technology using tim e series for Chilean m acroeconom ic variables over the 
period 1963-2001. In th is m odel, the  num ber of exported goods and the 
share of industrial goods in total exports are treated as proxies for the  accu­
m ulation  of knowledge, the  presence of positive knowledge spillover 
effects, and learning by exporting. Using a different m ethodology bu t still 
w ithin a time-series, m acroeconom ic framework, Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres 
and Ferrantino (2000) also find that, in the  long-run, export diversification 
and grow th are positively correlated in  Chile (C hapter 4) and Colom bia 
(Chapter 5).
It would seem th a t an ISI stage is no t the  only way of achieving OED. 
Some countries have diversified their production mix directly by exporting, 
especially w hen the  first firms are fully or partly  foreign-owned. This has 
been the experience of Chile, a country tha t has based its export diversifica­
tion  on new goods.4 C hina 's export oriented grow th of recent decades 
seems to  have also followed this pattern , since the  goods produced owe 
little to previous industrialization. The im portance of foreign direct invest­
m en t has been param ount, bu t m ultina tional firms have been required 
to  en ter in to  jo in t ventures w ith national firms, first state-ow ned but 
increasingly private (Rodrik, 2006).
Subcontracting arrangem ents have also been used as a way around 
the need to incur in large sunk costs in m arketing and product design. The 
recent Chinese export boom  seems to  have relied heavily on  these two 
m echanism s. M uch of w hat is exported is produced directly for foreign 
m arkets and consum ed in  relatively small am ounts or n o t at all in  the 
dom estic m arket. In this way, C hina has gone from being a relatively 
closed econom y w ith an import-to-GDP ratio of less th an  10 percent in the 
early 1980s to about 35 percent at present.
So, in a sense, the  issue of w hether ISI or EP is to  be preferred as a devel­
opm ent strategy is a straw m an. There are m any paths to Rome. The correct 
strategy is con tingen t on th e  characteristics of the  country  applying it. 
Since economies of scale are very im portant in m anufacturing (and even in
4However successful, the experience of Chile has had some unfortunate characteris­
tics. Much of the skills developed during the ISI period (1940s through 1973) were 
destroyed during the import liberalization period (1973-79). Agosin and Ffrench- 
Davis (1995) argue that more pragmatic policies similar to those followed by Korea 
may have allowed firms to survive and orient their output to foreign markets.
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m ost m odern services), large countries are more likely to  benefit from pro­
tection than  very small econom ies. ISI was successful in creating en trepre­
neurial and worker skills in countries w ith a m inim um  market size, but was 
m uch less so, and exhausted its potential m uch faster, in smaller countries.
The real capabilities of a country to  absorb or adapt a foreign technology 
in a relative short period of tim e, together w ith  the speed at w hich the 
technology is changing in  the  leading countries, is ano ther elem ent to  be 
taken in to  account. The Brazilian inform atics policy of the 1980s, consist­
ing in protecting the domestic market for inform ation technology products 
and requiring foreign investors to  form jo in t ventures w ith dom estic in ter­
ests, proved to  be an expensive failure, because Brazil, at the  time, did no t 
have the capability to catch up quickly w ith Silicon Valley and the technol­
ogy was itself evolving rapidly. India's m ore selective approach of fostering 
software developm ent has been m uch more successful.
We will present evidence in favor of the hypothesis that export diversifica­
tion is positively associated w ith growth. We posit that export diversification, 
coupled w ith high export growth rates, has been a trait of recent growth 
success. High rates of export growth do no t guarantee high econom ic 
growth: they m ust be accom panied by export diversification. Undoubtedly, 
there are other factors behind successful growth experiences, but this chapter 
will not deal w ith them  in detail.
Export diversification is n o t necessarily the same th in g  as exports 
of m anufactures. Some countries whose exports are heavily concentrated  
on  prim ary com m odities may diversify in to  o ther natural-resource-based 
industries rather th an  into manufactures. Conversely, export concentration 
is no t synonym ous w ith prim ary com m odity exports. However, historically 
export concen tra tion  has tended  to  be associated w ith concen tration  in 
one or a few prim ary commodities. Heavy export concentration in  one or a 
few m anufactures is an anom aly .5 And diversification has been associated 
always w ith th e  production  and export of goods w ith higher-skill and 
higher-knowledge intensity.
W hat does the literature tell us? All recent papers find tha t diversification 
is good for growth. However, none is able to distinguish between the po rt­
folio effects and the dynam ic benefits of OED on growth. In fact, these are 
difficult if n o t im possible to  disentangle. Lederman and M aloney (2003) 
calculate a H irschm an-H erfindahl index (HHI) of export concen tration  at 
the  four digit SITC level and, together w ith o ther variables of trade struc­
ture (the share of natu ral resources in  to tal exports and the  Grubel-Lloyd 
index of in tra-industry  trade), plug it in to  an em pirical m odel of grow th.
5The only examples that come to mind are clothing exports from Central American 
export processing zones and heavy concentration on micro chips in Costa Rica since 
the establishment of an Intel plant in the late 1990s.
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The results are consistent w ith  the  hypothesis th a t is at the  core of the 
curren t chapter. The objective of the LM paper is to show  th a t natural 
resource abundance is beneficial to grow th and no t inim ical to it, as some 
au thors have claim ed (for exam ple, Sachs and W arner, 1995). The HHI 
is used m ainly  as a control variable. However, their results w ith regard 
to export concen tration  are n o t robust to m odel specification, a problem  
th a t they  share w ith those obtained by Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres and 
Ferrantino (2000, C hapter 7).
Trade and growth in Latin America and Asia, 1980-2003
As show n in Table 9.1 and Figure 9.1, the  Asian exporters of m anufactures 
grew m uch faster during 1980-2003 th an  LACs. Asian o u tp u t and exports 
grew more th an  twice as fast as Latin America's. Even if one excludes the  
1980s, the  "lost decade" in  Latin America, these differences also apply to 
the period since 1990, although the  Asian average rates of growth of output 
and exports are som ew hat lower th an  twice th e  ones recorded by LACs. 
However, even during the period 1990-2003, the country w ith  the highest 
rate of growth of GDP in Latin America (Chile) was surpassed by five of the 
ten  Asian countries included in the  sample.
W hat is in teresting  about these figures is th a t th e  Asian countries con­
sistently grew faster than  LACs, bo th  w ith regard to GDP and to exports. In 
fact, the ratio of GDP growth to  export growth is practically identical in the 
two regions for the two periods shown.
Table 9.1 GDP and export growth in Latin America and Asia, 1980-2003 
(percentage annual change in GDP and real exports of goods and services)
1980-2003 1 990-2003
GDP Exports GDP Exports
Growth rates
Latin America 2.4 5.3 3.0 6.2
Asia 5.9 11.1 5.5 11.7
GDP-export elasticity
Latin America 0.49 0.45
Asia 0.47 0.53
Source: A u tho r's  calcu la tions, based o n  W orld  Bank, World D evelopment Indicators.
Notes: E xports  refer to  real e x p o rts  o f goods a n d  services (n o m in a l v a lues  de fla te d  by  th e  GDP 
d e fla to r o f  ex p o rts  o f  g oods a n d  services). C o u n tr ie s  in c lu d ed  are , in  L a tin  A m erica, A rg en tin a , 
B olivia, Brazil, C h ile , C o lo m b ia , C osta  Rica, D o m in ic a n  R epub lic , E cuador, El Salvador, 
G uatem ala , H onduras, M exico, N icaragua, P an am a , Paraguay, Peru, U ruguay, V enezuela; in  Asia, 
B angladesh , C h in a , H o n g  K ong, Ind ia , In d o n es ia , Korea, M alaysia, P h ilip p in es , T h a ila n d , an d  
V ietnam .
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Figure 9.1 Latin America and Asia: Growth of GDP and of exports of goods and 
services, 1990-2003  (average annual rates of growth)
Source-. W orld Bank, W orld Development Indicators.
Note: C o u n try  ab b rev ia tio n s  are as follows: in  Latin  Am erica, A rgen tina  (AR), Bolivia (BO), C h ile  
(CH), C o lom bia  (CO), Costa Rica (CR), D om in ican  R epublic (DR), Ecuador (EC), El Salvador (ES), 
G u a tem ala  (GU), H o n d u ra s  (HO), M exico  (ME), N icaragua (N[), P anam a (PN), Paraguay (PA), 
Peru  (PE), U ruguay  (UR), and  V enezuela  (VE); in  Asia, B angladesh  (BA), C h in a  (CHI), H ong  
K ong (HK), In d ia  (IN), In d o n es ia  (1NDO), Korea (KO), M alaysia (MA), P h ilip p in es  (PH), an d  
V ie tn am  (VI).
Of course, th is does no t m ean th a t faster export grow th is the  key to the 
success of the Asian countries relative to their Latin American coun ter­
parts, since there are m any o ther differences betw een them , but faster 
export grow th, and th e  factors th a t underlie it, do appear to have played 
a role.
There is evidence th a t OED has been a trait in the  developm ent pattern  
of Asia. The proxy for OED th a t we use here is the  HHI,6 taken from 
UNCTAD's Handbook o f Trade and Development Statistics and m easured at 
the  three-digit S1TC level. This indicator is detailed enough to capture, 
however imperfectly, bo th  vertical and horizontal diversification. By verti­
cal diversification is m eant the  shift from exporting, say, prim ary com ­
modities to exporting m anufactures. Horizontal diversification refers to the 
broadening of the export basket by diversifying into goods w ithin the same
6The HHI for country j is defined in the following manner: , where is the
value of exports of good i by country j and Xj represents the value of total exports of 
country \.
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Table 9.2  Selected Latin American countries and Asian exporters of manufactures: 
Hirschman-Herfindahl export concentration index, 1980-2002
1980 1986 1992 1998 2002
Latin America3 0.36 0 .40 0.30 0,26 0.25
Argentina 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.14
Brazil 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.09
Bolivia 0.39 0.52 0.32 0.20 0.25
Chile 0.41 0.37 0.31 0.28 0.27
Colombia 0.58 0.58 0.24 0.25 0.22
Costa Rica 0.32 0.39 0.30 0.19 0.21
Ecuador 0.55 0.45 0.47 0.35 0.39
El Salvador 0.38 0.71 0.24 0.24 0.13
Guatemala 0.31 0.47 0.22 0.24 0.19
Honduras 0.37 0.50 0.46 0.44 0.20
Mexico 0.48 0.27 0.15 0.11 0.13
Nicaragua 0.37 0.52 0.29 0.32 0.18
Panama 0.26 0.37 0.45 0 .30 0.31
Paraguay 0.28 0.40 0.36 0.43 0.38
Peru 0.26 0.25 0.27 0.22 0.25
Uruguay 0.24 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.19
Venezuela 0.67 0.57 0.56 0.49 0.75
Asia3 0,22 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.14
China. 0.17 0.08 0.07 0.09
Hong Kong 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.12
Taiwan 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.14 0.15
India 0.11 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.13
Indonesia 0.53 0.34 0.19 0.16 0.12
Korea, Republic of 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.15
Malaysia 0.30 0.23 0.16 0.20 0.22
Thailand 0.20 0.14 0.09 0.11 -
Source: UNCTAD, H andbook o f  Trade and Development Statistics, G eneva. 
Note: “U nw eigh ted  average o f c o u n trie s  show n.
broad category of goods; for example, from grapes w ith  seeds to  seedless 
grapes, or from coffee for the  mass m arket to gourm et coffee.
As can be seen from Table 9.2, in 1980 Asian countries, on average, had 
m uch lower HHI th an  LACs; during the  period up to  2002 the  index 
declined consistently  in all Asian countries, w ith th e  exception (surpris­
ingly) of Taiwan. However, in 2002 even th is latter econom y exhibited  a 
lower HHI th a n  m ost LACs. Indonesia, a country  whose exports were 
heavily concentrated on oil in 1980, had a dram atic fall in its HHI over the 
1980-2002 period, from 0.53 to  0.12. China, also, while starting w ith a rel­
atively low HHI in  1986, experienced an  im portan t decrease to  less than  
0.10, w hich is a level observed in m ost developed countries. M ost of the
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Asian exporters of m anufactures are rapidly approaching HHI's th a t are 
very similar to  those of developed countries.
Several LACs have been going th rough  a diversification of the ir exports. 
Particularly impressive has been the decline in the HHI of Mexico, Colombia, 
and, to  a lesser extent, Chile. However, their exports rem ain more concen­
trated th an  those of the Asian exporters of manufactures.
Practically the same picture emerges if one looks at the  num ber of goods 
exported, also at the  three-digit level. The m axim um  num ber of positions 
in  the  S1TC classification of in ternational trade at three digits is 239. 
Practically all Asian countries are fast approaching th a t num ber. W hile 
an increase in  the  num ber of goods exported can also be seen in Latin 
America, th a t increase has been m ore m odest, so th a t the  average num ber 
of goods exported rem ains at about one-half the m axim um .
Figure 9 .2  The portfolio effect of export diversification on growth in 198 0 -2 0 0 3 : 
a simple flow chart
Source: W orld  Bank, W orld D evelopm ent Indicators; an d  UNCTAD, H andbook o f  Trade and  
Development Statistics. Export g row th  refers to  goods an d  services in  2000 US dollars. GDP grow th  
d a ta  are in 2000 US dollars.
Notes: T he values o f p  rep resen t th e  co rre la tio n  coefficients betw een  th e  variables in th e  tw o a d ja ­
cen t boxes m easured  w ith o u t th e  As. All of th e m  are sign ifican t a t th e  1% level. T he da ta  used are 
for 106 co u n trie s  over th e  1980-2003  period .
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Evidence in favor of the portfolio effect
The portfolio effect of OED on  grow th claims th a t export diversification 
should be associated w ith faster grow th. The causal relationships are 
sum m arized w ith the aid of a simple flow chart in  Figure 9.2. Export diver­
sification is related positively to  grow th through its effects on reducing the 
variance of export and  GDP grow th. As already stated, less GDP grow th 
volatility should have a positive effect on  GDP growth.
These hypotheses are no t falsified by the  data available for the  period 
1980-2003. The flow chart above would lead one to expect a negative cor­
relation between export diversification and the variance of export growth, a 
positive correlation betw een th e  variance of export grow th and the vari­
ance of GDP grow th, and a negative correlation betw een the variance of 
GDP growth and the rate of GDP growth.
This is precisely w hat th e  data show  (see correlation coefficients in 
Figure 9.2). All correlation coefficients are of the  expected sign and  are 
significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. Export diversifica­
tio n  is m easured as DIV  = 1 -  HHI. Increases in  D IV  are highly correlated 
w ith declines in  the variance of export growth. In turn, a lower variance of 
export grow th is highly correlated w ith a lower variance of GDP growth. 
Finally, a lower variance in  GDP grow th is strongly associated w ith higher 
GDP growth.
Of course, m any th ings o ther th an  export grow th and export diversi­
fication affect the  grow th rate of GDP. But the  data do no t allow one to 
reject the  hypotheses th a t export diversification, th rough  its im pact on 
reduced instability of exports and output, leads to  higher growth.
Growth empirics: Does export diversification add anything?
In this section, we explore w hether export diversification has any explana­
tory power in  a standard em pirical m odel of grow th. Two different vari­
ables were used. One was DIV  by itself, a second DIV  interacted w ith export 
grow th (RX*DIV). As will be no ted  below, w hile DIV has the  correct sign 
and is highly significant, it is th e  interactive variable th a t has the  m ost 
explanatory power. The in tu itio n  behind  the  inclusion of this interactive 
variable is th a t diversification is m ore powerful w hen a country 's exports 
are growing rapidly than  just by itself. Note the difference between Colombia 
and Malaysia: bo th  w ind up in  2002 w ith  a D IV  of 0.78 (HHI of 0.22), but 
M alaysia's exports grew at a rate of 10.7 percent in the  period 1980-2003, 
while Colom bia's grew only at an average rate of 5.7 percent. GDP grow th 
in Malaysia averaged 6.4 percent, while it only reached 3.1 percent in 
Colombia.
The estim ation strategy is to  add D IV  and RX*DIV  to  an  otherw ise stan ­
dard em pirical grow th m odel. The variables considered were initial GDP
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Figure 9.3 GDP growth; openness, and export diversification, 1980-2003
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per capita, initial openness (trade as a percentage of GDP), average fixed 
capital form ation during the  period, and the  rule of law index (developed 
by Kaufmann et al. 2005).7
For starters, the  in teraction  betw een export grow th and diversification 
appears to  be a m ore appropriate proxy for grow th-enhancing participation 
in  th e  in te rna tiona l econom y th a n  the  degree of openness m easured by 
exports plus im ports as a share of GDP. As can be seen in Figure 9.3, which 
plots the  rate of grow th of GDP per capita in  1980-2003 against openness 
and against RX*DIV, this latter variable appears to be m ore correlated w ith 
growth th an  the degree of openness.
The results of the exercise are show n in Table 9.3. W hen one controls 
only for initial GDP per capita and openness, DIV  and RX*DIV are of 
the correct sign and highly significant w hen they are entered individually 
in to  the regression, as in equations (1) and (2). But they b o th  affect the
7A host of different controls were also used, including the average years of schooling 
in the population aged 15 through 64, but they were not found to add anything to 
the equation.
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Table 9.3  An empirical model of growth of GDP per capita (dependent variable: 
average annual rate of growth of GDP per capita, 1980-2003)
Explanatory
variables 0) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log YPC80 -0.210* .007 -0.006 0.247*** -0.596*** -0.593***
(-1.72) (0.08) (-0.06) (-2.64) (-5.16) (-4.96)
TRADE80 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.013*** -0.008* 0.005* 0.004
(2.95) (4.16) (4.07) (-2.07) (1.66) (1.61)
1 0.213*** 0.149*** 0.149***
(7.95) (6.05) (5.97)
RL 0.633*** 1.104*** 1.108***
(3.25) (5.87) (5.79)
DIV 4.846*** 0.221 2.757*** -0.090
(5.68) (0.24 (3.47) (-0.12)
RX*DIV 0.526*** 0.515*** 0.315*** 0.319***
(9.58) (7.28) (6.39) (5.23)
Adj. R2 0.215 0.474 0.455 0.530 0.707 0.704
No. of obs. 119 115 115 109 106 106
Sources: All data are from World Bank, World Development Indicators, except for HHI, which is from 
UNCTAD, Handbook o f  Trade and Development Statistics. Underlying GDP and export data are in 
constant 2000 US dollars. Exports refer to goods and services. The rule of law index is from Kaufman et 
al. (2005) and is measured in 1996.
Notes: M ethod of estim ation: OLS 
Constant not shown; t ratios in parenthesis.
* Significantly different from zero at the 10% level.
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
*** Significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
Definition o f  variables:
YPC80 = GDP per capita in 1980
TRADE80 = exports plus im ports divided by GDP in 1980
I = gross fixed capital form ation (average for th e  period), as a share of GDP
RL = rule of law index (1996)
DIV = export diversification index (1 -  HHI)
RX*DIV = rate of growth of exports m ultiplied by D/V
significance of initial GDP. Openness, so far, appears to  be significantly cor­
related w ith grow th of incom e per capita. The inclusion of b o th  DIV  and 
RX*DIV, in  equation  (3) renders DIV  no t significantly different from  zero, 
while the  coefficient associated w ith  RX*DIV  rem ains alm ost unchanged 
and is still h ighly  significant. In addition , RX*DIV  has a m uch greater ex­
planatory  power (the R squared jum ps significantly w hen  this latter vari­
able replaces DIV). Thus RX*DIV  would appear to be our preferred variable. 
It is also quite robust to changes in specification.
Next, we in troduce DIV  and RX*DIV  in to  a m ore com pletely specified 
model, one tha t includes gross fixed investm ent and the rule of law index.
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This is done in equations (4) and (5). It can be seen th a t this parsim onious 
m odel is quite powerful. Initial GDP per capita becomes highly significant, 
the significance of the  openness variables dim inishes considerably (which 
suggests th a t openness is a stand-in for o ther effects), and investm ent and 
the  rule of law are bo th  of the  correct sign and also highly  significant. 
These results confirm  the finding in the literature th a t grow th is positively 
related to  investm ent, a hypothesis th a t goes back to  the  H arrod-D om ar 
m odel and is corroborated in some of the more recent endogenous growth 
literature. The results also lend credence to  the m ore recent em phasis on 
in stitu tions as im portan t determ inan ts of grow th. O ther th ings being 
equal, countries w here the  governm ent is perceived as working for the  
good of society as a w hole experience higher econom ic grow th th an  those 
where this is no t the  case.
W hen the tw o variables associated w ith OED are in troduced in to  this 
m odel, the  in teraction  of export grow th and  export diversification 
(RX*DIV) turns out to be highly significant and of the correct sign, w hether 
the  diversification index by itself is entered in to  the  equation  as an add i­
tional variable or is left out. M oreover, the  value of the coefficient of 
RX*DIV is very robust to  changes in the  specification of the  model.
The incidence of crises
The 1980s were m arked by external and dom estic financial crises in  Latin 
America. These crises were protracted and affected m ost countries in  the 
region. The external debt crises was in m any cases accom panied by bank 
failures, falling GDP, and surging unem ploym ent. It was, indeed, a "lost 
decade." On the  o ther hand, during the late 1990s several rapidly growing 
exporters of m anufactures in Asia experienced similar crises, albeit shorter- 
lived th an  those of LACs in  the  1990s. From 1998 to 2002, partly as a con­
sequence of contag ion  from the  Asian and Russian financial crises, several 
LACs again suffered either a contraction  of ou tp u t or a sharp deceleration 
in  their rates of growth. Mexico, the Central American countries, and those 
in the  C aribbean were severely affected by the  slowdown in the United 
States in 2000-02. These factors certainly have had an im pact on  long-term  
growth, bu t are no t reflected in the  m odel presented above.
In this section, we incorporate in to  the model two crisis variables, w hich 
tu rn  out to  be very significant; they both  improve the explanatory power of 
the  m odel. One is derived from  the  database of Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) for banking crises. This variable (CK) is the  p roportion  of the 
24 years in the  sam ple (1980-2003) during w hich countries were affected 
by banking crises. The alternative crisis variable (CRISIS) is the  proportion 
of years during w hich each country had grow th rates th a t were lower th an  
the  sam ple average m inus 1.5 tim es the  standard  deviation of grow th in 
1980-2003.
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Both variables yield similar results (Table 9.4). The diversification variable 
used in  these regressions (RX*DIV) again proves to  be very robust to  the  
inclusion of the  crises variables. All o ther contro l variables are also robust 
and extrem ely significant, w ith the exception of the ratio of trade to GDP, 
w hich even switches signs w hen the definition of crisis is changed.
Table 9.4  Introducing crises (dependent variable: average rate of growth of per 
capita GDP, 1980-2003)
Explanatory variables (1) (2)
log YPC80 -0 .711*** 0.522***
(-5.91) (-4.55)












Adj. R2 0.809 0.727
No. of observations 75 106
Sources: All da ta  are from  W orld  Bank, W orld D evelopment Indicators, excep t for HHI, w h ich  is 
from  UNCTAD, H andbook o f  Trade and Development Statistics. U n d erly in g  GDP an d  ex p o rt da ta  
are in  c o n s ta n t 2000  US dollars. Exports refer to  goods an d  services. T he ru le  o f law  index  is 
from  K aufm an e ta l .  (2005) an d  is m easured  in  1996. T he b an k in g  crisis d a ta  are from  C aprio  
an d  K lingebiel (2003).
Notes: M ethod  o f e stim atio n : OLS 
C o n s ta n t n o t show n; t  ra tios in  pa ren thesis .
* S ignificantly  d iffe ren t from  zero a t th e  10% level.
** S ignificantly  d iffe ren t from  zero a t th e  S% level.
*** S ignificantly  d iffe ren t from  zero  a t th e  1% level.
Definition o f  variables:
YPC80 = GDP per cap ita  in 1980
TRADE80 = exports  p lus im ports  d iv ided  by GDP in  1980
i = gross fixed cap ita l fo rm atio n  (average fo r th e  period), as a share  o f GDP
RL = ru le o f law  in d ex  (1996)
RX*DIV = ra te  o f g ro w th  o f e xpo rts  m u ltip lied  by  DIV
CK = p ro p o r tio n  o f years in  w h ich  a co u n try  experienced  a b a n k in g  crisis
CRISIS = p ro p o r tio n  o f years in  w h ich  a c o u n try 's  g row th  ra te  w as below  th e  sam ple  average
g ro w th  ra te  m in u s  1.5 tim es th e  sam p le 's  s tan d a rd  d ev ia tio n
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Even though  the  equation  incorporating  the  variable derived from 
Caprio and Klingebiel has som ew hat greater explanatory power, we prefer 
the  one using the  alternative measure. Falling GDP or grow th slowdowns 
happen  for a variety of reasons, and no t all of them  are due to banking 
crises. In addition , th e  second crisis variable allows us to  use the entire 
database, while use of the  variable derived from Caprio and Klingebiel 
shrinks the sample from 106 to  75.
Table 9.5  Contributions to growth of GDP per capita, 1980-2003  (percentage 









o f  law Crises
Latin America
Argentina 0.1 -0 .7 1.4 2.5 0.2 -1 .0
Bolivia -0 .3 -0 .2 0.9 2.2 -0 .6 0.0
Brazil 0.6 1.1 2.4 2.9 -0 .2 -0 .5
Chile 3.5 2.4 1.7 3.3 1.1 -0 .3
Colombia 1.0 0.4 1.1 2.6 -0 .4 0.0
Costa Rica 1.2 1.9 1.7 3.1 0.6 -0 .3
Ecuador 0.1 0.5 0.9 2.9 -0 .3 -0 .3
El Salvador 0.0 -0 .9 0.8 2.1 -0 .4 -0 .5
Guatemala -0 .1 -1 .0 0.4 2.1 -0 .6 0.0
Honduras -0 .2 0.5 0.2 3.5 -0 .7 0.0
Mexico 0.8 1.4 2.5 3.1 -0 .1 -0 .5
Nicaragua -1 .3 0.7 0.6 3.5 -0 .6 -0 .3
Panama 1.2 0.6 0.3 3.1 0.2 -0 .5
Paraguay 0.1 0.7 1.0 3.3 -0 .4 -0 .3
Peru 0.0 -0 .1 0.9 3.1 -0 .3 -0 .8
Uruguay 0.4 -0 .8 1.0 2.0 0.5 -0 .8
Venezuela -1 .9 -2 .1 0.2 2.6 -0 .6 -0 .8
Asia
Bangladesh 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.6 -0 .6 0.0
China 8.2 6.2 3.2 5.2 -0 .4 0.0
Hong Kong 3.9 4.8 2.9 3.9 1.5 -0 .3
India 3.7 3.7 2.6 3.1 0.0 0.0
Indonesia 3.6 2.0 1.0 3.6 -0 .3 -0 .3
Korea 5.6 5.1 3.7 4.4 0.7 -0 .5
Malaysia 3.6 4.5 2.4 4.3 0.7 -0 .3
Philippines 0.4 1.3 1.5 3.1 -0 .1 -0 .5
Thailand 4.7 5.2 3.1 4.4 0.4 -0 .3
Source: A u th o r's  ca lcu la tio n s , based  o n  e q u a tio n  (2) in  Table  9 .4 . D ata are as described in 
Table 9.4.
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How important are different factors in explaining growth?
The contribu tions to  grow th of th e  various factors identified in the  p re­
ceding sections can be estim ated m ultip ly ing the  coefficients of equation
(2) in  Table 9.4 by the  observed values of the  explanatory  variables and 
expressing the results as a share of the observed rate of growth of per capita 
GDP. Interest centers on the export diversification variable, investm ent, the 
rule of law, and crises.
As can be seen in  Table 9.5, the  higher grow th rates of Asian countries 
appear to  be explained by a larger con tribu tion  of export diversification 
and investm ent. These two variables together pretty  m uch explain the 
differences in  grow th perform ance. The rule of law variables makes a less 
negative con tribu tion  in Asia th a n  in  Latin America; crises have been 
significantly less prevalent in  Asia, subtracting less from the contribution to 
growth of the  positive factors th an  in Latin America.
It should be noted tha t all the contributions identified in Table 9.5 exceed 
the observed grow th rates. This is because some factors have been om itted 
(conspicuously, the role of conditional convergence, as m easured by initial 
per capita GDP) and because the equation yields a large and  negative con­
stant (-3.2), indicating the probable presence of unexplained factors.
Conclusions
This chapter has show n th a t export grow th can be im portan t to  overall 
econom ic grow th, and th a t the  key to  success is no t export grow th per se 
b u t export grow th together w ith  diversification. The channels th rough  
w hich diversified export grow th stim ulates ou tpu t grow th appear to  be 
two. One of them  we have called the portfolio  effect. Diversification of 
exports leads to  less export volatility, w hich in tu rn  results in lowered 
o u tp u t volatility. C ountries w ith highly unstable econom ies grow m ore 
slowly th an  countries th a t exhibit m ore dam pened cyclical fluctuations. 
The data do no t contradict this chain of causation.
The second effect is associated w ith the fact th a t export diversification is 
likely to  be a proxy for the w idening of com parative advantages th a t come 
w ith a more diversified economy. OED is associated w ith knowledge acqui­
sition and  spillovers, enhanced  abilities to carry out research, on-the-job 
train ing  th a t has positive externalities, etc. Once a critical level is reached, 
OED may acquire a self-sustaining character, w ith fu rther OED occurring 
spontaneously.
The em pirical results are congruent w ith this m odel. In a cross-country 
econom etric m odel cf growth, the  proxy for OED used (the in teraction  
between export growth and export diversification) is highly significant and 
makes an im portan t con tribu tion  to  explain ing variations in  grow th rates 
across countries.
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The em pirical m odel shows th a t variables o ther th an  export diversifica­
tion also play a role in explaining differences in econom ic grow th between 
countries. Investm ent certainly takes pride of place. It has already been 
noted  th a t the  dynam ic Asian econom ies have rates of investm ent th a t are 
quite  higher th an  those of the Latin American countries. The strength  of 
investm ent could well be associated w ith export grow th and export 
diversification.8 If export grow th is sustained over long periods of tim e, as 
has been the case in Asia, fast export growth could well be a powerful stim ­
ulus to  investm ent. Export diversification is also likely to  be beneficial to 
investm ent, since the m ore diversified exports are th e  stronger will be the 
linkages between some exporting activities and the rest of the economy.
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Trade and Growth: Past Experience 
and Perspectives for Latin America
M arcelo de P aiva  A breu1
Introduction
The collapse of the gold exchange standard in  the  late 1920s led Latin 
American countries (LACs) to  seek new growth strategies as natural answers 
to  specific developm ents rather th an  as conscious strategies resulting from 
public debate. In the  largest econom ies, th is followed a well-known 
pattern . First, there  was a deepening of im port substitu tion  industrializa­
tion  in the wake of the  balance of paym ents shock. In some of them , such 
as Brazil and Mexico, th is was only a new  step in  a process w ith roots 
before the tu rn  of the tw entieth  century.
After a golden age lasting un til the 1960s, im port substitution came to  be 
com bined in the late 1960s and 1970s w ith limited liberalizing reforms and 
the extension of pick-the-w inner policies to  encom pass export prom otion. 
This new  m odel was based on selective export subsidies and  the  attrac­
tion  of foreign direct investm ent based on  export perform ance criteria. 
Especially in the  larger economies, FDI was m ostly attracted by a com bina­
tion  of high tariffs (or effective non-tariff barriers), subsidies in various 
forms, and lim itations to  the  right of establishm ent of com petitors. 
Liberalization of access of im ports to  dom estic m arkets proceeded at a 
m uch slower pace. Growth perform ance in  some LACs was still rather good 
in the 1970s, but less so than  in the period before the oil shock of 1973-74.
In the  1980s, as financial crisis and recession h it Latin America, new 
grow th strategies began to take shape in m ost econom ies based on  a com ­
prehensive set of dom estic econom ic reforms, w hich included im proved 
access of im ports to  dom estic markets and privatization of public assets. 
The com prehensiveness of such reforms of course varied very considerably 
depending on  the economy. They w ent m uch further in economies such as
'I thank Roberto Bouzas, Robert Devlin and Ricardo Ffrench-Davis for their com ­
ments, even if they were not always incorporated into the final text.
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Chile and Costa Rica, were Jess extensive in  econom ies as A rgentina and 
Mexico, and even less so in Brazil. In some of th e  sm aller Latin American 
econom ies fully-fledged export platform s were created, generally in  the 
form of maquiladoras targeting the  U nited States market for clo th ing p rod­
ucts. The results in term s of GDP grow th perform ance tended  to  be dis­
appointing  for the region as a whole.
The generally m ediocre grow th perform ance of Latin America in  the 
recent period contrasts very sharply w ith the  grow th perform ance of m any 
East Asian econom ies, and especially so w ith th a t of C hina since 1980. As 
this growth performance has been accom panied by a very fast expansion of 
trade, there has been an increasing in terest in  the links betw een trade and 
growth, and especially between exports and growth. There has also been a 
resurgence of in terest in policies aim ing at im proving supply-related 
responses, seeking inspiration in policies adopted by China.
Improved export grow th perform ance also depends on im proved market 
access, and this has been stim ulating  a large num ber of initiatives th a t 
involve trade liberalization. The in terest of specific Latin American eco­
nom ies in different formats and sequencing of trade liberalization measures 
is bound to vary very considerably depending on their characteristics. It is 
im portan t to  keep th is in  m ind  w hen assessing developm ents of bilateral, 
subregional, regional and m ultilateral trade negotiations.
The first section considers how  im port trade liberalization efforts affected 
dom estic markets in different Latin American econom ies, how  the process 
can be deepened and w hich are the  obstacles faced. The next section ana­
lyzes the  links betw een exports and grow th and how  Latin America has 
been perform ing recently. This is followed by a discussion on the diversity 
of the  export com position of different Latin American economies. The pos­
sible role of supply-response policies is considered in the  next section. 
There is an a ttem pt to  establish a taxonom y of Latin American interests in 
m arket access negotiations, based on different export structures and trade 
geographic o rien tation . D evelopm ents in the  m ain  subregional, regional 
and m ultilateral negotiations are considered. Conclusion are then  drawn.
Imports and growth
To the extent that, besides the  level of dom estic econom ic activity, tariffs 
and non-tariff barriers are the  m ain variables to  explain im ports they  are 
the  crucial variables to  consider w hen links betw een im ports and growth 
are analyzed. There is m uch work trying to relate low tariffs w ith high 
growth, a view widely held by policy-makers, especially in multilateral orga­
nizations. But the  subject has been surrounded by deep controversy, bo th  
in the long-term and for more recent periods. Work by O'Rourke (2000) and 
Clemens and W illiam son (2001), for instance, suggested a positive correla­
tion  between im port tariffs and econom ic grow th across countries from
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1875 to  1914. This has been criticized by Irwin (2002) on several grounds, 
including the weight of land-abundant outliers th a t used tariffs as a source 
of revenue. For the  m ore recent period, there is also deep controversy. 
Several studies, such as Sachs and W arner (1995), have suggested tha t open­
ness is correlated w ith higher econom ic grow th in the  post-war period. 
Frankel and Romer (1999) overcame the sim ultaneity  problem  and found 
th a t m ore trade is related to  higher incom e. But Rodriguez and Rodrik 
(2001) have found little evidence tha t lower tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
trade are significantly associated w ith growth.
Pre-great depression experience in Latin America indeed suggests a positive 
link between tariffs and growth, but this is at least partly related to the market 
power of some of the bigger economies in  specific com m odity markets, such 
as coffee and copper. More recent experience indicates that trade liberalization 
m ight be a necessary rather th an  a sufficient condition for higher growth. 
W hile it is true m any Latin American economies that engaged in deep trade 
liberalization did no t reap the expected growth performance, it is also true 
th a t no  econom y tha t has been laggard in its trade liberalization since the 
1980s is among the economies with a good growth record.
Average tariffs for 1985-2002 and GDP per capita PPP growth since 1990 
are presented in Table 10.1 for selected LACs. Beware th a t MFN tariffs are a 
good indication  of protection  in some econom ies but in  o ther economies, 
as for instance in Chile, Costa Rica, and Mexico, they  are no t as m uch of 
the  trade is conducted w ith partners in FTAs. A rgentina, and especially 
Brazil and  Colom bia, are exam ples of a relatively high tariff -  in spite of a
Table 10.1 Latin American selected economies: GDP-PPP 1990-2003  per capita 





Average unweighted tariff rates
1985 1990 1995 2002
Argentina 1.9 22.8 18.2 13.9 13.2
Brazil 1.0 51.3 30.5 12.8 12.3
Chile 4.0 26.0 15.0 11.0 7.0
Colombia 0.5 46.4 34.1 13.3 11.7
Costa Rica 2.7 22.3* 16.8** 11.7 6.0
Dominican Republic 3.6 n.a. n.a. 17.8*** 10.1*
Mexico 1.1 22.6 13.1 13.0 16.4
Peru 1.7 63 26 16” 13.5” +
Venezuela -1 .7 32* 15 12*** 12.2
Sources: W orld  D ev elo p m en t Ind ica to rs , Abreu (2004b), W orld  T rade O rg an iza tio n  (1994), 
(1995), (1996a), (1996b) an d  (2001), FTAA d a ta  base.
* 1986. ** 1989 *** 1994 ^2001 ” 1993 " 2 0 0 0 .
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rapid pace of liberalization u n til the  m id-1990s -  and a m ediocre grow th 
performance. In a polar position are the low tariff-high growth basket cases: 
Chile, Costa Rica and the D om inican Republic. Mexico is perhaps the  best 
example of a low protection and low growth experience.
In some of the  larger econom ies, w ith  significant sectors producing 
capital goods, the  costs of m ain ta in ing  h igh  protection  in term s of fore­
gone grow th have been substantial. Smaller econom ies have been able to  
reap the benefits of unh indered  access to  the in ternational m arket buying 
capital goods th a t are cheaper and  state of the  art. In Brazil's high protec­
tio n  closed access to  the in ternational m arkets and high inflation stim u­
lated dem and for real assets. Between 1970 and 1990, prices of capital 
goods doubled in relation to  the GDP deflator. Since 1990, trade liberaliza­
tion has reversed this trend and may have answered for some 0.8 percent of 
GDP yearly grow th. The m ediocre grow th perform ance m ight have been 
even worse w ithou t trade liberalization, even if im port tariffs on  m ost 
capital goods are still around 20 percent.2
Export performance and growth
The historical evidence on the  geographical d istribu tion  of world exports 
makes clear the shrinking im portance of Latin America since 1928 for m ost 
economies (see Table 10.2). Market shares of Argentina and Uruguay fell to 
one-eight and one-ten th  of their level in 1928. Some economies, especially 
those exporting coffee, however, were able to  increase the ir m arket share 
betw een 1928 and 1950. This was due to  significant increases in world 
coffee prices in the im m ediate post W orld War II period.
M any of the  com m ents m ade on the  links betw een protection and 
grow th can be repeated in relation to  export perform ance and growth, 
a lthough in this case the long-term  bad perform ance affects practically all 
Latin American economies, w ith the exception of Mexico, even if its share 
in 1928 was artificially low given the  econom ic difficulties since the early 
1910s and its share in 2003 reflected the effects of NAFTA. W hile in m ature 
econom ies it is to  be expected th a t exports increase at lower rates th a n  
world exports (especially if they are no t involved in significant integration 
initiatives),3 in developing econom ies th is is an ind ication  of lack of com ­
petitiveness as the  structure of world exports shift from com m odities to 
m anufactures. The relevant m easuring rods for Latin America are China 
and the  rest of Asia (excluding Japan and th e  M iddle East).4 Since 1928
2See Abreu (2004b, pp. 17-19).
3It should be noted that data in Table 10.2 refer to national economies. In particular, 
the European Union is not treated as a single econom y. This is why the European 
share of world exports remains relatively stable over time.
4West Asia is mainly the Middle East.
224 Economic Growth with Equity
Table 10.2  Latin America: Shares of world exports, 1928-2003, (%)
1928 1950 1980 2003
Latin America 9.32 12.35 5.47 5.03
MERCOSUR 4.93 4.61 1.45 1.42
Argentina 3.12 1.92 0.39 0.39
Brazil 1.45 2.22 0.99 0 .98
Paraguay 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02
Uruguay 0.31 0 .42 0.05 0.03
Chile 0.72 0.47 0.23 0.28
Mexico 0.74 0.86 0.89 2.22
Andean Community 1.25 3.11 1.50 0.73
Bolivia 0.13 0.12 0.05 0 .02
Colombia 0.39 0.65 0.19 0.17
Ecuador 0.06 0 .12 0.12 0.08
Peru 0.38 0.31 0.19 0.12
Venezuela 0.35 1.91 0.95 0.34
CACM 0.32 0.48 0.23 0.16
CARICOM 0.26 0.40 0.57 0.12
Cuba 0.85 1.10 0.27 0.02
Other Latin America* 0.40 1.32 0.33 0.06
United States 15.42 16.72 11.03 9.72
Europe 47.68 40.00 39.80 46.28
United Kingdom 10.74 10.03 5.50 4.09
Japan 2.72 1.35 6.49 6.34
China 1.40 0.91 0.91 ' 5.88
Asia** 10.51 13.15 17.79 19.49
West Asia 0.64 2.26 10.55 4.29
Rest of Asia 9.87 10.89 7.24 15.20
Sources: Société des N a tio n s  (1942); UNCTAD (1991, 2004).
* D o m in ican  R epublic, H aiti, Panam a a n d  th e  N e th erlan d  A ntilles. 
** E xcluding  C h in a  a n d  Jap an .
Latin American exports declined from 9.3 percent to 5 percent of world 
exports, while those of C hina and the  Rest of Asia doubled from 11.3 per­
cent to 21.1 percent of world exports. It is true th a t China and the  Rest of 
Asia were in turm oil in  1928, but this is no t relevant to  explain more recent 
disparities. Since 1980, Latin America's world m arket share of 5.5 percent 
fell slightly to  5 percent, while the share of China and the Rest of Asia rose 
from 8.1 percent to  21.1 percent.
There is an enorm ous literature on export-led grow th and on the causal­
ity between export perform ance and growth. Results are conflicting. There 
is surely a link betw een exports and grow th. There m ight be a causality
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going from exports to  grow th.5 But, as in the  case of links betw een protec­
tion  and grow th, it is possible to  make the  d istinc tion  betw een necessary 
and sufficient conditions concerning export perform ance w hich m ight 
explain growth. That rapid expansion of exports does no t assure a high rate 
of growth is exemplified by Mexico's mediocre growth perform ance and its 
very significant expansion of m arket share in  world exports. Mexico's 
growth performance, of course, could have been even worse had its exports 
increased at a lower rate. But elsewhere in Latin America some good export 
perform ances have been accom panied by high grow th since 1990, notably 
in  Chile, but also in  o ther good grow th perform ers such as, for instance, 
Costa Rica and the  D om inican Republic.6 W hile it is difficult to  be too 
confident on the  power of export expansion as a grow th engine, w ithou t 
the  help of o ther policies it is unlikely th a t export expansion would hinder 
growth.
In a review of Latin American export grow th perform ance, especially 
un til the  early 1990s, one should be aware tha t even the overall unsatisfac­
tory  export perform ance in econom ies such as Brazil was heavily depen­
dent on direct subsidization w hich was either GATT or WTO-illegal. This 
took the form of direct tax exem ptions, tax rebates exceeding the am ount 
of indirect taxes paid, and tax rebates or o ther advantages dependen t on 
export perform ance criteria. Decision m aking on export subsidies in  fact 
was a sim ple variation of the pick-the-w inner m ethods w hich had been 
consolidated under the  im port substitution industrialization regime, at first 
w ith  good results un til the  early 1970s, th en  w ith  decreasing success in 
the late 1970s and  1980s. It was only after the  mid-1980s th a t a change of 
strategy started to  take shape as d isappo in tm ent w ith th e  deterioration  of 
grow th perform ance increased, together w ith  the  awareness of the  lim its 
imposed by both  fiscal constraints and m ultilaterally negotiated rules.
Export of services may also be a source of grow th, as th e  exam ple of 
India suggests. But they  are still of lim ited im portance in  Latin America 
and have expanded less th an  world exports of services. Brazil, and  espe­
cially Chile, Costa Rica, and the  D om inican Republic have expanded their 
exports betw een 5-fold and  7-fold since 1990, w ith perform ances above 
the region's average. This contrasts w ith betw een 8-fold and 15-fold in  the 
case of China, India and the Republic of Korea. Exports of services in  Latin 
America tend  to  be m ore concentrated  in  tourism  and  travel and  less in  
m ore sophisticated item s such as business services (see UNCTAD, 2004, 
Part 5).
5See, for instance, Giles and Williams (2000a, 2000b), and Love and Chandra (2004).
6The share of Costa Rica in world exports rose from 0.04  percent to 0 .18 percent 
between 1990 and 2003, and that of the Dom inican Republic from 0.06  percent in 
1990 to 0.09 percent in 2001, UNCTAD (2004).
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Table 10.3  Export structure by main categories and selected commodity groups, 








Argentina 74.3 10.9 0.4 0.5 13.9
Brazil 63.3 11.9 0.6 10.1 13.2
Chile 4.5 2.9 0 88.1 4.3
Mexico 39.7 9.1 3.2 15.5 32.5
Bolivia 2.7 1.7 4.5 88.0 3.0
Colombia 75.0 6.2 10.1 0.7 8.0
Peru 43.5 5.9 0.7 48.4 1.4
Venezuela 1.7 0 91.0 5.8 1.4
Costa Rica 79.0 0.8 0.4 0.1 18.7
Dominican Republic* 87.8 0.1 7.5 3.6 3.2
1990
Argentina 56.3 3.9 8.0 2.4 29.3
Brazil 27.7 3.3 2.2 13.7 51.8
Chile 23.1 9.5 0.5 53.1 9.8
Mexico 11.6 1.6 37.5 5.7 43.3
Bolivia 18.9 7.6 24.6 44.1 4.7
Colombia 32.8 4.3 36.9 0.2 25.1
Peru 21.2 3.3 10.0 47.0 18.4
Venezuela 1.9 0.4 80.1 7.4 0.2
Costa Rica 58.2 5.5 1.0 0.9 26.8
Dominican Republic** 14.9 0.3 0.3 0 81.4
2003
Argentina 45.7 1.2 17.1 3.9 30.7
Brazil 28.6 4.5 5.2 8.5 51.0
Chile 27.8 9.3 2.2 41.0 15.6
Mexico 5.5 0.5 11.2 1.2 81.4
Bolivia 29.6 2.0 30.1 17.7 16.1
Colombia 17.4 5.5 37.2 1.0 34.3
Peru*** 20.7 2.1 7.6 29.4 17.0
Venezuela 1.1 2.2 82.2 4.1 4.3
Costa Rica 30.1 3.1 0.5 0.7 65.4
Dominican Rep. **** 18.7 0.4 0.1 0.3 76.2
Source: UNCTAD (1991, 2003).
* D o m in ican  R epublic to ta l expo rts  o f US$ 214 m illio n  (p resum ably  n a tio n a l exports).
D ata from  UNCTAD (1991).
** D o m in ican  R epublic to ta l expo rts  o f US$ 2 ,034.3 m illion . D ata from  W TO (1996a).
*** U nallocated  Peruv ian  exports  o f 23.1%  in  2003.
**** T his s tru c tu re  is for 1995, d a ta  from  UNCTAD (2002). D om in ican  Republic to ta l
expo rts  in  2001 w ere US$ 5 ,290 m illio n  o f w h ich  US$ 752 m illio n  n o t from  free-trade 
zones. D ata from  W TO (2003).
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Export expansion; taxonomies in Latin America
The econom ies of Latin America are heterogeneous from m any poin ts of 
view. Export structures and the geographical distribution of export markets 
are no exception. Different econom ies have widely different export struc­
tures, and contrasts have deepened since the  1960s. U ntil then , exports 
interests were w holly in com m odities: fuels (oil), ores and m etals (ores), 
food products, and agricultural raw m aterials. Since then , m anufactured 
exports becam e significant in  m ost econom ies. In m any cases, these 
exports are concentrated in consum er goods and, especially, in textiles and 
clo thing products. But in some industrially m ore m ature econom ies in  the 
region, exports of more sophisticated products have been gaining ground.
Of the  largest econom ies of Latin America, A rgentina is a relevant 
exporter of m anufactures, but its share in to tal exports has been around 
30 percent since 1990 and they  are m ainly  exported to  the rest of Latin 
America. It still is essentially a large exporter of com m odities, m ainly of 
food products and oil (see Table 10.3). Brazil has a m ore diversified export 
structure. The share of food exports has been drastically reduced and also 
its com position, as coffee gave way to  new  products such as orange juice 
and soy beans. Sugar exports became relatively m ore im portant. Success of 
Brazilian agriculture relied heavily on the  developm ent of new p lan ting  
techniques, soil treatm ent, and  seed varieties appropriate for tropical agri­
culture in  poorer soils bu t w ith  m uch higher inso lation  and hum id ity  
levels th a n  in  m ost com petitors. C om petitiveness in pulp, paper, and 
related products is also explained by such advantages. The share of exports 
of ores in total exports fell slightly in recent years, but the econom y plays a 
m ajor role in  the  world iron  ore m arket w ith Vale do Rio Doce as the  
market leader. Market share of m anufactures has rem ained at about 50 per­
cent since the early 1980s, but, in  spite of some success stories such as 
Embraer exports of regional jets, there is a heavy concentration in less tech­
nologically sophisticated products. A nother im portan t developm ent was 
the  consolidation of a p rom inent role as an exporter of iron  and steel p ro­
ducts. Mexico, in  the  later period, became essentially an exporter of m anu­
factures and fuels, m ainly to  th e  United States. Its range of m anufactured  
exports is more com prehensive th an  those of any other LACs.
Chile has been gradually increasing its export m arket shares in  food 
products and m anufactures to  the  detrim ent of copper. In the  former case, 
m uch of the  success has been due to  product and process innovation , as 
exemplified by its increasing im portance as a world exporter of fish and 
fruits. Fish, fruit, and wines answered for almost 12 percent of Chilean total 
exports in 2003. Chile also consolidated a significant share in  world 
m arkets for pulp and related products, whose exports surged before 1990. 
Colom bia reduced dram atically  the share of food products in its total 
exports, increasing oil and coal exports before 1990 and  rather diversified
Table 10.4 Export structure by main regions of destination, 1970-2003 (percentage of total exports)
Developed economies Developing economies







Argentina 55.5 9.3 6.2 1.0 4.3 23.7 21.1 0.5 0.6 1.1
Bolivia 46.2 34.8 9.6 0 0.8 8.5 8.5 0 0 0
Brazil 45.5 26.2 5.3 0.9 4.5 17.1 11.7 1.6 0.5 2.5
Chile 60.9 14.4 12.1 0.5 0.1 11.9 11.5 0.2 0 0.1
Colombia 38.5 38.0 2.8 0.3 4.9 15.5 14.2 0.1 0 0.1
Costa Rica 25.5 43.1 4.8 0 2.9 23.6 23.5 0 0 0.1
Dominican Rep. 11.8 81.8 3.0 1.7 0 6.9 6.9 0 0 0
Mexico 11.1 71.2 5.7 0.3 0.3 11.3 10.5 0.1 0 0.5
Peru 48.8 33.4 13.6 0.5 3.1 9.5 6.5 0 0.1 0.9
Venezuela 15.1 46.6 0.8 0 0 37.5 36.7 0.5 0 0
1990
Argentina 31.7 14.4 3.3 1.1 5.1 43.8 27.6 3.2 6.1 7.0
Bolivia 29.1 20.0 0.3 0 2.2 46.2 45.3 0 0.1 0.5
Brazil 33.7 26.3 7.5 0.8 1.3 28.1 11.8 3.2 3.7 9.3
Chile 38.5 17.9 16.1 0.4 0.2 25.8 12.2 1.3 1.2 10.3
Colombia 28.9 45.6 3.8 0.5 0.6 18.2 17.2 0.1 0.2 0.7
Costa Rica 29.7 49.6 1.0 0.3 0.1 18.2 16.4 0.1 0.2 1.3
Dominican Rep. 19.4 67.6 2.0 0 1.0 9.1 3.5 0.5 0 4.6
Mexico 13.4 70.2 5.5 1.0 0.1 8.6 6.6 0.3 0.2 1.2
Peru 33.0 23.2 13.4 0.2 3.8 24.9 15.7 0.7 1.0 7.5
Venezuela 14.0 54.2 2.8 0.1 0.1 27.3 14.5 0.3 0 1.6
continued
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Table 10.4 Export structure by main regions of destination, 1970-2003 (percentage of total exports) -  continued
Developed economies Developing economies






Europe and  
the CIS**





Argentina 20.3 10.6 1.2 0.7 0.9 65.2 40.9 4.8 3.8 15.7
Bolivia 21.6 11.6 1.5 0.2 0.1 64 .0 62.4 0.1 0 1.5
Brazil 25.4 24.2 3.4 0.7 2.6 41.0 19.1 4.0 3.8 13.6
Chile 22.8 18.1 10.5 0.6 0.5 41 .0 18.2 0.5 1.4 20.8
Colombia 14.5 48.4 1.5 0.8 0.4 31.9 28.7 0.6 0.6 8.0
Costa Rica 21.2 26.6 1.4 0.1 0.1 22.0 13.4 0 0.2 8.4
Dominican Rep. 7.6 86.1 0.8 0.1 0 5.1 3.5 0.5 0 4.6
Mexico 3.5 89.4 0.7 0.2 0 5.8 3.5 0.1 0.1 1.4
Peru 20.2 28.6 4.4 0.7 0.8 31.9 17.9 0.4 0.5 13.1
Venezuela 7.2 46.2 0.2 0 0.1 33.2 31.7 0.1 0.1 1.1
Sources: UNCTAD (1991, 2004).
* In 1970 Europe excludes th e  Czech Republic, H ungary , P o land  a n d  th e  G erm an  D em ocratic  R epublic.
** In 1970 included  th e  C zech Republic, H ungary , Po land  a n d  th e  G erm an  D em ocratic  Republic as w ell as th e  Socialist C o u n trie s  o f Asia. B ut Latin 
A m erica's trade  w ith  th e  la tte r was neglig ib le in  1970.
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m anufactures in  a m ore sustained way since then . The share of food 
exports decreased in Peru, as its m anufactured exports increased betw een 
1970 and 1990. But, since then , the la tter rem ained below 20 percent. 
Venezuela is still essentially an  oil exporter. In Costa Rica foreign invest­
m ent in electronic products -  massive if com pared to  the  size of the 
econom y -  has radically changed the export structure towards m anu­
factures, w hich now  represent about tw o-thirds of to tal exports. The 
D om inican Republic and some of the  C entral American econom ies, as 
El Salvador and Honduras, are heavily dependent on clothing exports.7
To a large extent, export m arket orien tation  results from export product 
structure. Table 10.4 presents data on the  destination  of Latin American 
exports. Exporters of com m odities tend  to  have a more diversified export 
structure by destination. Geography, of course, also plays a role. The closer 
is an  econom y to the  U nited States, the h igher the  share of its exports 
directed there. The economies in the Southern region of South America and 
Peru being m ore rem ote geographically in relation to the  United States 
and m ore im portan t as world com m odity  suppliers of food and ores, tend  
to  have a lower share of exports directed to  the  U nited States and Canada, 
typically in the  10-28 percent range. In the economies in the  Northern part 
of South America this tends to  rise to  50 percent and nearer to  the  United 
States in Central America and Mexico, to  the  60-90 percent range.
The im portance of the European m arket for Latin America has been gen­
erally decreasing since 1970. To a certain extent, this reflects the  fact th a t 
Europe is no t as im portan t as the  United States as a m arket for Latin 
American exports of m anufactures. Intra-Latin American trade became 
increasingly im portant in the  1990s for almost all LACs listed in Table 10.3, 
w ith the  exception of Costa Rica and Mexico, whose exports increased 
m uch above the regional average. This trend was reversed in the late 1990s, 
as a new  crisis h it Latin America. Exports to  o ther developing econom ies 
rem ained m odest, w ith the exception of O ther Asia where com m odity sup­
pliers such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru increased their shares as the 
Chinese econom y boom ed.
Sources of export growth: Supply-related responses8
Export grow th can be driven by im proved com petitiveness resulting from 
better dom estic policies. Dissatisfaction w ith the perform ance of Latin 
American econom ies has prom pted  a quest for successful na tional experi­
7According to the WTO, the shares of clothing exports in total exports in
El Salvador, the Dom inican Republic, and Honduras were, in 2003, 62.6 percent,
51.4, percent and 38.3 percent, respectively (WTO, 2004, p. 156).
^ h is  section is mostly taken from Abreu (2005c).
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ences elsewhere, from which lessons could be extracted. The quest for para­
digms of growth experiences, however, m ust take in to  account specificities 
b o th  of econom ies selected as exam ples of fast grow th and those th a t are 
seeking lessons tha t can serve to formulate more successful policies. Among 
those more relevant are: size of population and area, location in relation to 
m ajor m arkets, conditions of access to  those m arkets (FTAs), "cultural" 
factors (language, size of diaspora), factor endow m ents, savings ratios.
There are a few stylized facts w hich are com m on to  successful Asian 
econom ies and are no t often found in  Latin America. Gross fixed capital 
form ation in Asia has often been quite high. In 1990-2003 it was very high 
in  C hina (39 percent), around 29 percent in  m ost o ther Asian econom ies -  
Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and Hong Kong -  and lower in India 
(23.1 percent) and Indonesia (21.9 percent), com pared to  the  low 20 per­
cent in Latin America. In Chile, it peaked at 23-26 percent in 1992-98. 
G row th in these h igh-perform ing econom ies has also relied on high rates 
of to tal factor productiv ity  grow th, w hich in tu rn  depended on openness 
and /o r the  w eight of m anufactured  exports in  to tal exports. All these 
econom ies have substantially  expanded the ir export/G D P ratios since the 
1960s. It is now 56 percent even in Vietnam, contrasting w ith an average of 
21 percent in Latin America. FDI to  GDP ratios have been very high only in 
Hong Kong and Singapore, and  to  a lesser ex ten t in Malaysia in the  early 
1990s. It was no t above 3-5 percent in  the o ther Asian economies. In Latin 
America it peaked at 5 percent in m idst of the  big privatization spurt, bu t it 
is back to  3 percent. The share of m anufactures in total exports in the Asian 
paradigm  econom ies is above 80 percent in  m ost cases, higher th an  in 
Latin America, even allowing for the  different resource-endow m ent bases. 
Research and developm ent expenditures were and  still are relatively high 
only in Korea -  around 3 percent of GDP -  com pared to  peaks in Latin 
America, in Chile and Brazil never above 1 percent. The role of the Chinese 
diaspora has been crucial to  the  w idespread success of grow th histories in 
m ost Asian econom ies. H ong Kong and  Singapore, m oreover, had the 
advantage of being English-speaking.
Asian econom ies have used a panoply  of industrial policy instrum ents.9 
Some are now  banned  by upgraded m ultilateral disciplines or m ade dif­
ficult to  use as global trade liberalization has been gaining ground. They 
have included subsidized credit targeting exporters, h igh pro tection  of 
dom estic m arkets and tax incentives to  FDI cond itional on  export per­
formance. An im portan t aspect of the  Asian success history has been open­
ness to  foreign technology in  its several aspects: im ports of capital goods; 
a ttraction  of export-oriented  FDI or active technology licensing (in  m ost 
success histories); active technological policies concerning licensing, transfer
’This paragraph relies on World Bank (1993).
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of non-proprietary technology, enhancing the role of returning nationals and 
the developm ent of dom estic research.
The Korean exam ple is of great in terest because the  governm ent played 
such an im portan t role in selecting sectors as targets for its policies. And 
also, because Korea took off in terms of sustained high growth while Brazil, 
its often m entioned counterpart in Latin America, at least in the beginning 
of the  period, practically ceased to  grow after 1980. Brazil failed in its 
a ttem pt to  cope w ith acceleration of inflation and a m ajor balance of pay­
m ents crisis in the  late 1970s, and faced recurrent m acroeconom ic crises 
betw een 1980 and 2002. Most of the  Korean-type m icroeconom ic policies 
have been tried and the very active export subsidization policy in the 1970s 
and 1980s did no t result in  the  em ergence of m any com petitive exporters, 
in  spite of em blem atic exceptions such as Embraer. Industrial policies in 
Brazil tended to involve m ore or less perm anen t subsidization rather th an  
Korean-type histories of success of firms simply taking off.10
Export growth can also result from increased dem and. This can take the 
form of either very high rates of dem and growth in specific markets because 
of high growth of GDP, or increased market access in markets previously 
highly protected. The latter will be considered in the next section. The first 
case has been exemplified by China, but has also been relevant in the past to 
explain im port dem and of other high-growth Asian markets. W hat makes 
China im portant is the size of its econom y coupled w ith its backwardness 
w hen compared to  o ther economies in Asia whose GDP per capita levels 
increased at high rates in earlier periods, but lower than  China's.
It is unlikely th a t Latin America will play a significant role as supplier of 
m anufactures to  C hina. And com petition  from Chinese products in  th ird  
m arkets is a very concrete m enace to  Latin American exports. M uch of the  
im pact of Chinese com petition is likely to hu rt Latin American suppliers of 
clo thing products located in  the  vicinity  of the United States market, such 
as Mexico and m ost Central American econom ies.11 But Mexico especially, 
could also be hurt by Chinese com petition in traditional export markets of 
o ther types of m anufactures. The picture is different for Latin American 
com m odity  exports. For some sem i-m anufactures, m arkets can be tem ­
porarily in disequilibrium  as dom estic dem and surges outstrip  dom estic 
supply, generating an im port surge. In this latter case, given time, domestic 
productive capacity can be increased, im ports reduced and the country 
becom e an exporter ra ther th an  an im porter of the  relevant processed 
product. This has been the  case of steel im ports in C hina w hich have 
surged until quite  recently, bu t have rapidly declined as dom estic produc­
10See Moreira (1995) for a com prehensive com parison of Korean and Brazilian indus­
trial policies.
"As show n in  Inter-American Development Bank (2005), especially C hapter 5.
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tive capacity started to  come in to  production. The long-term  behaviour of 
im ports of com m odities whose dom estic supply is constrained by resource 
endow m ent -  iron ore, soya, and copper -  is likely to  be different. C on­
vergence of Chinese per capita consum ption levels to  those of more m ature 
econom ies in Asia is the crucial elem ent to  explain the  expansion of 
Chinese im port dem and of com m odities and processed products such as 
iron ore, copper, soybeans, and  soy oil.12
Sources of export growth: Improved market access
The interests of Latin American economies as demandeurs of trade liberaliza­
tion  are rather heterogeneous. Exports of ores and fuels are really no t 
affected by obstacles to  m arket access. These obstacles are very relevant in 
markets of agricultural products, mostly, but far from exclusively, in devel­
oped economies. They may take the form of extrem ely high tariffs or tariff 
quotas. Tariff escalation is also relevant, especially affecting tropical p rod­
ucts. For m any tem perate agricultural products, dom estic support policies 
and export subsidies adopted by developed econom ies contribute to  lower 
world prices of food products -  sugar, beef, pork, poultry, soybeans, dairy 
products -  and also tobacco and  agricultural raw m aterials as cotton . As 
agricultural p rotection and subsidization are progressively dism antled, 
sanitary and  environm ental standards will tend  to  be increasingly used as 
protection in the  last resort.
A particularly perverse feature of agricultural protectionism  in the  Euro­
pean U nion (EU) is th a t it creates vested interests in Asian Caribbean 
Pacific (ACP) econom ies in  favor of the  status quo as they  have preferential 
access to  the  EU m arket as, for example, in the case of bananas and sugar. 
There are conflicting interests on the  issue between the  Caribbean produc­
ers and those in C entral and  South America. For sugar, ACP preferences 
serve as justification for heavily subsidized European exports. Efficient food 
producers -  in  Latin America notably  MERCOSUR -  w ould greatly benefit 
from trade liberalization and higher export prices for food products. 
Some net food im porters in  Latin America may be unfavorably affected by 
higher im port prices, and thus be no t enthusiastic about agricultural trade 
liberalization.13
Latin American exports of m anufactures face relatively high tariffs in 
developing econom ies. In developed econom ies tariffs are generally low, 
bu t discretionary protection, especially an tidum ping , is very significant, 
affecting products such as iron and  steel th a t com pete w ith  structurally
12See Abreu (2005a). C hina's per capita consum ption  of soy oil, for example, is still 
only 40 percent of Korea's.
13See Ingco and Nash (2004), Chapters 1 and 7, and Laird (2002).
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inefficient dom estic producers in  m ature econom ies. Exports of high- 
technology industrial goods, such as electronic com ponents and regional 
jets, face no significant obstacles to  enter m arkets of either developed or 
developing economies.
The end of the  M ultifibre A rrangem ent (MFA) and C hina 's accession to 
the  WTO are likely to  have im portan t consequences on Latin American 
exports of clothing. The end of MFA inertially-defined quotas in developed 
econom ies unfreezed constrain ts to  the  substitu tion  of trad itional less- 
efficient suppliers by new m ore efficient entrants, such as C hina. In the 
longer term, it is likely tha t these developm ents will deeply affect exporters 
in  Mexico and  Central America. M argins of preference resulting from 
regional agreem ents are unlikely to  be sufficient to com pensate the  very 
significant difference in  production  costs. C hina 's com petition  is likely to  
be also relevant in displacing o ther Latin American m anufactured exports 
from third markets, including those in Latin America, but this is unlikely to 
be as im portant as the case of clothing, at least in the  im m ediate fu ture.14
Developed econom ies are demandeurs in  relation to  two sets of issues in 
Latin America. The first set of issues relate to  m arket access. Market access 
for goods is relevant since th e  W TO-bound rate in m ost Latin American 
econom ies is 35 percent, bu t average MFN applied rates are around 13 per­
cent, even in  the  m ore protectionist econom ies as MERCOSUR. There are, 
however, m any applied tariffs above 15 percent and some even reaching 
35 percent on products w hich are of in terest for the developed econom ies 
as demandeurs: electronic products, electric and  transport equipm ent. 
Market access for services is m uch more lim ited and m uch of it still depen­
den t on discretionary decisions. M any of the  dem ands by developed 
econom ies are in  fact for a transform ation  of de facto in to  de jure m arket 
access.
The o ther set of issues is essentially on rules, and encom passes nego tia­
tions in  relation to  w hich there is m uch m ore reluctance by developing 
economies to make concessions: intellectual property, public procurem ent, 
labour and environm ental standards, and com petition. Size of an econom y 
as measured by GDP, as opposed to  market size as m easured by trade flows, 
is particularly  im portan t here, since often w hat is at stake is access to the  
domestic market as a whole. The more active an economy has been in seeking 
preferential trade agreements w ith significant trading partners -  w hich are 
likely often to be large developed economies -  the less reluctant they will 
be, ceteris paribus, both  to  open their domestic markets and to agree to con­
cessions on rules. The largest a given economy, the more comprehensive,
14See Part IV of Inter-American Development Bank (2005) for a com prehensive treat­
m ent of the im pact of Chinese exports on Latin American exporters of clothing, and 
C hapter 5 for com petition in third markets.
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ceteris paribus, will be the range of industrial products which may be hurt by 
increased com petition from imports entailed by trade liberalization.
Since NAFTA, Latin American econom ies -  frequently as part of an exist­
ing FTA or "com m on m arket" -  have been involved in  a large num ber of 
bilateral trade negotiations w ith trade partners -  also in  m any cases FTAs 
or "com m on m arkets" -  w ith in  and outside th e  hem isphere. In term s of 
affected trade, the  m ost im portan t negotiations have been betw een the  
United States and m any FTAs and econom ies in  Latin America. Nego­
tiations w hich have been concluded have included neither the  m ore sen­
sitive agricultural sectors in  U nited States, no r an tidum ping . In varying 
degrees, LACs have accepted strengthened disciplines in relation to services 
and the rule-related other issues: intellectual property, public procurem ent, 
labor and env ironm ental standards, and  com petition . In fact, w ith  the  
im portan t exception of sugar in Central America, the United States was in 
general in a com fortable position  as a relatively efficient producer of agri­
cultural products com pared to  m ost of non-MERCOSUR Latin America 
(especially if agricultural subsidies are no t taken in to  account).
MERCOSUR itself faces, even if as a mere FTA, m any problem s whose 
analysis is outside the scope of this chapter. The persistence of the  issue of 
autom atic safeguards to cope w ith  real or alleged im port surges, coupled 
w ith the  inability to devise equitable policies w hich could level the playing 
field am ong its m em ber states, does no t bid well for the  future. This has 
had, of course, a significant im pact on the  likelihood of reaching favorable 
results in the  negotiations w ith the European U nion, the  m ain exam ple of 
ongoing negotiation  of a Latin American FTA w ith partners outside the 
hemisphere. The obstacles have been, as expected, the  difficulties in extract­
ing concessions from the  European U nion on agriculture. Reciprocally, 
MERCOSUR has also proved obdurate in its refusal to  im prove on  earlier 
com m itm ents on protection on industrial goods, services, and rules-related 
issues. The indefin ition  of the  Doha Round is no t easy to  circum vent, as it 
is difficult to  have a clear idea of w hat could be the  liberalization package 
finally reached m ultilaterally. The very lim ited results of the  Hong Kong 
m eeting of December have m ade this difficulty very explicit. A similar 
difficulty is faced in the FTAA negotiations. M any th ink  tha t negotiations of 
MERCOSUR b o th  w ith the European U nion and the  U nited States, in the 
FTAA context, will have to  wait for the Doha results, especially on  agricul­
tural subsidies and antidum ping. If so, the  whole tim etable of negotiations 
is likely to be postponed, as m eaningful results in  the  Doha round are 
proving to be elusive.
It should no t have come as a surprise th a t the  FTAA negotiations have 
been stalled after the decision to have a two-tier process was reached. This 
architecture is to  include a rather loose core of universally agreed weak dis­
ciplines and lim ited m arket access concessions, com plem ented by more 
exacting agreem ents covering access and rules agreed only by subsets of
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future m em bers. This weak hybrid structure agreed in  Miami, reflects 
m ainly obstacles in  MERCOSUR and the U nited States. On the  one hand , 
MERCOSUR's reluctance to  accept bo th  a deep opening up of their m arket 
for m anufactures and  m any of the  US-sponsored dem ands on rule-related 
issues. On the  o ther, it reflects the  U nited States refusal to  deal w ith agri­
cultural subsidies and  an tidum ping , and the  m arked reluctance to  scratch 
agricultural protection. The geography of p ro tection  in  the  United States 
and Brazil indeed suggests th a t negotiations envisaging a scenario of com ­
prehensive liberalization of trade in goods would face very significant polit­
ical obstacles in  b o th  econom ies. Their rem oval would require a decisive 
com m itm ent from bo th  sides, w hich is really difficult to  see as likely.15
M ultilateral negotiations in the  Doha Round are badly behind schedule, 
as show n by th e  M inisterial m eeting  at Hong Kong. There are m any 
difficulties to  face, in  particular, those related to  the balance betw een agri­
cultural concessions from the  developed econom ies and im proved m arket 
access concessions for industria l goods to  be m ade by the  developing 
economies.
Conclusions: Domestic policies and improved market access16
It is im portan t to  recognize th a t m acroeconom ic stability, in general, has 
preceded the histories of growth success propped by specific industrial pol­
icies. Only in rare cases has there been significant and sustained grow th 
w ithou t a substantial im provem ent of the  previous record of investm ent 
and capacity of saving. This autom atically raises issues related to the cost of 
investm ent, w hich affects the costs of both  capital goods and construction, 
and also their quality. M icroeconomic policies should target cost and qual­
ity to  ensure th a t investm ent is cost-effective, th a t is, th a t addition to pro­
ductive capacity is m axim ized given an investm ent ratio. A nother related 
issue is also a grey area betw een macro- and micro-policies: th e  lower the
15See Abreu (2004a) for the political econom y of the FTAA. See, for the regional 
im pact of the FTAA o n  Brazil and the US, Abreu (2005b), w here protection ist in te r­
ests are show n to be concentrated in Brazil in the States of Sao Paulo and Amazonas. 
M ajor net interests against trade liberalization of Brazilian im ports in to  th e  US are 
located in  the States in th e  no rthern  part of the  M ountain Division in the W est 
(Idaho, M ontana, W yoming, the Dakotas, Nebraska and Iowa), some States in the 
South (Arkansas, Alabama and Mississippi), Maine and W est Virginia. For tariff pro­
tection, AD protection and agricultural support the States w ith more "protectionist" 
congressional districts are Pennsylvania (11 CDs), Georgia (9), N orth  Carolina and 
Texas (8), Ohio (7), Florida and Illinois (6), California, Iowa and Virginia (5), Alabama, 
Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana and M ichigan (4) and Indiana (3).
16Most of the conclusions on  domestic policies come from Abreu (2005c).
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variance of an econom y's rate of growth, the  lower the  probability  th a t 
investm ent plans will be affected by the  econom ic cycle. Fluctuations in 
the rate of growth badly affect governm ent's savings and its level of expen­
diture, as they  generate revenue shortfalls. Projected rates of re tu rn  are 
adversely affected as the conclusion of in tended  plants or infrastructure is 
delayed. This also affects private investm ent.
A good starting  po in t w hen considering industrial policies is the  recog­
n ition  th a t in ternational constraints, certainly for the  m ore m ature devel­
oping economies, prevent the use of instrum ents which have been effective 
in the  past: preferential access to foreign exchange cover, subsidized credit, 
national con ten t rules, export perform ance criteria. It is unlikely th a t the 
Uruguay Round decisions in relation to such "productive policies" -  in  par­
ticular, those on  export perform ance criteria -  could be reversed w ithou t 
ra ther expensive quid pro quo concessions by the  m ain developing eco­
nomies. For these, a m eaningful developm ent round is likely to hinge more 
on im proved m arket access than  on special and differential treatm ent. This 
naturally  brings the  focus o n to  policies th a t target m arket failures and are 
covered by WTO rules on non-actionable  subsidies related to  science and 
technology, aspects of regional disparities, and environm ent-related  pro­
jects. On the o ther hand, since horizontal policies are non-specific, there is 
a strong argum ent for their defense, as there are no subsidies th a t can be 
targeted by dissatisfied trade partners.
There is scope for deeper horizontal structural reforms in  alm ost every 
econom y in Latin America, as for instance, furthering the  creation of a 
strong long-term  capital m arket. Some horizontal policies may lack focus 
and give room  for merely disguising expenditures w hich are unrelated to 
science and technology developm ent. But they  avoid difficulties related 
to  specificity th a t characterize vertical policies, even w hen they are targeted 
to  address m arket failures. There is scope for policies a t the  interm ediate 
level of aggregation betw een horizontal policies and vertical policies 
(which restrict the ir targets to  firms in specific sectors or regions). There 
is m uch to  be said in favor of a coord ination  of the  several layers of 
in terven tion  prom pted by m arket failures, som ething w hich does no t 
often happen. O pportunities created by WTO rules th a t allow regional 
subsidies should be used perhaps th rough  a com bination  of science and 
technology and  regional tax expenditures and vertical industrial policies. 
In spite of all well know n difficulties involved in  gathering the required 
inform ation, vertical policies addressed to the  im provem ent of distortions 
related to  m arket failures still may have an im portan t role in a com pre­
hensive fram ework of industrial policies. In Brazil, such vertical policies 
have been applied in the  past, taking in to  account a rational set of criteria 
targeting the  risk entailed by specific projects, the  im portance of ne t exter­
nalities created, the ability of benefited firms to  appropriate the  results 
of the ir projects and the geographical location of projects in depressed
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areas. The record of success is no t good even if there are some success 
stories.
The im plem entation  of a m eaningful package of such "industrial po l­
icies" requires political com m itm ent at the  highest level on  the b lueprint of 
such a set of policies. It is im portan t tha t governm ents open a com prehen­
sive debate on industrial policies and are able to  w in political support for 
rational policies. It is in th is env ironm ent th a t "self discovery" should 
ideally take place involving full m obilization of science and technology 
institu tions: governm ent departm ents, academies of sciences, research 
institu tions, universities, certification agencies, organizations of en tre ­
preneurs and firms.
The im plem enta tion  of a package of horizon tal and vertical industrial 
policies will also require an overhaul of obsolescent governm ent in sti­
tu tions. It is im portan t to  transform  purely financial agencies in to  tech ­
nological and scientific agencies w ith  a h igh level of com petence in th e  
evaluation of technological alternatives, able to identify and mobilize state 
of the  art technologies on a global basis, to  gather m eaningful m arket 
inform ation, and undertake effective technological brokerage th a t will 
im prove access of national industry  to  technologies adapted to  the ir 
specificities.17 It is also essential th a t robust evaluation m achinery is put in 
place w ith the  participation  of acknowledged specialists recruited on a 
worldwide basis following transparen t procedures. The objective would be 
to evaluate the  results of previous efforts and offer a feedback th a t con­
tributes to  im prove the "aim " of policy-makers in the  selection of w hich 
m arket failures to  target in  the  future. These vertical policies aim ed at 
m arket failures still involve picking w inners, bu t they are based on m uch 
m ore defensible criteria th an  the  traditional policies favoring rent-seeking 
sectors w ith political clout and w ithout any concern for market failure cor­
rection, w hich has been typical of m ost of Latin America in the past.
Past experience in m any econom ies indicates th a t effective trade liberal­
ization may be an im portan t catalyst for the in troduction  of revam ped 
dom estic policies. Success in  m ultilateral, regional and subregional nego­
tia tions on  m arket access, or deepening of such initiatives, is im portan t 
by itself due to  the  stim uli provided by increased exports and efficiency 
gains related to  further opening  up of dom estic m arkets. But it is also 
im portant, as the m obilization of private interests required by the form ula­
tion of negotiating agendas in trade negotiations may have as byproducts -  
no t necessarily less im portan t -  a reexam ination  of form er "industrial 
policies", the discussion of their overhaul and im provem ent in their 
im plem entation.
I7On the lines of TEKF.S, the main public funding organization in Finland. See Abreu 
(2005c).
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The likelihood of trade liberalization playing such a positive role in dif­
ferent Latin American econom ies varies significantly as the  prospects of 
success in the  conclusion of different negotiations are very different. Based 
on  past perform ance, one should  expect th a t the U nited States would be 
able to  com plete its program m e of negotiating  FTAs w ith  m ost of Latin 
America. The m ain exceptions w ould be where political aspects tend  to 
prevail, as in Cuba and Venezuela.
So there are good prospects of im proved market access playing a catalyst 
role for fu rther reform  and  com plem entary  policies in m any econom ies 
of Latin America w hich m ay help  them  to face the  m enace of enhanced 
com petition from exports of o ther developing economies, especially China. 
In the  m id-term , the  use of safeguards in  the  U nited States to  protect 
CAFTA and D om inican Republic c lo th ing  im ports by US-connected 
firms may extend the transition  period required by the  deep struc­
tural ad justm en t w hich is likely to  occur. On the  o ther hand, there  is no 
reason to doubt th a t the success histories of Chile and Costa Rica can con­
tinue. There is also some inertia  in  good decision-m aking on  econom ic 
policies.
In MERCOSUR, political difficulties m ay also play a role in  trade negotia­
tions, especially in the FTAA context, m ostly by defining polar stances on 
rule-related issues. But even in  m ore favorable political scenarios, there 
are im portan t substantive obstacles, as m entioned  earlier, to a significant 
im provem ent of access of agricultural products in  the  United States market 
w hich could be used politically by the  Brazilian governm ent to  justify its 
own concessions. The solution, or even reduction, of present frictions 
w ith in  MERCOSUR is som ething w hich depends crucially on the course 
of political developm ents bo th  in Argentina and Brazil. The same kind of 
political difficulties would probably affect the  EU-MERCOSUR negotiations 
unless MERCOSUR governm ents are really hard-pressed for results in order 
to show som ething concrete. In spite of th e  better Brazilian recent macro- 
econom ic perform ance in com parison w ith its recent past -  w ith low and 
declining inflation coexisting w ith m odest growth -  and the  relatively good 
performance of Argentina, there is a notorious lack of a catalyst to domestic 
reform  in the form at of a serious com m itm ent to further liberalize im ports 
coupled w ith new export opportunities.
But it is still m ore th an  likely th a t m ost developm ents in such partial 
negotiations hinge on w hat happens in the WTO. The only good th ing  
th a t can be said about the  present prospects of the  Doha Round is th a t the 
world trading system canno t face a further failure after the  stalem ate in 
C ancún and the  near failure at Hong Kong. There is going to be a lot of 
pressure on all quarters to  reach an  agreem ent. The problem , of course, is 
how  to make sure th a t a balanced agreem ent, including a significant effort 
to liberalize agricultural trade, is reached w ith in  the initial tim etable for the 
conclusion of the  Doha Round.
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